

PRS-UMA-89-001
1 JANUARY 1989



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
Military Affairs

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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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Yazov on Discipline, Problems of Draftees

18120037 Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English
No 218, 10 Nov 88 pp 1-4

[USSR Defence Minister General of the Army Dmitry Yazov replies to questions put to him by the Novosti Press Agency]

[Text] [Question] What has necessitated a resolution of the Party Central Committee on strengthening discipline in the Soviet Army and navy and the discussion of its fulfillment at a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee?

[Yazov] I wish first of all to draw the attention of foreign readers to this point. The development of the Armed Forces has always been in the focus of attention of our Party. The resolution of the CPSU Central Committee on strengthening discipline in the Army and Navy was taken at a time when, in line with the requirements of perestroika, every aspect of our country's life began to be assessed in a new and more exacting way, including all matters relating to military development, a major component of which is discipline, organization and order in the troops. The Armed Forces are a part and parcel of our society, live one and the same life with it, and, consequently, face the same problems of development.

Practical implementation of the CPSU Central Committee's resolution calls for determined efforts on the part of the USSR Defence Ministry, the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Soviet Navy, of all personnel in order to overcome the negative phenomena in army and navy life, particularly those that arose in the period of stagnation. Just as in the whole of society, so in the Armed Forces, there is an urgent need for decisive restructuring, whose main directions were outlined in the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee.

[Question] The Politburo meeting noted that instances of irregular relationships between personnel, facts of violation of combat duty rules, and break-ups of fighting equipment, cause serious concern. What do you think are the main causes of such things?

[Yazov] The causes are different. The main one is that we have been unable to make full use of available possibilities to ensure a strict and regular order in every unit and on every ship, an order that guarantees the smooth functioning of the entire military machinery and creates a healthy moral and psychological climate in the collective. It ought to be said frankly that there are still instances of violation of the daily routine, and that some commanders are insufficiently demanding to their subordinates and show little care about them.

Or take this problem: how close is the officer to a soldier or a sergeant? I do not refer to official contacts in line of duty—there is perhaps no dearth of them. Many of the commanders and political instructors spend their time in the barracks, as they say, from waking-up hours to lights

out. What they sometimes lack is the ability to "sound" the man, to see his needs, understand and take into account his interests and requirements, and to show real fatherly concern. In a number of instances there is a tendency to embellish things.

In other words, we must step up our efforts in tightening up the regulation order in units and on ships, and to increase command execution at all levels. A major task is to give priority to individual work with servicemen, to eradicate more decisively any formalism that may be found in the political and military training of personnel.

Greater openness in every sphere of army life, its democratization within the laws and basic military regulations will contribute to accomplishment of this task.

[Question] What are the main drawbacks, in your view, that exist in preparing young people of pre-conscription and call-up age for active military service?

[Yazov] On the whole, the army and the navy get good replacements. Youths fulfill their military duty in defending the socialist Fatherland with honor and dignity. But there are some problems. As you may know, in the army a young person is set higher requirements in many areas. Physical strains are greater, and the entire mode of life is more exacting. Unfortunately, not all are duly prepared for this.

First, there is a certain lack of moral and psychological preparation of some youths for army service, for overcoming difficulties and observing rules and regulations. Many join the ranks of the Armed Forces having a too "domestic" kind of toughness.

Second, there are facts when individual young people do not deeply enough grasp their honorary constitutional duty and personal responsibility for the defense of the country. Here, I think, there are certain defects of the patriotic education of young people.

And third, there is a need for better physical training of pre-conscription youths. It is no secret that some of them are not called up into the Armed Forces for reasons of health, while others, due to their poor physical condition, cannot endure high strains in the early period of service.

To be sure, not all problems have been mentioned here, but these are the main things on which to focus efforts in preparing young people for military service.

[Question] The USSR Defence Ministry and the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Soviet Navy have been recommended to take an additional set of measures to strengthen military discipline. What exactly is meant by this?

[Yazov] The main tasks and directions of strengthening the discipline in the army and navy were defined in the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee. The USSR Defence Ministry and the main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Soviet Navy have already mapped out and are carrying out a system of measures of an organizational and educational nature. The main line in the further tightening of military discipline is as before to ensure order in every unit and on every ship, in strict conformity with basic military regulations.

As for the additional measures, their principal tenor is determined by the implementation of perestroika requirements in the Armed Forces. This means the democratization of army life with strict observance of unity of command, greater openness and an increased role for public institutions.

Speaking concretely, it means the beginning of a comprehensive programme of training and retraining of officer corps in the system of military training colleges and in the process of service itself. Most attention is being paid to instilling in officers habits for work in conditions of greater openness and democratization. Party and political work is being changed. Relying on research done by military scientists, we have drawn up specific recommendations to improve the moral and ethical climate in army and naval collectives and to root out irregular relationships between servicemen. Party and Komsomol organizations are to have a decisive say here.

We continue to strengthen law and order. Everyone is being taught legal standards and norms. Work is being completed on new army regulations. A number of documents have been drawn up to raise considerably the rights and the role of officers' public opinion. Measures are also being taken to involve every soldier and seaman in the active life of their units and ships.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that big and responsible work lies ahead in fulfilling the Party's demands for perestroika in the Armed Forces, for a radical improvement of military discipline.

Col Gen Moiseyev Discusses 'Non-Regulation Relations'

18010285 Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian
No 9, May 88 pp 9-16

[Article by Col Gen M. Moiseyev, commander, Red Banner Far Eastern Military District: "Strengthening Discipline is a Daily Concern"]

[Text] Great and responsible tasks today face the district forces. And when one thinks about how to solve them, so that our combat readiness is at a level that guarantees a rebuff to any aggressor, one more and more often arrives at the thought that we can do and restructure much, if each party member, always, everywhere and fully, will

steadfastly follow the letter of the Party Charter. What is required of him today? He must be at the vanguard of the transformations, lead people, and be a model of selflessness in today's fundamentally changing, revolutionary time.

This is also directly related to solving one of the most important tasks, that has a most direct influence on the quality of training and of standing alert duty—the strengthening of military discipline. The times insistently demand that we resolutely do away with distortions and shortcomings in matters of maintaining organization and order in the forces, get rid of non-regulation relations, and overcome negative phenomena in the formation and establishment of military collectives. To speak specifically, today we do not need innumerable appeals for struggle to strengthen discipline, but practical waging of this battle, involvement in it of all communists, and the creation in party and military collectives of an environment of high responsibility and irreconcilability toward carelessness, slovenliness and negligence.

There are numerous units and large units in the district where in-person work with people has increased and directives have decreased in the activity of commanders, political workers and staff officers to establish exemplary order in classes and exercises, and in the process of standing alert duty by the subunits.

An example is the regiment where officer K. Rybnikov is serving. The communists took the party guidance to restructure attitudes toward discipline as a requirement to solve a complex of interrelated tasks at the same time. What does this look like in practice?

The commander regularly exchanges information about the state of discipline with party committee members, and presents analyses of the state of affairs in this area, and proposals to improve matters, at meetings of communists. Here each communist views the task of strengthening military discipline as a party assignment. All persons inclined toward violations of regulatory order are not only taken under control, but the commander, staff and political department officers, and party activists work with each of them personally. And of course, well-proven social forms and methods of struggling for exemplary order are also fully utilized. Say that violations of regulatory norms were committed in one of the subunits. The party bureau effectively and promptly hears the report of the CPSU members responsible for this sector, clarifies the reasons for the deviations from directives, calls the specific guilty persons strictly to account, and at the same time notes measures to eliminate shortcomings in the work of party activists and communists who do not display zeal in their service.

In short, the struggle for discipline in the unit is permeated with a spirit of party-mindedness, irreconcilability toward any violations, and persistence in implementing regulatory norms and traditions of comradeship and friendship among the troops. Owing to this, last year and

this year there have been no flagrant violations of discipline in the regiment, and the personnel are successfully fulfilling the military training tasks.

One could discuss a great deal the work of command and political cadres of other military collectives, aimed at strengthening discipline and order. Conscientious labor and good experience deserve attention and dissemination. But we must not avoid discussing that which especially troubles us today, and arouses the serious concern of us communist leaders in the district. I cite this fact. In the air defense missile unit where officer V. Kaznacheyev is serving, a scheduled party meeting was held. Seemingly, who if not the communists, who always most keenly sense their responsibility for the state of affairs in the collective, should have asked the natural question: Why did the majority of the subunits receive only satisfactory marks in the annual results? But they did not think about this. And, after all, no one will get it into his head to assert that it is all right to defend the air boundaries of the homeland at a "C" level. It is vitally important that everyone to whom a combat mission is entrusted accomplish it in an exemplary fashion. The communists spoke about everything, only not about their personal responsibility for the mediocre results, and about their blame for the mistakes and omissions. Such a position taken by communists indicates eloquently that restructuring of thinking and actions is still not being carried out everywhere with the necessary persistence and effectiveness. And it is necessary to acknowledge frankly that here and there the demands of the party remain unfulfilled, including even in the sphere of strengthening discipline on alert duty.

So, life today insistently dictates to us that it is necessary to rid ourselves decisively of the oversimplified, primitive approach to strengthening regulatory order, and to implement in practice the most important principles of true discipline: consciousness, responsibility, independence and initiative, and unity of will and collectivity. What is necessary for this, and in what directions, in my view, should the work of commanders, staffs, political workers, and party and komsomol organizations lead?

The service book of a Red Army soldier confirmed by V. I. Lenin discussed the sacred duty of a soldier always to be prepared to stand up to defend the interests of the workers. Let us recall that Vladimir Ilich openly and directly linked the birth of the Red Army, the army of a new type, with conscious socialist discipline.

The problem of firm discipline and order is also topical today. "Questions of strengthening order and discipline, as before, require party attention and support," notes CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev. "Without order and discipline we solve nothing... There are those who considered that we have already spoken enough about discipline, wondering how much we can mess around about it.

"This does not do. We have not yet seriously straightened out order and discipline. We will do so seriously only when every leader, and all the more so the party committee, really grasps the importance of these decisive factors of restructuring and of the functioning of our society in general."

Needless to say, in any matter, and all the more so in such an important one as strengthening discipline, it is necessary to have a clear impression of the whole "mechanism" of the process, and to know with what to begin, what are the stages, and who must act and how. Everything begins with the commander—the direct organizer of restructuring. He affirms the businesslike style of work that amounts most of all to personal, unconditional, unqualified industriousness. He implements control over the precise fulfillment of all the provisions of regulations, orders and directives, and takes needed measures to eliminate shortcomings and to root out phenomena alien to us. In this effort, naturally, he relies on the party and komsomol organizations.

In connection with this I will discuss the work of communist-leader L. Shevtsov. One can boldly assert that this is not only a competent, professionally trained officer, but also a propagandist of discipline by deed. His high personal standards, inner strength of purpose, and outward bearing affect people. Of such it is said that they have not a borrowed, but a truly most profound aspiration toward strictness, order and perfection. The first thing that this commander did upon taking over his position was to begin to strive persistently to get rid of indulgences and oversimplification in military training, and of poor performance discipline, and to see that each step of all specialists was strictly scheduled as it applied to the tasks being accomplished. Then he instituted regular study of regulations and documents regulating military training and service, and along with his deputies gave tests. Much began to be done to improve the incentive system, and to propagate the experience of leaders in socialist competition, soldiers who excel in training, and those who vigilantly stand alert duty. I would like to direct attention to this fact.

Being demanding would be named among the main qualities of this officer. Do we always understand what this art consists of? For Shevtsov it is found in the combining of exactingness with other methods of indoctrination: strict demands without abasement; sincerity without currying favor. I pose the matter in this way because practice shows that a significant portion of the violations of military discipline is committed due to the fact that commanders do not always ascribe importance to checking the fulfillment of the orders and instructions they have issued. It is not necessary to explain what this may result in in accomplishing a combat mission. Officer Shevtsov always establishes precise deadlines for fulfillment of his instructions; determines personal responsibility for the assigned job; and has taught himself to check punctually what has been fulfilled, by whom and how.

It is no accident that the officers work harmoniously and willingly in this collective, which influences creation of an atmosphere of general interest in order and organization. At this time they are confidently picking up speed here in military and political training, and the desire to meet worthily the 19th All-Union Party Conference is evident.

At the same time, speaking about the need for regulatory order in the process of military service, accomplishing military training tasks and standing alert duty, which is especially important, I believe that it is also necessary to keep this in mind. The demandingness of the commander and his personal industriousness are among the most important conditions for strengthening military discipline. Only we must also not forget this. What is the use, for example, in requiring of an officer outstanding fulfillment of some task or another, if the appropriate conditions have not been created for this; if the subjective factor of the training and indoctrination process does not rest on a stable material base? For discipline is a multifaceted concept. It includes the conduct of the soldier in formation, at lessons in class, and in the field, his attitude toward fulfilling his functional duties on the equipment, and the ability to use fully the capabilities of the most complex apparatuses. The commander also has the task of ensuring that each soldier handles skillfully the weapons entrusted to him. At the same time, it is no secret that not everywhere are they yet able to achieve this. At times equipment goes out of commission due to the low level of professional training of specialists. What can be the frame of mind of the people who arrive, say, for the next shift? In such a situation the most varied violations are committed, fraught with unanticipated consequences.

How can this be avoided? I will cite as an example the unit in which officer V. Kovalets is serving. They had to solve a complex problem under conditions of remoteness and discrepancies in supply, and moreover not slackening their concern about raising the class qualifications of specialists and the organization of competition. But, the specific task was posed: everyone turned his attention to the equipment. It is necessary to give their due to the commander, and to officers V. Zadorozhnyy, V. Semenov and V. Samsonov. They decided to create their own repair and adjustment base, and to uncover capable people, and they inspired them with their ideas. Here, needless to say, the personal example and authority of the unit commander, a strong-willed and capable organizer, decided much. Although you can imagine all the difficulty of implementing the plan in an atmosphere of chronic shortage of spare parts. But, the commander was not alone; people followed him. He was able to define the goal precisely and prompt his subordinates, and to help them solve the problem. And today this collective does not know troubles with equipment. It is all "passed" through the repair and technology chain, and functions flawlessly. And for emergencies, mobile operations teams are always ready. The efficiently organized service process has a positive influence on the soldiers, fostering

in them smartness in appearance, inner strength of purpose, and responsibility for each step they take. And this results in high combat readiness and vigilance in standing alert duty.

Restructuring in the struggle to strengthen military discipline is the concern of each officer and communist. This is the leading idea of all present work in this direction. New approaches and non-standard forms are required. And here I would like to direct attention to this. Military service and alert duty are particular not only in the methods by which tasks are solved. At action stations, in crews, at command posts and in teams, people are required to associate with one another constantly and for a long time, and they experience strong moral and psychological tension. And, if we speak about the impermissibility of crude administrative pressure on the part of commanders, and the fallaciousness of a style of pep talks and dressings down as the "universal" method of indoctrination, all of this is most intolerable precisely in the place where people carry out their service. Spiritual comfort—that is what I would call the atmosphere that it is necessary to create here. Success, experience shows, can be achieved only when the commander has a firm support in the person of the political workers and party organization. It is they who are called upon to ensure, through the forms and methods inherent to party and political work, the authority of the commander's order, and to form in the people a conscious attitude toward military discipline. Yes, we have individual commanders who are afraid to get their hands dirty, and some who are boors. But, there are also many deputies for political affairs and secretaries of party committees and buros for whom even today the most difficult thing is to restructure, to work in the new way.

Not so long ago I had a difficult conversation with the commander of one of the units (I will not name him, since he was transferred to another district). He is a conscientious and hard-working man, and he frankly acknowledged that he did not sense any special active-ness on the part of his deputy for political affairs or party buro secretary. I do not wish to justify this communist leader. I think that he was not able to use fully the broad authority and powers granted to him. But, the party organization also cannot stand aside from the concerns of the collective, be passive, and act only according to instructions "from above." The 30 May 1987 CPSU Central Committee Politburo session underscored the need to raise decisively the level of combat readiness and discipline in the armed forces, and that of able troop control, and to ensure their constant ability to stop any infringements on the sovereignty of the Soviet state. And what other reminders are still needed, in order for the struggle to be developed everywhere to improve the microclimate in the military collectives, get rid of non-regulation relationships, and create such a situation at the launch, range, airfield and on alert duty, that no chance incident catches us unawares? But even today, at military soviet sessions, conferences and meetings of the

party aktiv, it is necessary to remind some commanders and political workers about continuing violations, omissions and mistakes.

The reasons involve inertia in the thinking of some communist leaders, and yes, properly speaking, also secretaries of party committees and buros, and a formalistic approach to solving the tasks on which combat readiness directly depends. Let us take the same analysis of military discipline. At times impermissible slowness is manifested, and the circumstances that interfere with the formation of a healthy moral and psychological climate in the collectives and affirmation of regulatory order are not analyzed thoroughly. Not studying the retarding phenomena, commanders, political workers and party activists do not work out the necessary measures for improving the state of affairs on the ground. Some of them even hush up, even such instances, rare but fraught with undesirable consequences, as prolonged absence without leave, non-regulation relations, negligence and carelessness. We cannot, of course, reconcile ourselves to this.

In particular, serious reproaches were repeatedly expressed toward communist leader O. Basistyy, for his unwillingness to involve himself fully in matters of strengthening military discipline. He was heard at a military soviet session, and in the district political directorate. However, he did not draw the necessary conclusions for himself, and most importantly, for improving the situation in the military collectives. It was necessary for the party commission at the political directorate to examine his personnel file. Needless to say, punishment is an extreme measure for inculcating responsibility in communist leaders for their contribution to improving the level of discipline and organization. The district military soviet, staff and political directorate are developing and introducing a systematic approach in this important direction. Its main elements are study, generalization and dissemination of leading experience, and making demands upon every general and officer for the state of affairs in the units under their jurisdiction. Today their activity is being evaluated not according to the number of their visits to the troop units, but according to the state of discipline and level of combat readiness there.

Successful accomplishment of the tasks advanced by the times of strengthening military discipline depends on the ability of commanders, staffs, political organs and party organizations to escape from the gravitational field of inertia. It is necessary to renew the style of work and increase attention toward people. Life dictates insistently: vital, concrete work with the soldiers is needed. This is explained by a number of circumstances. First of all by the multinational composition of the military collectives. How can they be united into a single military family? It must also be taken into account that recently many youths, infected by vulgar, consumer-oriented psychology, and moreover spoiled by parental affection and family privileges, enter the army (let us call things by

their names) with a reduced sense of civic responsibility. Such people, stumbling up against difficulties for the first time, immediately shirk them and embark upon violations. This, I believe, is the locus of the most extensive field of activity of commanders, political organs and party organizations. It is more than obvious that in first priority they must concern themselves about creating conditions of service, training and living of the personnel, under which even the prerequisites for disciplinary violations are excluded. That is, the barracks must replace their home, and their commanders and coworkers their parents and relatives.

However, it has been noted that the more we talk about closeness to people, the less some communist leaders concern themselves about them. Here is an example. The leader of a political class is speaking convincingly, even with pathos, about the noble duty of the soldier, while the students are huddled up against the cold and dreaming only about getting warm. Or take this fact. On alert duty the soldiers of one subunit must always turn on various heaters, including homemade ones, because the command did not concern itself about the necessary preparation for winter. Is it really necessary especially to create extreme circumstances, in order for our people to display their best qualities? It is already time, I think, for all to understand that if living conditions have been properly set up things will go well, and if they have been forgotten unpleasantness can be expected.

This axiom has already long been understood in the unit commanded until recently by Lt Col A. Gnezdilov. Here one day they started thinking: Why are we not succeeding in getting rid of negative phenomena? Considerable efforts had been made, but the number of disciplinary violations was not declining. There were a particularly large number of them in separate subunits, where the people were accomplishing missions independently. A searching analysis, based not only on existing information, but also on confidential conversations with the personnel, led to an unexpected conclusion. On the one hand, the prestige of military service had sharply fallen in the eyes of the officers. He who worked at half strength felt best (those who excelled were not noted or distinguished). On the other hand, there was no concern about the families of the servicemen, not to mention the living conditions of the personnel. Then the commander, political officer and party buro secretary brought the question to a meeting of the headquarters communists. They found in themselves the courage to acknowledge that the unit had lost sight of a sphere that largely determines high discipline and combat readiness. At the same time the assembled commanders and activists were reproached for lack of initiative, independence of thought and vigilance. The following fact, a very typical one, was brought up at that meeting. The personnel of Lt A. Pagels' platoon regularly stand alert duty. However, virtually no attention is paid to it. Unit headquarters officials know that the people are not sufficiently provided with everything, that their apparatuses and facilities require repair, and that cable and spare parts are

needed, but forgot the way to the subunit. How can initiative and diligence be expected of people here? Violations arise where disorder, uncertainty and a lack of community and material support exist.

Thus, the problem of closeness to people appeared before the communists in all of its bareness and sharpness. But, I want to say something else. Distinctly understanding the difficulties, the commander, political officer and communists of the subunits did not shirk them. First, through the efforts of the activists, a get-together was held to honor those who excelled. Then, a lane appeared dedicated to them, and then stands about the best officers and warrant officers. They approached solving the cadre problem in a principled way. Those who deserved it received promotion or incentive awards, and some idlers and windbags were even "shown the door," as the saying goes. At the same time they began to improve living conditions. It was necessary to deliver many of the materials themselves, displaying under conditions of remoteness and our universal shortages, managerial ability and enterprise. But, the matter was completed. And it is not enough to say that warmth and comfort appeared in the barracks, and that the food in the soldier's mess hall significantly improved. Today the unit has more unit welfare farming in the cow shed, pigsty, rabbit-hutch and greenhouses. An orchard with over 200 trees has been established. In parallel with the work they also engaged in uniting the military collectives. After all, only subunits united by unity of purpose and common interests can successfully conduct training and vigilantly stand alert duty. The collective where Maj Yu. Stepchenkov is political officer placed study of the personnel on a new qualitative foundation: with the help of questionnaires, surveys and tests. A linguaphone class for study of Russian was created for soldiers called up from Central Asia and the Transcaucasus.

But, needless to say, closeness to people was accomplished not only by this. The practice of departures to distant "points" was reexamined. They became comprehensive and goal-oriented, and today all staff officers participate in them in turn. A political officer must go with each group. First the question is studied: What do the personnel of the subunit need, and what measures must be undertaken? Upon arriving on the site, the officers take an interest in the mood of the people and their spiritual needs. Films are shown, photographs are made, and in conclusion a traveling agitation team gives a concert.

Real, specific concern about people always has an effect. And here in this case the quality of military and political training notably improved. The personnel of the subunits headed by officers M. Dzhariashvili, A. Pagels and L. Kuzmenko live in a harmonious family, and confidently handle the tasks assigned to them.

I especially want to say something about the still existing non-regulation relations. They still have a strong effect, including in the process of carrying out service duties. How can they be eliminated? How, figuratively speaking, can

the air in the barracks be fully ventilated? The practice of other subunits that lag in discipline shows that even establishing good living conditions is not a panacea against every evil. This means that political workers and party and komsomol activists must have serious knowledge of psychology and pedagogy, in order to deal confidently with the particularities of the behavior of young people, and with the laws of the arising of microgroups, formal and informal leaders, and typical variants of interpersonal communication. Otherwise it is not possible to learn to anticipate, stop on time and ably solve arising conflicts. But it is a strange thing: discussion has been going on for years, and the situation remains the same. VUZ programs have not undergone serious changes toward improving the forms, methods and directions for the study of people, and little attention is being paid to this in the forces either. At times we approach the assessment of a unit's readiness using old measures. The equipment is operable, the people handle their weapons pretty well, and they operate well in exercises, and this means that all is in order. But, somehow, little attention is paid to the moral state of one or another officer or soldier, or how he might behave in an extreme situation. Yes, if we are to be entirely frank, at times we simply do not know. Therefore, sometimes the desire of a zealous chief to throw dust in people's eyes and color reality by a clean garrison and equipment painted as if on parade, alienates people. You cannot open another's heart thorough falseness and work done for "show."

From this is the task of the day. Communist leaders must not only master the art of handling forces and resources soundly, but they must also be able to influence people morally and politically. Here one cannot get by, naturally, without high erudition, inner culture, a thorough understanding of the problems and clear vision of the ways of solving them. This necessitates constant improvement in the training of military cadres. With all the burdens of his duties, it is necessary that systematically working on himself, and forming the most effective style of his activity, become the rule of each officer.

Some may object: Where is one to find time for this? We work from morning until night in the barracks, in class, on the artillery range. What is there to answer to this? One could say: Look what books you borrow in the library of your Officers' Home. Are there many works among them by Makarenko, Sukhomlinskiy, and our military psychologists and pedagogs? But better, I will cite the experience of many officers in the unit where communist leader A. Rukshin serves. Here the problems of military psychology and pedagogy are being studied both independently, and in the course of scientific and practical conferences, theoretical seminars and lectures, with experienced VUZ specialists invited. This is doing a lot, and I am not judging by heresay, since I often visit the military collectives of this famous unit.

Today's restructuring in the army and democratization, which presuppose decisive rejection of bald administration, closeness of leaders to the masses of military personnel, respect for the human worth of each soldier, and

concern about people, makes it necessary to activize officers' meetings, courts of honor of officers and warrant officers, and general meetings of military personnel in the struggle to strengthen military discipline. It is necessary to develop glasnost. The importance of all this is indicated, in particular, by the experience of the work of the commander and party and komsomol organizations in "N" unit. I will cite but one example. Three barracks hooligans, privates V. Mitskin, A. Kholikov and Yu. Krasilnikov, who had been quiet for a time, did not even succeed in raising their heads, when immediately the komsomol information mechanism that had been organized went into operation. First Private Yu. Abramov, a communist living in the barracks, actively came out against the group of three. He was supported by members of the komsomol buro. The commander, Maj V. Nikulin, Capt A. Varlamov and other party members immediately started to work on this case. They invited a military lawyer to a unit komsomol meeting where the conduct of the violators was examined. He proclaimed an official prosecutor's warning to Pvt Yu. Krasilnikov. And the incident was exhausted, as the saying goes. This military collective has long forgotten what non-regulation relations are.

We must overcome stagnation and decisively develop the struggle to strengthen military discipline. For this it is necessary to raise the responsibility of party members, having looked more thoroughly at the reasons for ineffective ideological and party organizational work, and to assess more exactly the activity of each communist at each place of work. We cannot keep in step with the times, or ensure the necessary progress toward our planned goals, unless we arm ourselves with the lessons of the 27th Party Congress, drawn from the errors of the past.

Specific deeds are needed in the work of communists to establish regulatory order and strengthen military discipline. For this, along with the old forms and methods that have recommended themselves well, new approaches are needed, and new views and assessments are required. And, most importantly, an understanding of the fact that firm military discipline is the foundation of high quality of the training and indoctrination process, and of constant combat readiness, must be confirmed in every military collective.

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New Veterans Benefits Reviewed

18010233 Moscow SOVETY NARODNYKH
DEPUTATOV in Russian No 8, Aug 88 (signed to press
22 Jul 88) pp 115-117

[Article by military lawyer N. Dyakov under the rubric
"The Law and Legality": "New Benefits for Veterans—
Consultation"]

[Text] The USSR Council of Ministers and the VTSPS
[All-Union Council of Trade Unions] adopted the decree

"Additional Measures for Improving the Living Conditions of War and Labor Veterans" on 12 May 88. The councils of ministers of the union and autonomous republics, ministries and departments, ispolkoms of the local soviets and the managers of enterprises and organizations, with the participation of trade-union organs and labor collectives, are charged with providing an individual apartment or house for war invalids, the families of servicemen who have perished and individuals equivalent to them who need it before the end of the current five-year plan (by 1991) as counted from 1 January 1988, and to determine the specific condensed time periods for improving the housing conditions of the remaining participants in the war and internationalist-soldiers in need of it. The procedure for allocating housing space to war and labor veterans will also be improved so as to satisfy more fully their requests for housing closer to the residences of relatives and family, as well as the replacement of living space on the upper floors of buildings without elevators to lower ones.

The USSR Ministry of Communications is charged with accelerating telephone installation in the apartments of war veterans and providing telephones for needy war invalids (at their request) before the end of the current five-year plan, and the remaining participants in war by no later than 1993.

The ispolkoms of the local soviets will carry out capital repairs on individual residential buildings belonging to war invalids, the families of servicemen who have perished and individuals equivalent to them under established procedure through the local budget (within the limits of up to a thousand rubles per single building).

The corresponding organs in the localities and the ministries and departments of the USSR have been assigned to eliminate the lag in the construction of boarding homes for the elderly and invalids in the shortest possible time, to place these boarding homes in places comfortable for living, and to provide for the more complete satisfaction of the needs of single war and labor veterans in special residential homes with social and cultural services and accommodations for labor activity. The monetary norms for food and medicine will be raised starting 1 January 1989 in boarding homes for the elderly and invalids, and the minimum monetary sum for personal expenses was raised to 10 rubles on 1 July 1988. If the size of the pension exceeds the cost of upkeep, the resident will be paid the difference between the pension and the cost of upkeep, but no less than 10 rubles. For war invalids and other individuals that have the right to larger pensions, the right to receive them in the amount of no less than 10 percent of the stipulated amount is preserved if it exceeds 10 rubles and the difference between the pension and the cost of upkeep in a boarding home.

Fundamentally new is the fact that individuals awarded orders and medals of the USSR for selfless labor and irreproachable military service in the rear during the

Great Patriotic War have been granted the following benefits and privileges:

- a 20-percent age supplement to the pension for continuous work service at a single enterprise, institution or organization with the presence of the essential uninterrupted and overall term of service will be paid to them regardless of whether they were working on 1 January 1983 or later (this date is cited in the USSR Supreme Soviet Ukaz of 30 June 1983 as one of the compulsory conditions for receiving this payment; now, as we see, it has been abolished for this category of individuals);
- the receipt of an interest-free loan for individual housing construction under the procedure stipulated for invalids from the Patriotic War;
- the receipt of an interest-free loan for acquiring or building gardening structures and outfitting garden plots;
- the use of regular yearly leave at a time convenient for them, as well as the receipt of additional time off without pay for up to two weeks a year;
- the use of polyclinics after retirement with which they were attached during work;
- the preferential right of entry into horticultural societies (cooperatives), the installation of telephones and the repair of apartments.

Retirees among those individuals receiving a pension of up to 80 rubles a month are also granted a 50-percent discount on the cost of medicines obtained according to a doctor's prescription.

The resolution of issues in the preferential provision of rear-services laborers with passes to sanatoria and rest homes and the establishment of benefits for them in paying for passes and authorizations obtained at the country's resorts, as well as services rendered by palaces and houses of culture of trade unions, is also projected.

The VTsSPS Presidium 26 April 1988 decree "The Further Development and Improvement of the Organization of Sanatorium and Resort Support, Tourism and Rest for Workers" stipulated that the participants in the war and internationalist soldiers that were wounded in the fulfillment of their military duty, as well as individuals decorated with medals and orders for selfless labor during the Great Patriotic War, that arrive at the country's resorts during the period from October through April inclusive will, in obtaining passes or comprehensive authorizations on the spot, pay 30 percent of the cost. The remaining 70 percent is paid to the resort soviet from social-insurance funds.

The trade-union committees have been granted the right to determine annually the quantity of passes for treatment and rest issued at the expense of social-insurance funds to veterans that were workers at the given enterprise, first and foremost invalids and participants in the Great Patriotic War and internationalist soldiers who received injuries in the fulfillment of their military duty, along with those who were decorated for selfless labor during the war years with orders and medals of the USSR and labor invalids.

The medals booklets or attestations of medals, in the presentation of the passport or other document certifying the individual, serve as documents confirming the right of rear workers decorated during the war years to the enumerated benefits and privileges. Awards in the postwar years for selfless labor or irreproachable military service in the rear during the Great Patriotic War can be confirmed by entries in the work booklets or references of archival institutions and other authorized organs. Analogous confirmation is essential with the loss of award documents as well. Certifications of the medal "Forty Years of Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945" with the inscription "Participant in the Labor Front" can also be taken into account.

All orders and the following medals of the USSR received for selfless labor and irreproachable service in the rear during the Great Patriotic War are taken into account in granting privileges: "For Valor," the Ushakov medal, "For Combat Merit," the Nakhimov medal, "For Labor Prowess," "For the Defense of Leningrad," "For the Defense of Moscow," "For the Defense of Odessa," "For the Defense of Sevastopol," "For the Defense of Stalingrad," "For the Defense of Kiev," "For the Defense of the Caucasus," "For the Defense of the Soviet Polar Regions," "For the Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45," "For the Victory over Japan" and "For Valorous Labor in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945."

Retirement certificates with the stamp of the retirement organ on the right to the given benefit is grounds for receiving a 50-percent discount from the cost of medicines prescribed by a doctor for retirees among those indicated workers in the rear receiving a pension of up to 80 rubles a month. A notation is made regarding this in the clinical cards of individuals with this right at preventive-treatment institutions.

For individuals who have received the right to a 20-percent age supplement to the pension for continuous work service at a single enterprise, institution or organization with the presence of the required duration of overall and uninterrupted labor service, a recalculation of the pension is performed with a regard for this supplement as of 1 Jul 88, including instances where additional documents are presented.

The task has been posed of implementing an extensive set of measures for further improving the life of invalids, war and labor veterans, retirees, the single elderly and citizens unable to work.

The USSR Ministry of Light Industry, the USSR State Agro-Industrial Complex, the USSR Ministry of Trade and Tsentsosoyuz [Central Union of Consumers' Societies] have been charged with developing and implementing in 1988-90 measures for increasing the production of inexpensive goods, products for dietary and treatment nourishment and for the broader provision of them to retirees and invalids, while the councils of ministers of the union and autonomous republics and the ispolkoms of the local soviets have been charged with improving the trade and domestic support of war and labor invalids and the families of servicemen who have perished, organizing progressive forms of support for invalids and retirees—specialized stores, departments, sections for the sale of clothing and shoes and ordering tables for provisions—and supporting single citizens unable to work and the elderly more widely at home.

The USSR Ministry of Health Care and the organs and institutions of health care in the localities are obliged to raise the quality and standard of medical assistance to invalids and the elderly, provide for their annual clinical examination, expand the network of specialized hospitals and develop benevolent services more widely.

The proposal of a number of social organizations on the need to expand home-visiting services to render medical and domestic assistance to the single elderly, parents unable to work and the widows of servicemen who have perished was supported.

Military's Place in Soviet Society Considered
18120029 Moscow XX CENTURY AND PEACE in
English No 9, 88 pp 18-28

[Roundtable discussion: "Army and Society"]

[Text] All the structures of the Soviet state and society are engaged in the movement of renewal. To what extent does this affect or should affect the masses of people engaged in the country's defence? What kind of perestroika does the army need? What is new in the relations between the army and society today? To review these questions, we invited professional military people and civilians, for the most part scientists, to participate in a roundtable discussion.

Taking part in the roundtable were officers from the Main Political Department of the Soviet Army and Navy and the Lenin Military-Political Academy: Major-General N. Chaldymov, Colonel Yu. Mamontov, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Kokorin, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Savinkin, Lieutenant-Colonel V. Sergeyev, Candidate of Science (Philosophy); Lieutenant-Colonel S. Yushenkov, Major M. Smagin, graduate; as well as Professor R. Bogdanov; A. Podberyetskin, senior researcher at the Institute of World Economics and International Relations; I. Malashenko, learned secretary of the Institute of the USA and Canada Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences; L. Saraskina, senior researcher at the Institute

of Artistic Education of the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences; A. Nuykin, deputy director of the Cinema Research Institute; A. Pankin, deputy editor-in-chief of the "Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn" magazine.

N. Chaldymov: While preparing for this discussion, I set before myself the following main problems: firstly, do we need an army? In answering this question, we'll have to speak about the sources of military danger. And secondly, if we need an army, then what kind of an army do we need?

So, is there a real source of military danger? Some people consider that in spite of the military moods prevalent in Western countries, no one there plans on fighting—they've had enough of it! I would not like to play the role of a booster of fear and tension, but we must be realists in evaluating the lineup of forces in the political arena of NATO countries. I don't want to belittle the significance and certain successes of the antiwar movement, but I would like to warn against excessive hastiness in the evaluation of its effectiveness.

It's impossible not to see that there are very influential forces in the West who continue to count on weapons in world politics and relations with socialist countries and consider such an approach to be correct. Today as before, military threat comes from the adventurist, militaristic policy of imperialist circles. The international policy of the West remains not fully realistic and constructive. And wars, regrettably, remain a social and political reality. I won't give any examples here—they are well known to everyone.

The heated present disputes over the essence of war in the nuclear age is quite understandable. This problem worries everyone and everyone tries to solve it—writers, poets, physicians, workers, collective farmers.... Everybody is against war and against those who can unleash it. This is fine, but, unfortunately, discussions more often than not remain on an emotional level.

In modern times, war ceases to be a reasonable means for achieving political goals. Our General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev speaks about this. Does this definition fully explain the essence of war? No. The appearance of an armed force capable of leading humankind to catastrophe has drastically changed the nature of war. However, if we because of this begin to completely reject the connection of war with politics, the "political genotype" of war—and this is the sense of Lenin's definition of the well-known formula of Clausewitz—then it will, to my mind, be difficult to solve the problem: what brings war about, and what is the reason for the incessant arms race? War cannot be prevented by rock music, poetry or philosophy. The only salvation is in political means, in politics. And really only in politics since war is its ugly child.

L. Saraskina: My participation in today's roundtable—with so many professional military people sitting here—I regard as a happy opportunity to ask the questions

troubling me and to receive answers to them. I fully understand that the army, as an unsociable body, mostly ignores the cries of the "mob" and looks very skeptically upon antiwar "amusements" of the non-official public. But it seems the time has come—long-awaited and blessed—when the theme "army and society" might become a topic of public discussion.

My questions are simple. Proceeding from the basic provisions of the USSR's new foreign policy course, we declare that we will never be the first to unleash a war, nuclear or conventional; nuclear war—in the event that there should be one—won't be a local but a worldwide one; there will not be nor can [there] be any winners.

So then, what war is our army preparing for? If nuclear then does it need such a huge (several million) corp of officers and soldiers? For what purpose is it stockpiling so many missiles and warheads, which will be enough to destroy everything living on Earth many times over? Does it need (by Western data—ours, alas, are not available) to be spending a quarter of its GNP? If the army task is to strengthen our defence, then I would like to know who is threatening us.

Who is the potential enemy whose image they're aiming at? Maybe the army as before adheres to the notorious thesis about the "enemy's encirclement," and considers everything is beyond our borders? The image-of-an-enemy-just-in-case, so to speak?

Frankly speaking, whenever I asked competent people about this I didn't receive clear answers giving an all embracing picture. To my mind, it is difficult for the army to enter into an honest and open dialogue with society because it is in deep moral discomfort, to say the least. Instead of striving for purification and improvement, it is defending itself against any criticism.

I. Malashenko: We must not think that security is the matter for the military alone and that the army is fully responsible for it. We are talking about security of the whole society, because society—military and civilian, professional and amateur—has the right to take part in an open democratic discussion about the methods and means of its safeguarding. Yes, "amateur" also: their common sense can understand and correctly assess any departmental point of view. I think that in respect to this problem the army demonstrates a hypertrophied sensitivity to criticism (today it still remains a "zone outside criticism") and even to the attempts to understand what it is doing. For this, we need to open military information at least on the scope that it is provided to participants in international talks, at which, by the way, participate not co-citizens but "potential opponents."

Today some of the military talk about misunderstanding and even ill will towards them from a part of our society, but they are also responsible for this: an active, serious

dialogue is needed, and the military hasn't displayed enough interest to participate in it up to now. But after all, this is our common interest.

A. Kokorin: I'm sure that no one in the army is against a discussion of the problems of army life. Everyone has the right to discuss them. And our roundtable confirms this. Nevertheless, people who know the army from the inside should not be given priority in such discussions. I cannot understand why we shouldn't lend an ear to the voice of the professional military, military scientists if we are going to take part in an honest, purposeful talk in seeking the truth. It is difficult for us, for example, to agree with such judgments as the military produces weapons, the military calls young people in the army, etc. I believe such formulae reflect a misunderstanding of army processes and the army itself. Its status is determined by society, and not by the army itself. The army does not produce weapons. Therefore such appeals as "Give us a new army," "Don't produce weapons," and so on, are naive at the very best.

A. Podberezkin: Really, prior to answering the question [about] what kind of army we want, we must decide [what] it's for, for what purposes? This is a key problem and, to my mind, we should begin with political categories. The nature of the threat cannot be investigated and estimated independently until we determine our own interests: what, in fact, do we need?

What kind of logic should we use here? First of all, we must find out what our state's interests are and how they are transformed into political aims. While doing this we must understand that interests and aims are historical categories. Our aims in 1964 differed from those of 1945; now we have different aims, too. Only when we determine aims, can we speak about the means for our achievement. And, of course, we have to take into account the fact that politicians and not the military are responsible, in the long run, for the formation of military doctrine. A very rigid demarcation should be used here. We must not dump everything into one heap. Some of us are trying to impose upon the military tasks that have never been and never will be their responsibility in any state.

A. Pankin: I'd like to support the way this problem is posed. More than that, I think that now it is difficult to give a definite answer to the nature of threat since our state is still in the process of the revaluation of our foreign-policy priorities. We have to put complex questions to ourselves during such a revaluation. How probable is a large-scale war? Must we be a guarantor of national-liberation movements or socialist transformations all over the world? What kind of relations with bordering countries (including socialist ones) are we interested in most of all: allied or based on the principles of neutrality and non-alignment?

These are only some of the questions, and a reply to them will influence what kind of actions the army should be prepared for.

I'd like to share my thoughts on some of them. Wars are waged for achieving ideological, political and economic aims. Are there now such aims and contradictions between the East and the West which the latter would like to solve by a massive nuclear strike or, say, by invading our territory from Europe? I don't think so.

Besides, it is sufficient to look at the ideological and psychological condition of Western societies to see that, in fact, no one there has a desire to wage large-scale wars. Let's remember that even the decision on the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe set a number of states in this region on the edge of political crises, while in the USA, the careless statements of the Reagan administration spurred a powerful peace movement (and this happened during the period of an "upsurge of conservative wave"!) which became one of the reasons for the transformations which later took place in the White House.

A. Kokorin: These are more than controversial questions. Let's look at the situation like this: does history remember a situation when a country or forces preparing for a war declared that they would attack a certain country, i.e., when they revealed a concrete address? This was never the case. Nevertheless, there were wars, i.e., history did not provide us with an opportunity to name a potential aggressor, but that, unfortunately, did not and does not abolish war. I think that pointing the finger at our present aggressor is in its essence an incorrect approach. Is there a real enemy? Can anyone say that it is the United States? No. It seems that we cannot. But the existence of such an enemy and the fact that there is a qualitative accumulation of weapons is a reality. And it is a reality that there are forces working for war. There are forces who, while speaking about new thinking, are clinging to SDI. Which of you sitting here rejects the fact of their existence?

A. Pankin: I realize that the development of modern military technology is continuing in a rather dangerous direction, and we can find in various Western military plans many points for worry. I'll even dare to say that this must not be regarded in a one-sided fashion. The arms race has its own logic. The West hints at our military preparations, and we at theirs. As a result, we have mutually induced processes which to a great extent have lost all contact with real political aims and tasks. But reality shows that in the economically developed world with its nuclear reactors, chemical plants, dependence on the most complex of life-support systems, and so on, there is no place for wars, and not only for nuclear but for conventional ones as well. At present, the nature of industrial societies combined with the destructive character of weapons excludes a large-scale war. Therefore, I do not worry that we, as some civil experts assert, can lose the technological arms race—to my mind, this doesn't matter.

I get the impression that both the West and the East—paradoxically—while fearing war, are preparing for it,

i.e., that by means of the arms race they are trying to prevent a war for which there are no reasons and which is impossible.

I. Malashenko: I'll just add that we often forget the fact that the threat to our security may be of a non-military nature, that it may be rooted in the unhealthy state of society itself, above all in the economy. Our security would be most negatively affected if we did not find the way out of economic stagnation. And if we fail to restructure the economy, we will again find ourselves in a similar situation.

We successfully demonstrated our ability to keep up with the leader in the arms race—the United States—but we paid a heavy price for it! Alas, we do not know the exact answer—glasnost still has to penetrate this sphere—but we know that the price was very high. It was so high that Washington even formulated a so-called "competitive strategy," the sense of which is to exhaust us economically by imposing an arms race in the most unfavourable for us, that is, expensive, directions. And only in answer to SDI do we say that this won't work.

That's why we must seriously think about what is the most dangerous for us and our interests today. Our primary interests lie in the fulfillment of perestroika and in socio-economic and political transformations in our society. The threat to perestroika is the main threat to our security. In other words, we cannot cope with many dangers to our security by military means.

R. Bogdanov: Nevertheless, the problem of the army is the key one in the system of security problems. I won't touch upon the "threat from the West" or the nuclear factor. I'll mention something else: on our southern borders there are several states obsessed with Messiah ideologies whose behaviour is unpredictable. They are able to deliver strikes to our territory to a depth of a hundred kilometres and more. That's a fact. This is a political reality. Who will stop them if they begin a war with the use of conventional weapons?

N. Chaldymov: We need an army for a guaranteed defence against a possible outside attack, for defence; this for me is, at least for the time being, a political axiom. But if we agree that in principle we do need an army, it's unlikely that someone will stand up for one that's weak, poorly prepared and unfit for action. As long as society admits that the armed forces are a necessity, it must support them correspondingly.

Another thing—what kind of an army we need is not an easy question. Similar questions set by perestroika in the economy, science and culture are also difficult. Of course, it would be wrong to think that perestroika must be carried out in all spheres while the army needs only minor reconstruction. Naturally, we do not need our

present army, which in practice has preserved its post-war structure. New conditions demand a thorough restructuring of the entire army structure. A modern army should be built on other principles.

It is very important to correctly determine the general concept of the Soviet Armed Forces reform. Do we need a mass regular army as before, should it be built on the principle of the militia, or should it perhaps be a regular-militia one? These problems can obviously become a theme for a discussion.

R. Bogdanov: I'm convinced a whole number of objective reasons shows that we need a professional army. The present level of technical equipment of the armed forces is so high that perhaps in five years only soldiers with engineering degrees will be able to serve. Professionals are needed, otherwise senseless material losses will be colossally high. A soldier spends two years learning how to break equipment and not how to use it effectively. We need a professional army. And its structure and strength will depend on the concrete threat involved.

A. Savinkin: I think it is incorrect to take the position of building a small professional army. First, such an army will be cut off from people, and second, it will be unable—even with the use of the threat of a nuclear retaliation—to defend our vast territories.

M. Smagin: I disagree that a small professional army is unfit for us. Why not? Such an army of volunteers would not be a caste cut off from the people; on the contrary, it would be able to effectively fulfill its functions. Therefore, it's unwise to immediately reject the concept of a "small professional army." We must not forget that we are talking about a peace-time army intended for the prevention of war, one which is built on the basis of non-aggressive military doctrine and not on the defence of our vast territory on all sides at once. Of course, a general mobilization would be needed to fulfill the last task.

A. Savinkin: But more often than not the reasoning about a professional army only hides the desire not to enhance the quality of the army system but to reject the principle of compulsory military service, an unwillingness to serve in the army.

L. Saraskina: I just happened to be interested in the political aspect of the Law on Universal Military Service, and how this law corresponds to new political thinking. The main thing is how today we can explain—without demagoguery and lies—to a tenth-grader or a first-year student that all young men should be drafted?

"Why is it impossible to build our army on exclusively voluntary principles?" I asked a military. "Because nobody will want to serve," he answered. "But other countries don't have compulsory military service," I persisted. My interlocutor was also persistent: "The level

of society consciousness, the population's culture, the moral atmosphere in the army and its material security are such that we cannot expect volunteers."

M. Smagin: The fact that principles must not be turned into dogma and imposed on life and society is a truth which has become very popular lately. The principle of general military service is probably not an exception. All the more so since in practice it's not so general. Maybe the principle of general military education or even the general accessibility of military matter is more democratic and socialist? Military training can assume different organizational forms. For example, the capabilities of the Voluntary Society for Assisting the Army, Air Force and Navy are [far] from being fully used. Another fact, the principle of general military service rigidly links the strength of the armed forces with a demographic factor: a quantitative increase of draftee-age people automatically leads to its increase, and vice versa. Therefore, in case of sharp future decreases in the armed forces, this principle will not be very convenient, even simply technically speaking.

It's probably worth thoroughly investigating historical truths and the concept of a mass regular army, in general, to see to what degree this concept is Marxist: We cannot exclude that it may have been modernized by Stalin because a mass regular army corresponds most of all to the political regime whose rudiments we now are discarding. Someone may disagree with me, saying that it was Lenin who spoke of a mass army, but he meant an army that was waging a war, about a war-time army. Now we must deal with a peace-time army, taking into account, of course, the existing military threat.

A. Savinkin: The practice of military construction shows a model of the army which corresponds to modern conditions. I'm talking about a regular militia-based system. We had it in the 20s.

No complication of military service or situation can justify the artificial curtailment of the regular militia-based army in the 30s and its replacement by a regular one. That runs counter to Marx, Engels and Lenin who were always in favour of replacing a regular army by the militia. The democratic form of the armed forces organization did not suit the Stalinist political system, which carried out reprisals against its own people. In the beginning of the 60s the refusal to restore a territorial-militia system within the framework of the Soviet Armed Forces led to great economic expenditures. The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government headed by Nikita Khrushchev were actively caught up in this problem. Nothing came of it because it was easier and more profitable for the administrative-bureaucratic system to deal with a regular army.

Today we have all the opportunities to restore such a system. Moreover, militia concepts are steadily developing in a number of socialist and capitalist states strengthening their ability to repulse aggression. If need be, such

a system allows for the development of a well-trained military force over a short period of time, while in peacetime there are small regular units supported by a wide network of territorial-militia formations. General military service will remain, but its character will radically change. It will be more democratic, humane and differentiated. Only in this way will we provide a direct connection between the army and the people within the framework of a democratic society.

On the one hand, military service will become more professional, while on the other, it will be more closely connected with productive labor, and characterized by non-barracks training over shorter periods. In perspective, a new military system in the course of literary-political detente can transform into a "pure" militia army.

A regular-militia army more fully corresponds to the new military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty Member-Countries. It allows for a flexible response to disarmament dynamics.

The transition to a regular militia system will make it possible to avoid the extremes of military construction, and to reject the development of a mass regular army which, under the available structure of armed forces, can be regarded as a potential factor of military threat regardless of political intentions.

M. Smagin: Maybe it's worthwhile considering how to divide the functions of national security and military training and preparation of the reserves? The first, say, will remain a function of the regular professional army, while the preparation of reserves and the military education of citizens will be conducted outside the army in some other system....

L. Saraskina: I'm interested in the state of the moral spirit of the army today, and what it's made up of. How high is the army's educational potential?

I know hundreds of stories of demobilized soldiers about the so-called non-regulation relations. They are horrible stories about humiliation and the insult of human dignity, about crimes against morality and consciousness. The humiliation of younger soldiers, which we only recently began speaking about, is in fact legalized slavery, very convenient for the brass who are accustomed to having others do their dirty work.

To preserve its prestige and authority, the army itself—through its newspapers, radio and television—should have told about the cases of despotism, the breaching of law and regulations. But instead—sugary programmes of the type: "Serve the Soviet Union!" to the accompaniment of cheery clangs of march music.

The army, its ideologists and troubadours (like writer A. Prokhanov) still believe that if one was submerged in army "order" and survived—that means that he has become a real man and that all young people of this country must undergo such "submergence."

V. Sergeyev: I'm under the impression that not all of us are taking into consideration that the army and its functions have been created by society, and that it is society that generates the main positive and negative phenomena in the army since it is but a copy of society, its integral part. I think that we must first of all proceed from these facts in analysing the processes taking place in the army.

I'd like to draw your attention to another issue. Today many magazines and newspapers are writing about everyday life in the army. This makes it possible to get a feel for the army's life and problems as if from the inside and outside at the same time. But the urgent necessity for a more balanced, well-reasoned and responsible approach to this theme has already appeared. For example, some Soviet young people don't want to serve in the army due to superficial and incompetent statements during the broad and emotional discussion concerning the breaching of military regulations by servicemen. Understanding that military service is a difficult but at the same time honorable duty necessary for society is a powerful positive factor for educating Soviet young people. The army objectively accelerates the political, social, spiritual and physical development of young people.

R. Bogdanov: I think that we are already beyond the time when we regard the army as an All-Union educational club. We already have experience in this. I don't know whether our society needs it.

A. Pankin: It seems to me that the thesis that criticism undermines the combat spirit of the army is simply laughable. What was the reason for such reproaches? Several articles by the writer Adamovich, the story "A Hundred Days Before the Order" by Polyakov, a TV speech by Ryazanov and a dozen publications in the press. Where are these reproaches coming from? From representatives of the army which has a Main Political Department with the rights of the CPSU Central Committee department with its wide network of departmental and wide network of departmental and mass press, a daily hour-long TV programme, a multimillion voluntary Society for Assisting the Army, Air Force and Navy and for providing primary military training. If this huge machinery suddenly felt itself uncertain due to some timid pinpricks of criticism, this shows only two things: either—if the tasks facing it are normal—it works extremely badly, or the tasks are so unrealistic that they cannot be fulfilled even by the most perfectly adjusted mechanism.

A. Kokorin: I have some doubts about the conclusion that the army has ceased to be an "educational club." Of course, it is incorrect to consider the army an educational school alone. And it is apparently wrong not to take into account the fact that there are changes in the system and in the educational methods of servicemen. They differ from those that existed yesterday and the day before. More than that, there are new problems connected with the solution of the tasks of education in the army. There are negative facts in this work that no one can ignore since they do exist. But another thing: I believe the time has not yet come to fully deny the army's educational function. We have carried out research more than once which confirmed the conclusion that the overwhelming majority of boys who served in the army experienced its educational influence. I suggest being serious, thorough and objective about this question. To be objective means that we must pay attention not only to the army's positive influence on the boys, but also to the problems which exist. And in striving for innovations we shouldn't deny the data of sociological science, which show that the time has not yet come to file away the educational function of the army.

Yu. Mamontov: We must acknowledge that the stagnation processes and phenomena did not pass the Soviet Armed Forces by, either. In general, they showed themselves to be constant repetitions of the same miscalculations and dereliction of duty, of lowering the combat readiness of troops; in the manifestation of the complacency and self-satisfaction of servicemen; in indulgence, simplification, cancelling drills and using soldiers for other duties; in the poor organization of training and its lack of correspondence to practical tasks; in emphasizing the "window dressing" aspect in combat training and violating its regularity; in the slow process of including advances in science and technology in combat training; in the negative aspect of military discipline, especially in relations among servicemen of different terms of regular service; in the low status of officers and junior commanders; in the absence of social justice in assessing the results of labour; in wage levelling regardless of the results; in the formalism in the organization of socialist competition, etc.

A. Nuykin: I think it would be better if we widened discussion of the theme. We are talking mainly in a technocratic way. We're expressing our attitude towards the army, its future, its status and model not from the perspective of social (including political) development of society, but in relation to private, mostly mythological, mostly falsified and mostly transient present factors. Such an approach leads to the obvious justification of all that has been done in the military sphere, to the preservation of stability in the current military economy and in current army orders. But another thing is worrying me—whose side will the army be on if someone in this country attempts to forcibly liquidate perestroika?

N. Chaldymov: do you think this is a proper question?

A. Nuykin: Let it be improper, but the main thing is that it must not be late. If we are afraid to raise such a question today, we may be completely unprepared for some unexpected version of events. And then we'll again begin lamenting about the unpreparedness of people for democracy, about the tragedy of our historical path, etc.

S. Yushenkov: Does that mean we must defend perestroika with weapons in our hands?

A. Nuykin: We have no right to exclude such a version if we're proceeding from the fact that any way other than perestroika leads to catastrophe. These are not fibs. These misgivings have not been provoked by journalists, but by those who aren't fond of perestroika.

Serious events certainly await us. I don't think that the solution to the problems put forward by the 27th CPSU Congress, proclaimed by Plenary Meetings, etc., will take place smoothly, painlessly and without conflicts. We've already seen some open ones. Bureaucrats, apparatchiks and the like put up powerful resistance to the present course of the Party, and this resistance sometimes goes far beyond constitutional methods. Because of this it would be irresponsible to exclude the possibilities of plots which could take place in corresponding circles. The military can be included in them. So far, of course, this is an abstract possibility, but.... the gap between apparatchiks and rank-and-file Communists, bureaucracy and people is widening very quickly, and we cannot overlook the fact that the army will have to make a choice. What's worrying us is what this choice will be.

A. Kokorin: Why do you think this? The army is on the side of the people carrying out perestroika. Servicemen are for perestroika, believe in it and are carrying out a renewal of the army, as well. I think all this corresponds with the interests of the people.

A. Nuykin: We civilians aren't aware of the present situation in the army, whether the officers support perestroika or not. We can only suppose that in the army, as in any other sphere, there are certainly supporters, but no doubt many opponents, too. The same is true of other circles. The opponents of perestroika in "other circles" do not have weapons, but those in the army do. Therefore, it is very important to know what position the army will take in such a situation. I do not exaggerate that this is of vital importance for all our future history.

Past experience quite clearly shows situations when the army becomes a decisive political force inside the country. It shows another thing as well: in most cases, outside conflicts and mirages of threats have been created and have spiralled in order to solve domestic political and social problems. Pleasing the army and beefing it up, satisfying generals' ambitions—all this happened thousands of times throughout history. It is very important for us to realize that by no means are we excluded from such historical plots and that the same things can happen

to us as happened in other countries. Therefore, while discussing a theme like "The Army and Society" I would like to ask a key question: What is the army's position regarding perestroika?

I'd say the main theme of our discussion is not "Perestroika in the Army" but "Perestroika and the Army" because I'm sure that all the other questions can be answered only after the situation with perestroika is cleared up. If perestroika wins, this will be one concrete situation for the army. If we retreat—the situation for the army will be quite a different one. Therefore, the first question of us is perestroika and the army, the military's position concerning perestroika.

S. Yushenkov: Nuykin's question is interesting. I would like to put it this way: to what degree is it possible to use an army under socialism against people's interests? I think that the history of our army gives quite a definite answer: the army and people have one fate. These are not only words. Who suffered most from reprisals in the 30s? The best representatives of the army, Party and people. There are plenty of facts attesting to that. Besides, it is also important that none of the groupings managed to use the army for their own interests. On the contrary, it would have been impossible to overthrow Beria without the army. And what about Chernobyl? Academician Legasov's words about the role of the army in eliminating the horrible consequences need no commentary. Can such a unity between the army and the people be preserved if the army is given a professional status? It is easier to use a professional army in someone's interests.... This is an example of a situation when the solution of one problem can bring about another.

Nevertheless, the future of our army apparently lies in its professionalization. That's why we must already start thinking about the creation of a more reliable mechanism for mutual relations between the army and society. To my mind, we must follow the path of the democratization of the army. One of the first steps could be the formation of Soviets in all units with not only servicemen of all categories participating in them but also representatives of the Party, state and Komsomol bodies.

Currently on this level we have mainly one-way cooperation, as a rule; commanding officers of units and their deputies on political work are deputies of district Party committees, deputies to local Soviets, etc. There is virtually no feedback. But we need it.

And what about creating a soldiers' court of honor which can guarantee a soldier's personal dignity? Military regulations also need a substantial improvement.

N. Chaldymov: A special commission on new military regulations is working in our Armed Forces. It is of vital importance to have qualitatively new rules which will be the mainstay for maintaining a high combat readiness

and discipline in the Soviet Armed Forces, combined with the obligatory democratization of relations in military units and the democratization of soldiers' consciousness.

Bogdanov: We can probably already draw some conclusions from our discussion. Our army, let's be honest, was a compensation for all our inner ulcers. All our power and grandeur over many decades was supported by it. Maybe those responsible for transferring all the sources into the military simply had no desire to make changes in other spheres. The army was preserved and developed, I would say, in a static society. Now it lives under very different conditions. Today it is undergoing a process which is utterly unfamiliar to us. Society is in a great movement never seen before. Thanks to a number of reasons and peculiarities, many military people expect society, which is on the move, to adapt itself to their needs. Maybe, on the contrary, it is they who should adapt themselves and be more flexible? Most likely a reciprocal movement is needed. I think that today's talks should be regarded as the beginning of an important problematic discussion. Why not continue it in the SPC Disarmament Commission with the participation of our leading military and civil theoreticians?

The topicality and acuteness of the "roundtable" continued to be felt by its participants even several days after the discussion. Having known about the theme of the discussion, the high military bosses expressed their disapproval, hinting that the so-called "roundtables" of some editorial boards try to find out on whose sides the army will be if perestroika gathers a high speed and scope.

The editors feel—and this is their position—that although our army is commanded by professionals, it is nevertheless accountable to society and that we, the public, are not indifferent to the deeds of citizens whom we have entrusted to deal with the defense of our state.

GlavPU Department Chiefs Confer on Role of Primary Party Organization
18010201 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Sep 88 First Edition pp 1-2

[Article by Col V. Semenov and KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Maj I. Sas: "The Political Organizer and the Primary Organization"]

[Text] *How to resolve problems of party construction more energetically is set forth in the resolutions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the decisions of the July (1988) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, while how to ensure more fully the unification of the ideas of restructuring with the practical affairs of political organizers and primary party organizations was discussed at the Chief Political Directorate [GlavPU] of the Soviet Army and Navy at a conference-seminar of the chiefs of sections for organizational party work by political organizers in the army and navy. Party organizational workers took part in an expanded session of the bureau of the*

Chief Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy at which the work of the political directorate and political organizers in the Far East Military District in raising the role of the primary political organizations as the political core of the military collective was considered in detail.

Speaking at the conference-seminar was the head of the Chief Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Arm Gen A. Lizichev.

The report of the head of the Organizational Party Work Directorate of the Chief Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Lt Gen V. Lukinykh, was discussed.

Also speaking to those assembled was the deputy chief of the Organizational Party Work Department of the CPSU Central Committee, G. Kryuchkov.

Sector chiefs N. Chukardin and N. Shlyaga of the Administrative Organs Department of the CPSU Central Committee also took part in the work of the conference-seminar.

We publish here the notes of our correspondents on the work of the conference-seminar.

Receptiveness to the New

The principal political criterion according to which real affairs should be evaluated today—judging restructuring according to how urgent practical tasks are resolved—is entering our consciousness and the life of the army and navy party organizations more and more deeply. I would thus like to begin my notes with numerical computations that were mentioned at the conference-seminar.

The number of criminal offenses has declined by 29 percent over the past two and a half years in the Far East Military District [MD].

What sort of a shift is even several percent on the scale of a district in the realm of reinforcing discipline? It is first and foremost labor. The great labor of an enormous number of commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol activists. But, as was noted in the report and in presentations, the organization and direction of this labor can differ. Some literally wring out these percentages through an increase in the quantity of the notorious "crucial" ones, nearly seeing a way out in appointing an "inspector" for every soldier and sailor. This produces some results, but extremely unstable ones. And the majority of political organizers and primary party organizations, understanding that cardinal changes are not achieved thereby, takes a different path which, perhaps, does not produce a gain this minute, but guarantees the untangling of many problems and the elimination of the causes that nourish negative phenomena. This is the path

for comprehending the profound processes that are transpiring in military collectives, the corresponding restructuring of the whole system of political-education work, a keen perception of non-traditional experience and the search for unusual solutions.

Such a view reveals much. Both the experience accumulated in the course of restructuring and a whole series of problems in improving party leadership and strengthening the influence of political organizers at lower levels. If we return to the figure cited at the beginning, one cannot fail to discuss the work of the political directorate of the Far East Military District and political sections aimed at emancipating the initiative of the primary levels and their creative potential along with reinforcing their independence. Having in mind work right in the local areas.

Such a defining feature of it as an integrity of substance is also becoming more and more appreciable. How are the directives of the 27th CPSU Congress and the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference being realized by the primary organization? Is the turn toward qualitative parameters in resolving tasks of combat readiness being accomplished energetically enough? Has it become a pioneer in the creation of a new moral and political atmosphere in the military collective, a deepening of the processes of democratization and the development of glasnost? How is ideological life in the unit being renewed, is the vanguard role of communists being assured, does the selection, education and placement of cadres have an effect? Is it fully responsible for the fact that service become a true school of internationalism for each member of the collective? Is it concerned that the atmosphere of intra-party life be defined by principle, party camaraderie and a humane and respectful attitude toward people?

Such delving into life makes it possible to find answers to the main question: what must be undertaken so that the party organization becomes the political leader, the leading political force of the military collective? On the other hand, this enriches the work practices of the political organizers with that which is new that is being born right in the primary organizations.

And it is being born every day, it just has to be noted in good time and nourished. The primary party organizations of the units where the party committee secretaries are Lt Col F. Melnichuk (Leningrad MD) and Lt Col M. Khanyukov (Air Force) along with the submarine where the party bureau secretary is Capt 3rd Rank Ye. Podsoblyayev (Northern Fleet) were cited in particular at the conference-seminar as the addresses of interesting experience. Much could be related about each party organization. But we will single out just one thing—ensuring the vanguard role of communists.

At first glance this does not seem to be the place to cross some new tropics—all has seemingly already been tested long ago. These elected party organizers refute this

opinion with all of their experience. Say a young communist is reporting here—they try to invite to the meeting those who recommended him for party membership. Just let them be fully responsible for his development. A statement arrives on the acceptance of a candidate for membership in the CPSU—let him be judged first and foremost in the collective where the comrade himself serves. Initiative groups are operating for the resolution of this or that problem in the party committees and buro. Party influence is gaining force on the formation of reserves for advancement and on personnel policies in the unit. It is becoming a tradition to invite sergeants, petty officers and Komsomol activists to party meetings where questions of professional competence are being discussed. They have long since dispensed with simplistic approaches in the system of personal evaluations.

All of this is naturally entering into the practices of many party organizations. An atmosphere of strict party exactingness, glasnost and democratism is being affirmed more and more through the reports of communist leaders and the discussion and issuance of party references and personnel work. The chief of organizational party work for the Political Directorate of PVO Troops, Col S. Vasilevich, cited an example that is very descriptive of our times. They were considering the candidacy of a unit commander to move into a higher position at the military council. It was decided to request the opinion of the primary party organization. It was categorical: no, he would not be recommended. The communists had a whole series of serious complaints against their leader. And the assignment did not take place—the military council removed this candidacy for promotion.

It is not difficult to imagine the passions that raged behind this story. Yes, it is always difficult to get accustomed to the new. Harsh clashes of positions, most acute conflict situations—the primary party organizations have to pass through all of this. Errors and miscalculations are possible here, but the task, as M.S. Gorbachev emphasized, consists of maintaining enthusiasm, disseminating experience and defending from injustice those who rush with all their heart into working in a new way, those who are not afraid to err in the present cause, those who take risks, those who feel themselves personally responsible for seeing that restructuring gain momentum.

Yes, it is namely on this path, it could be said, that the political maturation of party organizations takes place.

They were also discussing another problem with concern. In opening up the way for new approaches, the psychology of dependence is not always and everywhere being decisively broken. It is very distinctly manifested in the state of criticism and self-criticism in the party organizations of some units and ships. Criticism has moved steadily upward, and good must be seen in this—shortcomings in the work of many administrative levels can be seen more distinctly in its rays. But there are no

few primary organizations where criticism almost never passes along the horizontal, does not touch those who, figuratively speaking, are pulling in the same harness, shutting themselves off from the matter with loud talk, not illuminating dark corners and unsuitable rubbish in their own home. It has lost its constructiveness in many places and has been replaced with the fireworks of demagoguery. Sometimes just driving a nail becomes a problem that is immediately signaled to higher authorities, and it is demanded that steps are taken. This is very eloquently confirmed by the following figure: 97 percent of the complaints coming to the CPSU Central Committee, Ministry of Defense, Chief Political Directorate and other central organs could have been resolved on the spot. And here the primary organizations should have a word to say. It is especially important to concentrate on this today, when preparations for the reporting and elections to party organizations of the army and navy are underway.

There are still many bureaucratic boulders in the road of restructuring. The following example evoked animation in the hall. While a small questionnaire, consisting of just a few questions in all and aimed at the primary organizations was making its way from the center to its intended recipients in the PVO troops, it came to include about thirty clauses—each political organizer felt it essential to make “his own” contribution. And it is no accident that one aggravated secretary was unable to restrain himself and sent it to the party Central Committee as a classic example of paper generation. We must give our due to the self-criticalness with which Col S. Vasilevich talked about this.

The primary organization, as the political leader of the military collective, cannot dissociate itself from areas touching on working and living conditions, rest and the moral self-perceptions of the people. This is a fundamental issue. But, as experience shows, the aspirations of elected party agencies to resolve it in modern fashion, from the positions and directives of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, sometimes come up against bureaucratic indifference and operational mismanagement. It also happens that the families of servicemen in practice live in barracks or accommodations that are not adapted. And at the same time the training wings stand half empty, sometimes looking like palaces and erected not so much for education as to give the impression of “high command.” Instances of violations of legality in the distribution of housing are committed and glasnost is lacking. Departmental interests and provincialism get the upper hand in some places.

The chief of organizational party work for the political directorate of military-construction units, Col R. Yankilevskiy, related with genuine pain how at some garrisons where construction is underway, no housing or places in pre-school and kindergarten establishments are allotted for the families of the construction organizers. Sometimes they don't even let them in the stores. “You're not

one of us"—and that's it. The question is fairly asked: when will the local political organizers regulate these relations proceeding from principles of social equity?

The time of restructuring is a complicated and largely unconventional time. And it is not surprising that some party committees and buros cannot yet get themselves correctly oriented in the new situation and sometimes display confusion, an inability to master the situation, to direct the initiative and activeness of the people that has been aroused into the proper channels.

They need help. And not only on the part of the political organizers. Here is the opinion of many of the participants in the conference-seminar: military science is strongly indebted to those who are engaged directly in party work in the regiment, on the ship, in the cadet classroom.

These problems are also still acute in the activity of the universities of Marxism-Leninism and party activist schools, and they do not keep up with the life of political education in many places. And what can, say, the garrison library offer the communist in the search for answers to difficult political, social and economic questions? In the majority of cases, piles of long outdated texts and brochures. We must shake things up, give people what they have the greatest need for, release them from a forced spiritual diet.

This is also an important threshold in the fight for restructuring and for the affirmation of the primary party organization as the political core of the military collective.

Don't Command—Be Organizers

An instance occurred during the conference-seminar that, in my opinion, was extremely noteworthy for the time of restructuring, when creative thought and concrete affairs have an especial worth. The next speaker went up to the rostrum. And it soon became understandable from the reaction of the audience how the loud phrases pained the ear, what an internal protest was evoked by the attempt to retreat from the acute and vital issues, how the resonant drumming of words of imperiously accumulated from the lexicon of the times of stagnation "got on their nerves." The presidium gently requested that he stick closer to the topic of the vital and interesting discussion. But nothing came of it. The confused comrade rolled up his papers and, as they say, finished his speech ahead of time.

I deliberately do not give the name of the officer. A failed speech, you will agree, is far from the deciding criterion of the professional merits of a person who, by the way, is quite diligent in the opinion of many. But one conclusion suggests itself: one cannot live, think and act according to old measures today. And another thing—how impressively the level of requirements for the political, intellectual and moral image of the communist leader and party

agency representative of any rank grew after the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the July (1988) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

It is not by accident that we are discussing this in such detail. After all, on a larger score it is impossible to discuss ways of raising the role of the primary party organizations as the political core of military collectives without a close link to the most important factor: the level of leadership of these processes in the army and navy by the political organizers.

Good signs of the present day were cited in the report and in the presentations. A desire not to command, but rather to guide the basic cells of the party in contemporary fashion, to be organizers, to reject dictate and bare administrating in relations with the primary organizations is noticeable in the style of activity of the political directorates and political sections of a number of districts, groups of forces and fleets. A fight against conservatism, against attempts to reduce all efforts to petty improvements, is underway. Bureaucratic methods in the instruction and training of cadres and party activists are encountered more rarely. And most importantly, work with people is moving more decisively to the fore.

What does it mean for a person of the apparatus to conform to the requirements of the present day? This question was sounded in many speeches. The professional competence of organizers has gone up appreciably in the organizational party work section of the Political Directorate of the Leningrad MD, headed by Col N. Sumenko. They have gotten down to the study of theory and practice of restructuring, as they say, in capital fashion. How else to comprehend the difficult processes in the primary organizations, to separate the wheat from the chaff in what is sometimes called progressive experience? How can the initiative that makes it possible to multiply the force of glasnost, cleansing criticism and self-criticism and the democratization of the life of the military collectives be revealed correctly without political perspicacity and erudition?

How have you, the political organizer, enriched the commanders, political workers and secretaries of the party organizations? Have you studied deeply the sentiments of the people and their concerns and alarms? What organizational efforts can bring concrete results in the least amount of time in solving problems of combat readiness? Such questions are becoming the norm for the workers of the political directorate of the Far East MD. Bluntly speaking, not all instructors or inspectors who have returned from business trips can report on them in detail. A break in psychology is a difficult and often painful process. But the gain is obvious: it enters more and more deeply into the consciousness of people from the apparatus that it is possible and necessary to reinforce the reputation of the primary organizations only through the power of party influence and via democratic mechanisms, generously using one's political and intellectual potential.

The fresh winds of change, as was mentioned at the conference-seminar, aid the political organizers in assimilating new approaches and being more attentive to, as well as more tolerant of, the unaccustomed and non-standard in the life of party organizations, in delving into the deep strata of party work. Lt Gen A. Voronin mentioned in his presentation a dedicated action of the political directorate—a review of the fighting ability of the party organizations that was done on the eve of the 19th All-Union Party Conference. In the not-so-distant past, we had come to have a cautious attitude toward large-scale measures. The lessons of the past had taught us much. But in this instance there was no speculative juggling of contemporary terms at the rostrum. Most intensive educational work with people, when hundreds of unfavorable companies came under the eye of political organizers and primary organizations, went on without shouts and posturing. Where strict personal demand, serious training of activists and thoughtful assistance in the local areas has made concrete results accessible. And many have left the “risk group,” and the number of those who “were not suited for the service,” who were lost in moral labyrinths, who in an acute conflict gave way to a strutting nature, has declined...

Councils of secretaries in the political sections of the formations of a number of districts and fleets, so-called base party organizations in the Baltic MD where they are “cultivating” experience in the solution of this or that problem, dedicated-problem planning, social passports for multi-national military collectives, that is, special research, the employment of new techniques for studying public opinion in the Far East MD... These are some of the unusual forms engendered by restructuring, and we could go on.

But it was also impossible not to sense feelings of dissatisfaction with the current level of leadership of the primary party organizations in the course of discussion at the conference-seminar. The notorious command-pressure style and administrative-dispatch approaches still make themselves felt. The following incident was cited in particular. During the year the Chief Political Directorate has been studying the work of fifty political organizers. What struck them first and foremost? The lack of a proper system in many places, skipping along the surface of the profound processes that have been evoked by restructuring, an attempt to cram new phenomena into the track of old formulas. Symptoms of willful pressure and the bureaucratic habit of preaching to the elected activists rather than teaching still live among many representatives of the inspectional and instructional staff.

The turn to qualitative parameters in the construction of defense assumes a decisive turn toward the person. The party leaders are not expecting scoldings and shoves from the political organizers, but rather intelligent and specific organizational work in a concrete area. People have long since grown tired of general conversations, hollow phrases and meetings on any score. We must,

proceeding from the requirements of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, cleanse the leadership practices of the primary organizations of formalism, amateurism and organizational and ideological sluggishness, otherwise it will be difficult to surmount the separation of party work from the tasks of combat training, the reinforcement of discipline and regulation order and other most important concerns of the military collectives. The position of the organizational party work section of the Political Directorate of the Pacific Fleet, which is headed by Capt 1st Rank A. Plyusnin, is also convincing of this. This work was subjected to severe criticism at the conference-seminar.

Yes, the times make increased demands of the workers of political organs. It is impossible to fulfill the role of organizer, emphasized Lt Gen G. Stefanovskiy, the deputy chief of the Chief Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, without having mastered the ideology of renewal, without having transformed the ideas of the party conference and the July (1988) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee into the image of one's own ideas and actions. Concrete proposals were made at the conference-seminar associated with a review of the organizational aspect of the activity of political directorates and political sections and raising the level of training and professional competence of the inspectional and instructor staff. The discussion concerned in particular the creation of a more integral program of training and education. There were proposals on the usefulness of spending internships at the Chief Political Directorate and the more thoughtful selection and placement of personnel. The processes of improving the activity of the party political apparatus that are gaining force along with reductions in its numerical complement at some levels make it possible to be more decisively rid of inert and irresponsible people, of phrasemongers and chatterers.

Raising the role of the primary organizations as the political core of the military collectives is for the political organizer, as was emphasized at the conference-seminar, first and foremost mastering the methods of political leadership. Fearlessly developing criticism and self-criticism, being in the very thick of the most burning vital problems, accumulating the sentiments of people, reinforcing their conviction that they are the fully enfranchised masters of their party organizations. Affirming every day a truly businesslike style of work with the support of the masses.

The idea of V.I. Lenin to “convince people not through the force of authority, but through the force of reputation, the force of energy, greater experience, greater multi-facetedness, greater talent” has a topical sound today as well.

Find Your Own Image in Restructuring

I will permit myself a small digression.

Don't you ever want to speak with your commander or superior among a circle of fellow servicemen simply about life, about the honor of an officer, about the dignity of a military person, about joys and disappointments? To express your ideas and hear others? We put this question to a young platoon commander on a recent trip. He just smiled skeptically at this: Well, he said, you try it. Discussions of this type are held principally in elevated tones and "on the carpet" of the official office. And maybe also, well... at comrades' courts of officers' honor. But from the heart...

But there are other examples as well. They were born of restructuring. In the regiment where the party committee secretary is Yu. Krivskiy (Far East MD), a club called "Officer's Honor" exists. They don't come here because they have to, to do their time. People are attracted namely by a need for soulful exchange. It is noteworthy that those gathering over a cup of tea include the regimental commander, Hero of the Soviet Union and 19th All-Union Party Conference delegate Lt Col R. Aushev, the party committee secretary.

Much attention was devoted to this party organization at the conference-seminar and in the course of an expanded session of the bureau of the Chief Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. The regiment was not so long ago, as they say, in a profound breakdown, bringing many troubles and unpleasanties to the district command. It is on the ascent today: all combat-training missions are performed at high quality (two companies, for example, achieved outstanding results, and the majority, good ones), there have been no gross violations of military discipline and they have forgotten all about the notorious "hazing."

I do not directly link the successes of the regiment with the existence of the "Officer's Honor" club. Or with the creation of groups for relations among national groups in the party committee (another innovation in the life of the unit), including representatives of 17 nationalities. Although it had been long been noted that the shortage of intercourse entailed a shortage of ideas, creative restraint and labor inspiration. Something else is what is important. These little strokes testify eloquently to the moral climate that has taken shape in the regimental collective thanks to the efforts of the primary organization. Here a strict and fair exactingness toward the person has merged with a profound and unfeigned respect toward him, his dignity, sentiments and social and moral self-worth.

"You can't confuse this primary organization with any other," as they say, it has its own very clearly expressed image.

Why focus our attention namely on that? I want to transmit the alarm that was clearly felt in the presentation of Col V. Arkhipov, Maj Gen Yu. Dortsev and other comrades on the score of some trends that have been manifested in the work of the primary organizations.

They are first and foremost a leveling, leading to oversimplification and primitivism in the mechanical circulation of forms and methods of influence. This engenders a psychology of dependence at our paramount time. And we cannot reconcile ourselves to this.

The weeds of formalism unfortunately even make themselves felt in the activity of political organizers. Rear Adm B. Pekedov related this example. The reports of communist leaders were justly seen in the Black Sea Fleet as an effective lever for party influence on the state of affairs. And this form began to be widely incorporated. But then this dialogue took place between with a representative of the political directorate of the Navy and the chief of a certain political agency who had decided to boast of the numbers: the reports of 58 percent of the ship commanders had been heard. "And what is becoming clear, what conclusions?"—"Another 42 percent have yet to be heard from."

What use is this man-by-man reporting if a profound analysis of the life of the crews, the effects of the primary organizations on combat training and discipline, on the growth of political and moral responsibility of communist leaders for the state of affairs in military collectives, is not done?

The point is not the quantity or the more so the frequency of reports, the speakers noted. One must give a person the opportunity of looking around, comprehending his position and understanding his errors, arming him with a promising program of action.

There are instances where in the primary organizations, incorporating a system of personal evaluations of the contribution of each communist with the issuance of recommendation references, the entire matter is reduced to paperwork. Secretaries having to issue these recommendations practically every week are not at all concerned about affirming an atmosphere of principle and strict demand in the lower-level party organizations.

Thus do good enterprises end up in the dead end of paper generation.

It can be seen clearly through the prism of such instances why progressive experience is not taking hold everywhere. "That's not for us, we have our own specific nature," they rush to declare in some units. So transform the idea to fit your specific nature then, try to develop it, impart something unique to someone else's find—that is how the question is posed today. It is, after all, really impossible in party work not to take into account the distinctions that exist, say, in the tank and missile services, or submarine and pilot service... Even the geographic location leaves its imprint—people feel differently performing their duty in the hot desert sands and under the conditions of the Far North, outside the borders of the Motherland and in a garrison in the capital. The more distinctiveness and local nuances that

are imparted to the work of the primary party organizations, the richer and more efficient it will become. This idea passed through many of the presentations at the conference-seminar as a leitmotif.

What is required for this? Naturally, the initiative and creativity of every communist. The issue singled out by Col E. Vitsenets is quite topical, in my opinion: much depends on how solidly the practice of moving away from excessive centralization in the leadership of the primary organizations is reinforced. After all, it is a fact that in some places even the agendas of party meetings, not to mention a multitude of other directives that undermine the independence of the lower organizations with rigid restraining frameworks, are handed down from above.

The interconnection was noted long ago: as is the secretary of the party committee or buro, such is the work of the primary organization. If he is full of ideas and energy, if he is firm and unyielding in the pursuit of the party line, the style of the party organization is in fighting trim and energetic. And on the contrary, if this style is featureless and unexpressive, if the secretary proves to be under the thumb of the leaders of the unit or ship and duplicates their work, it is inclined toward playing it safe. It sometimes happens that relations with the commander are not formed at all—matters suffer especially from this.

Not an easy topic. And it is no accident that it elicited lively debate. Proposals sounded on how to draw other secretaries "out of the shadows" of the communist leaders, make them noticeable figures and reconsider their legal status for the purpose of ensuring complete social protection. Others defended in extremely reasoned fashion the idea that political organizers have enough rights to put a wayward bureaucratic type in his place. And we must put our trust not in the promulgation of some special standard documents and additional instructions, but rather in the development of intra-party democracy and glasnost. Those are the surest guarantees of the protection of not only the secretary, but every communist as well, from injustice.

One thing is indisputable: attention toward the figure of the party leader should be undiminished. What can you say, the secretary's lot is a difficult one. He who has tasted fully of it knows that the whole road is an intense one—now someone's coarseness must be stopped, now the consequences of some negligence must be eliminated, now he must clear away moral dead ends such that his heart is heavy for a long time. That is why secretaries need moral support and concrete assistance. One cannot agree with the speakers who were saying that many political organizers have not yet learned to stimulate the work of secretaries in the spirit of the times, especially unliberated ones, and break the circle of the infamous egalitarianism.

We ourselves have had to be witnesses: other zealous believers are powerfully "shaking" the party leaders. But they are rarely interested, for example, in such a question as what the secretary is reading. What do you nourish your intellectual potential with, are you able to pass through all that is new that is appearing today in the spiritual life of society? I want to emphasize once more that whether each primary organization becomes a genuine and fighting political core of the military collective depends largely on the leadership personnel, on the secretaries of the party committees and buros.

We turn to statistics once again: among the secretaries of party organizations dismissed today, 88.7 percent have higher education and 68 percent were chosen for party work in the last two years. Almost half are under 35 years old. At the same time, the level of training of the party leaders of units and ships must be raised in the interests of improvement and restructuring. The participants in the conference-seminar posed the question thus: we must put all existing capabilities and means into action for this—from the highest academic courses to the local party activist schools.

The importance of these questions grows in connection with the approach of the reporting and election campaign. It is essential to do everything possible today so that the elected party organs are headed by people with a creative store of knowledge and exceptional organizational abilities and are prestigious and businesslike.

The political face of the primary organization is reflected, as in a mirror, in the state of the ideological work. An analysis done by the Propaganda and Agitation [Agitprop] Directorate of the Chief Political Directorate testifies to the fact that the turnaround in it has unfortunately not been signified as it ought. This concerns some units of the Transbaykal MD in particular. Dialogue and discussion forms are not being incorporated actively enough into political and party training, a gravitation toward clichéd routines in the work of agitprop groups and cultural-enlightenment institutions is being felt and the substance of ideological activity itself is being renewed too slowly in a number of places.

Responsibility for this is undoubtedly borne by the political organizers and the political apparatus of the units and ships along with the elected party organizers and party organizations. But life insistently demands that we raise the role of the deputy secretaries of the party committees and buros in ideological work.

The circle of concerns of the primary organization is great, as is well known. In the first rank is extending its influence to all of the social institutions of the regiment or ship. Otherwise, what sort of political core of the collective is it? In noting positive elements, the participants in the conference-seminar spoke with concern of the role of the Komsomol, and it is no secret that in some political organizations the topical theme of the necessity

of developing independence, the independence of Kom-somol organizations, is taken as a possibility "they are not engaged in at all."

To find one's image in party work means without fail to find reliable allies in the fight for high-quality parameters of combat readiness and discipline in the image of independent political organizers in army society and to accelerate restructuring through common efforts.

More Simple, Everyday Deeds

A few more of the numbers that were mentioned at the conference-seminar. Today 79.3 percent of the officers and warrant officers in the army and navy are communists. Over 50 percent of them are serving directly with units or on ships. Practically all command, staff and engineering and technical posts, as well as key positions in the ideological life of the troops and the fleets, are held by communists and are thus under party control.

This is a truly powerful potential for restructuring in the armed forces. The task of tasks is not to proclaim slogans on the potential of the primary organizations, but rather to realize them in practice. This task has also become perhaps the chief idea in the discussion of all questions by the participants in the conference-seminar.

In what directions should the collective search proceed? Many of the seminar participants were reflecting on this. The idea that not much can be accomplished with methods of force and punishments was expressed in various forms. Conditions must be created wherein the highest responsibility, common sense and skilled labor will be cultivated. The speakers reinforced their conclusions with convincing examples.

Here is one of them. The missile unit where the party buro secretary is Maj V. Kozlov has been outstanding for 11 years now. Over fifteen years, a "barometer" reflecting the state of disciplinary matters, steadily reading "clear." And all of these undoubtedly important indicators are hardly darkened by a small detail—one communist in the unit has received a party reprimand.

The Political Directorate of the Strategic Missile Forces has studied the experience of this primary organization. Lt Col V. Stefanchishin stated directly at the conference-seminar that the secret here was the unique moral micro-climate that the command and the primary party organization were able to create and which was carefully maintained. Each communist is deeply concerned not only about his sector, but the whole unit as well: its results, its honor, its reputation. Here the person and his opinion are valued. Attitudes are permeated with a spirit of goodwill and party principle. It is considered dishonorable by the upper levels to do one's job poorly here. The very organization of labor of the servicemen is also very strong here, which should especially be noted.

Why am I focusing on this? The participants in the conference-seminar were singling out the trend that the

mobilization aspect, so to speak, prevails in party work today. There is, alas, no shortage of slogans and appeals. But the organizational aspect is noticeably weaker. And without a mastery of the art of organizing work and leading people, it is difficult to count on success.

Where this simple truth has entered consciousness and everyday practice, the forward movement is evident, the priority directions for training, service and educational activity are determined more precisely there. The example of the party organization of the missile cruiser Marshal Ustinov in the Northern Fleet is another example of this. A difficult situation had taken shape: the ship had to go into combat service with a considerably renewed complement. During the pre-cruise preparation period, the party committee was the initiator of the development of the Operator dedicated program aimed at the high-quality mastery of complex radio equipment by the specialists. The impact surpassed the most optimistic forecasts: by the end of combat service, the majority of the operators had fulfilled the standards for the level of 1st-class specialist. The fact that over this period of combat service the party organization was supplemented with twenty candidate party members also testifies to its reputation.

The contemporary style of the activity of the primary organizations is founded on a businesslike and concrete nature, competence and high professionalism. People today do not tolerate dependent sentiments in our party house or paper resolutions of the "raise," "strengthen" or "improve" type. I will mention the opinion of Col V. Radchenko. He cited the following data at the conference-seminar. In the course of considering candidates for secretaries of party organizations with conclusions on the possibility of recommending them for election for the next term, distrust was expressed toward nine dismissed secretaries of primary organizations. Eleven people declared honestly that they would not run in the next reporting and election campaign, since they felt themselves to be insufficiently prepared for the role of party leader. As we see, there was a serious re-evaluation of people, and healthy and energetic forces of restructuring were put in motion.

But we must also speak of other instances when they attempt to veil a lack of principle and inability to be genuinely included in the solution of the new tasks facing the unit or ship in the party organization using endless word games and sessions. This is probably the place to recall F. Dzerzhinskiy. He called a session the greatest calamity and proposed introducing a custom according to which the first point was to pose the question, Is this session necessary? And who among those present can and should be released from participation in it, and can the question be resolved without the session?

Party work is work with people. And first and foremost with a specific person. Are we able to understand him, investigate his sentiments, psychology, deeds? It is an arch-important question—the participants in the conference-seminar emphasized this repeatedly. And many

noted in self-critical fashion that we have not always been able to bring party work closer to the person everywhere. We more often "study problems" and forget that all of them are not restricted to a faceless "human factor," but are completely real personalities.

The interests of revolutionary renewal impel us to pose the question of the responsibility of each communist for the state of affairs where he is working and for the personal contribution to restructuring in a new, sharp and fundamental way. And here, it was noted in the course of discussing the report, there should be the maximum precision of evaluations and conclusions. It is not enough to know the true picture in this or that sector. In a climate of glasnost and democratization, the party organization is correct and obliged to approach the problem from another aspect: are the communist leaders able to improve the situation? What is required for this? Strictly speaking, this is the work of the primary organization with personnel, which is moving to the fore today.

It was no accident that the conference-seminar noted that there are enough of all sorts of references to the difficult contingent. Some comrades have already formed a bureaucratic ruse on this basis—hiding behind actually existing difficulties with obvious punctures. Here it is important that everyone—in the primary party organizations and the political agencies—learn that there will be no other people. There is one way out here—working seriously and responsibly with the personnel, striving for qualitative shifts. The personal example of the communist should become a most important example for ideological influence: in combat training, in discipline, in everyday life. His pure and honest image.

The policy of restructuring is moving onto the plane of practical realization. It concerns every party organization and each collective. The time has come to implement the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the July (1988) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee energetically and without any additional directives and instructions, to realize the fundamental stipulations for the qualitative parameters of the building of defense with each concrete step. In the words of Lenin, fewer splendid phrases and more simple and everyday deeds.

This is perhaps one of the chief conclusions of the conference-seminar.

Commanders Forced To Exchange Manpower For Scarce Goods, Equipment

*18010264 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Oct 88 Second Edition p 2*

[Article by Col. N. Fedoseyev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Siberian correspondent: "Seasonal Work—A Look at the Problem Through the Prism of an Extraordinary Accident"]

[Text] The death of a man is always perceived as something unjust, unnatural. But this death, in addition

to all else, was absurd. Private Viktor Tarasov died, not in the performance of his military duties, but on fatigue duty, on the grounds of a local trading center where he and similar young soldiers were unloading furniture from railway cars on their day off.

The unloading was practically finished. The soldiers, led by Sgt. S. Bondarenko, who had been appointed team chief, had already formed up when the freight superintendent asked them to roll an empty car from out of the warehouse. The soldiers set to the task all together. Picking up speed, the car rolled toward another car blocking the path of the one already empty. In order to stop it, Pvt. Tarasov seized a wooden block close at hand, and running to the front, flung it under the wheels. "Get back", his fellows shouted to him. But it was already too late. The couplings of the cars clanged, Pvt. Tarasov was struck in the chest and critically injured...

In their letter to the military procuracy, the soldier's parents, whose only son he was, by the way, were confused and distressed by the tragedy that had befallen them, and asked: Why did this happen? Who is to blame?

After studying this tragic occurrence, the garrison procuracy concluded that there was nothing criminal in the actions of the authorities in the signal training battalion that supplied the team. However, the actions of the commercial workers, who had not established safety precautions for unloading the railway cars, were being dealt with by the local procuracy...

Soon after this tragedy, a number of persons from the training battalion were punished. Removed from office and recommended for discharge to the reserves were the battalion commander, Maj. N. Kotryakov, and his political officer Maj. A. Tolmachev. Company commander Capt. V. Stepanov was removed from his position and demoted. Sergeant S. Bondarenko was reduced in rank to private. In addition, party punishments were meted out to the Communists.

The commanders were punished. Those to whom the lives of subordinates are entrusted bear personal responsibility for them. And if a soldier dies, and especially in such a way as befell Pvt. Tarasov, there is no reason to doubt their guilt. The guilt is also exacerbated by the fact that newcomers were sent to do the fatigue work, on their day off too, persons who had just arrived in the battalion to become communications specialists after passing their course of instruction. For you see, the relevant orders exist that forbid the use of personnel for work in civilian enterprises, and each commander is obliged to obey them without fail.

They knew this in the battalion, of course, but nevertheless they sent twenty men to unload cars at the very first request from workers in the local trading organization.

Incidentally, this request was by no means the first. As was discovered, such teams had been supplied by the battalion for a number of years. And not only to trading centers, but also to other enterprises. There the men earned money subsequently used to obtain different kinds of operating stock, construction materials, consumer items, and many other things to improve the grounds of the military camp, fix up the barracks and Lenin and recreation rooms, equip the park etc.

The following figure shows the scope of these secondary earnings. The district finance service learned that in just three-and-a-half years the men of the signal training battalion earned more than 30 thousand rubles. For fairness sake I must add that no one appropriated the money; the entire sum went for the needs of the garrison.

I have long been familiar with this garrison, where there is also a signal unit, in addition to the training battalion. I remember that a few years ago, especially in foul weather, one could only walk through the camp in rubber boots. The men lived in old rundown barracks. The combat equipment stood in the open. There was no consumer combine here, no club, no bath. The boiler house worked badly, and every winter the men froze, both in the barracks and in the residences. Comfort was out of the question. Now you would not recognize the camp. Wherever you look, asphalt, concrete, new buildings everywhere. The order and well-tended look of the camp are a joy to behold. And you would not recognize the barracks where the communications personnel live.

It would be naive to think that all this fell from the sky or was obtained at the district warehouses. Although it must be said that the district invested many resources and materials to transform this military camp, to make it almost exemplary. The senior officers from the district staff, and particularly the headquarters officers of the signal troops, spent literally days and nights here, seeking efficiently to resolve the supply and everyday living problems, helping the commanders to establish normal life and training for the men. Still, much was gotten elsewhere, i.e., in civilian enterprises and organizations, where money and materials were earned. They were earned by the same method used by Major N. Kotryakov and those who commanded the battalion before him. Incidentally from the amount named above, around six thousand rubles were earned under Kotryakov (he had commanded the battalion for just seven months). The rest was under the former battalion commander Lt. Col. V. Korolev, who now serves as the chief of staff of a neighboring unit.

I asked him: "Valeriy Vladimirovich, didn't you know that you were violating an order by sending out your men to earn money?"

"Of course I knew", he answered frankly. "But we have this system, you might call it: many things have to be gotten elsewhere. Tile, paint, cement, and plywood. Even spades, these too we have to find somewhere, because

they are not always in the stores, or not in the numbers that we need. Then the commander goes with his hand out to all sorts of trading centers, begging..."

Spades were exactly what Maj. N. Kotryakov needed. It was necessary to lay out some roads in the park. At this point he received a call from just the right man from the trading network, who had the ill-fated spades in his warehouse. And who, according to Kotryakov, had more than once come to the commander's aid in obtaining different kinds of operating stock and materials. Once paint was needed to paint the gates in the combat vehicle pool, the doors of bays, the covers of septic tanks, fire equipment, etc. Those assigning such jobs had little interest in how or where the battalion commander would obtain several two-hundred kilogram barrels of hard-to-get paint. He had to go to the Raytorg and make a deal. They provided the paint, but on the condition that he send men to unload cargo...

I ask Kotryakov, "Surely you knew this was illegal..."

"Illegal," he nods sadly. "But if I thought like that, none of the jobs I was assigned would have gotten done."

"But who assigned you these jobs?"

"Who do you think?" Kotryakov pointed upward. "The higher-ups, of course..."

Many jobs were assigned to Maj. Kotryakov, in the opinion of all who know him a man who gets things done, not used to arguing. Here a lane to replant, there paths to asphalt in the living area, there also an athletic field to equip, now a model rifle rack to be made for storing weapons, now a barracks to improve, so that later on one could show...

"For example, this lane," the former battalion commander says. "In order to replant the grown trees, we needed a truck crane. Where could we get one? I went to ask outside. They said: give us some people, you'll get your crane... Or the asphalt. I got a few trucks at the asphalt plant, made some paths in the quarters area. The deputy chief of the district signal troops came up, Col. Zabegalin, took a look and didn't like it, so he ordered that it be done over. And this meant another few truckloads of asphalt. I went to the plant again, but they had only one answer: give us some men... And so on, everywhere. No one gives you anything for a "thank-you." But you see, no one looks into these problems.

The words of the former battalion commander were not far from the truth. One can understand the desire of the higher officers to work energetically at improvements. However, distortions are not acceptable even here. One gets the impression that others were overcome by the itch for ostentatious improvements. Not the sort that create normal living conditions for the men, do not require great expenses, and do not exceed the bounds of regulations, but always those with elements of excess.

Now the fashion is plastic, artificial leather, polished tile, and other decorative materials. A single remark suffices, dropped by a senior officer about the modest circumstances, and the commander at once sends out men to hunt for materials and begins feverishly "eliminating deficiencies." And as a result, personnel are pulled away from immediate duties, turmoil is created in the daily schedule and in the training process, and great forces and assets are expended.

But let us return to the main subject of our conversation. I tried to find out, did the district headquarters of the signal troops know that battalion personnel were quite frequently hired out to unload railway cars? The deputy commander of signal troops Col. V. Zabegalin gave me to understand that he had nothing whatsoever to do with this affair. According to him, no one gave them such a command.

Perhaps there really were no orders that the men be sent off for pay. But it is hard to believe that the leadership of the district signal troops headquarters did not know about the earnings. After all, this was not the first case. It had been practiced by the battalion command for years, almost openly, without concealment. And representatives of the administration, it must be said, were at the battalion almost every day.

Including on 10 July, on Pvt. Tarasov's tragic day, when one of the senior officers from headquarters was there. But not even his presence abashed the battalion commander, or restrained him from making the illegal decision. And this again demonstrates that the removal of personnel for such jobs had become a normal phenomenon for the battalion command, something taken for granted.

Incidentally, this is confirmed by the following. Pvt. Tarasov, it appears, did not die at the center to which Maj. Kotryakov had sent the unloading team, but at another, to which, the former commander asserts, he did not send his men. It happened like this. As the team was ready to leave, the company commander Capt. V. Stepanov was accosted by yet another supplicant for labor from the same trading organization. It was necessary to unload furniture from railway cars. Capt. Stepanov, with instructions from the battalion commander to send twenty men to one center, thought that the commander would not object, since, he reasoned, it made no difference where the men worked. And he ordered Sgt. S. Bondarenko to divide the team into two groups and work at both centers. The latter did just that.

I must state bluntly: many officers of the training battalion, indeed of the unit where Kotryakov served previously, believe that we cannot abandon such people. They say: they found an extreme situation and gained from it...

I too know Maj. Kotryakov well. More than once I saw him at work. He was a specialist, with a master's rating, and a man of great industry. I remember the commander of the unit where Kotryakov served said this about him: "A workhorse, the kind of man you look for." When he became commander of a signal training battalion, the

officer remained true to his principles and devoted all of his efforts to service. He was respected for this, and to judge by the statements of many of his colleagues with whom I spoke, they respect him still.

"If one can put it thus, Kotryakov was thrashed by the system," believes Col. V. Kucher, for example, who in his day also did much to transform this military camp into a model. "Often the commander is put in such situations that he simply has no way out except to commit some violation."

Vasilii Ivanovich described how nerve-wracking and humiliating it was for him in his time to drum up the materials to build bays, storage rooms, and barracks by the self-supporting method.

"I would get in line practically at dawn to see directors of plants and combines," he recalls. "One would want a barrel of alcohol, another spare vehicle parts, a third, and these were the majority, manpower. Well, it's true I didn't give the alcohol or spare parts. But the men I did give, with the knowledge of senior officers. For example we took them to a cement plant for a whole month, back and forth almost every day, 150 kilometers..."

Quite a few of the people with whom I spoke were agreed that as long as there is no full-scale construction center in the district, or centralized supply of the units with construction materials (including plywood, which is used by the company first sergeants to build shelves for storing clothing items), until then, to put it figuratively, this illegally legitimized method of obtaining them will continue.

In our view the problem is serious. And we should not close our eyes to how the units are rebuilt. You see, there is practically no place they can get the necessary materials. The quarters and utilities service is quite destitute. The construction administration itself is barely making ends meet. The only industrial combine in the district is not large. There are no cement or asphalt plants. So it happens: prohibition or no, the materials have to be obtained, earned...

At the district procuracy they showed me materials from the investigations into the removal of men for work, so to speak, on the side. A procurator's warning was issued to a number of persons in authority, including the commander of an artillery battalion, Maj. V. Borzak, and the chief of staff of this battalion, V. Nebolsin. The former sent men to a local furniture factory, the latter to a plant that made reinforced concrete structures. This was done, of course, during combat training time.

I called the unit and inquired: why was it necessary to remove men from their combat training? The chief of staff, Maj. V. Pershin, answered:

"We needed materials to equip the recreation room for the men, and to build a field reception point for reserve troops..."

"So the unit commander knew that Borzak and Nebolsin were sending men to earn money?"

"I can't answer that question," V. Pershin hedged.

But here is a detail that did come to light in the talk. Borzak and Nebolsin, as the chief of staff reported, received disciplinary and party punishment. But those with whose knowledge this occurred? Does this mean that here too they were gaining from "extreme situations"?

Major N. Kotryakov, having served 17 years before this incident without a single adverse comment, is now awaiting orders for his discharge. Even now he must seek work to support his family, with two small children. And he must vacate his apartment, since it belongs to the unit. He still does not know where he will go, or how things will turn out. In fact he has nowhere to go, no place to live.

"For years and years I was good," the officer says. "I set an example, was elected secretary of the party organization, stood out on the honor board, and then this tragedy occurred and everyone stood aside. I alone was guilty of everything..."

No, he does not deny his guilt in the death of the soldier, and I dare say he suffers bitter remorse about it. But nevertheless, there is a large grain of truth in his words.

PRAVDA on Discipline, Recruit Quality, Combat Readiness

18010150 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Oct 88 p 6

[PRAVDA Military Department report under the rubric "We Serve the Soviet Union!": "The Main Mission"]

[Text] Yesterday, Army Gen D.T. Yazov, USSR Minister of Defense and candidate member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, A.D. Lizichev, Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and V.I. Mironenko, First Secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, met with the Army and Navy Komsomol aktiv in the Soviet Army's Central Club imeni M.V. Frunze.

The meeting was occasioned by the approaching 70th anniversary of the Komsomol. A glorious anniversary, it goes without saying. We would mention at the outset, however, that none of the high-flown, exultant reports were heard yesterday. On the contrary, the discussion was serious and based on principle. Particularly since the envoys from the districts, fleets and groups of forces had something to share.

The readers are aware that the fulfillment of the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee on the strengthening of military discipline in the Soviet Army and Navy was analyzed at a 13 October session of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. It was noted that the

main mission assigned by the party Central Committee, that of fundamentally strengthening military discipline, is being accomplished slowly. The party is seriously concerned about evasions of military duty, non-regulation relations among servicemen, violations of the rules for standing alert duty and breakdowns of the combat equipment—very expensive equipment, it should be said. Formalism has not been eliminated in the political and military indoctrination, particularly in the individual work performed with the servicemen. Far-fetched plans, conferences, orders and directives are sometimes substituted for vital communication with the personnel. All of this taken together is having a negative effect on the missions performed by the Army and Navy and on combat readiness.

These are precisely the things about which the participants in the meeting shared their ideas: an airborne officer from the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, the first sergeant of a missile launching battery, the pilot of a MIG-29, a seaman from the cruiser Kiev, a Kantemir NCO.... Surprising as it seems, the fact is that in the Komsomol work a preference is still being given to paper work, meetings and conferences, and not to the specific individual with his strong and weak points, with his attitudes toward military service, with his personal adversities and troubles, if you like.

Twice a year the army and navy receive replenishments. It is well known that the new recruits include young men with criminal records, nonconformists, as they call them today, drug addicts.... This is not something from which one can hide in an office. Has the time not come then, instead of endlessly blaming the family and the school and seeking the sources of the evil somewhere beyond the military post, finally to undertake some serious work—and not just on paper—in the barracks? This thought was clearly enunciated yesterday.

Yes, the dregs—let us call a spade a spade—are showing up in the army collective. Should we "turn over" the crew quarters and the barracks to them? The Armed Forces constitute one of the best organized components of the society. When there is trouble, who is the first to come to our assistance? The army. One does not have to look far for examples of this. We should assume that the readers are aware of them. Our army's collectivist foundation has always been its strength. We can possibly allow ourselves to reduce somewhat both the weaponry and the numerical strength of the Armed Forces. But only if the Soviet people are confident that the Armed Forces will be able to avert a war under all circumstances.

This is just how far the matter of military discipline extends. And it is made more acute by the poor predraft training, about which the military "Afghanners" should speak out, by international indoctrination work which was somewhat neglected at one time, and by an inability properly to teach the soldier how to fire and toss a grenade well, how to operate a combat vehicle, and how to use a trenching tool as well.

The Army and Navy are one with the people. Yesterday's discussion confirmed this once again. The army Komсомol is perfectly capable of handling the trouble spots in the contemporary organizational development of our defense. This is its main mission from the party.

Contradiction Between Command Authority, Democratization

18010258a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Nov 88 First Edition p 2

[Article by Major V. Demenkov, tank training company commander, Ural Military District: "Perestroyka: The Search for Experience—The Company Learns Democracy"]

[Text] The processes that are now taking place in society and in people's thinking leave no room for indifference. The young people of today who are entering the army do not see the words "perestroyka," "democracy" and "glasnost" as abstractions for these words have acquired specific meaning in their consciousness. This new situation in army life is creating a lot of unusual problems for them and for their commanders and educators. And if we, the officers, are able to support and strengthen this mood in people and show them through our deeds what perestroyka is and that perestroyka does exist in the Army, this will mean that we are equal to the demands of the times and will make Army service a school for both military and civilian development for these young people. But if we do not do this, when they leave two years after call-up, society in some cases may get someone from the Army who is not an active soldier in the struggle against the different types of negative manifestation, but instead will get a time-server or a demagogue.

This is not just my personal opinion. It is now shared by the majority of the officers in our regiment. But how do we start? How do we combine the processes of democratization with strengthening one-man command and military discipline? There is one small thing to hope for here. I remember that after we had been assigned the task of democratizing regimental life, we decided to have the leaders present reports. By this time this method had already proven itself in other collectives and we associated many things with it. Then we had the problem of selecting whom to begin with. We decided to start with the regimental commander. And the commander readily agreed and was well prepared for this report. The organizers also made an attempt—they tried in every possible way to create a trusting environment at the party meeting. But we did not get the discussion that we were counting on in the party committee, for the force of inertia had an impact. People had already learned how to ask themselves the question "What have I done for perestroyka?" But to ask that same question of a chief... Many reasoned that in the least this was not tactical, and could also be dangerous in the end.

Alas, until just recently there was good reason for this position and during the long years of stagnation many people had reason to be convinced that criticizing a chief was the same as cutting yourself to pieces.

And yet that report did have some positive effects. This was probably not as much because the commander-communist was to a degree able to look at himself and his work from the side, but rather because all of us were able to think about the fact that democratization would not become a basis for activities in and of itself even if everyone unanimously voted for it. You have to study and learn democracy. It is one thing to talk about democratizing army life and call for it and another to do everything so that this life actually becomes democratic.

After this meeting I thought for a long time about what learning democracy meant and I came to the conclusion that this meant allowing people to show more initiative in participating in general matters and to use their own rights, the right of a citizen, a communist and an officer, more fully. And just as important, to be concerned about the fate of perestroyka, say what you think and talk about what has to be done for perestroyka today. You read a periodical and are simply envious about how the wave of glasnost has flung open the critical sluice gates in many labor collectives and how criticism and self-criticism are clearing the atmosphere and rousing everyone to action.

But what about our unit? And the subunit I command? It turns out to be very difficult to teach people to boldly talk about shortcomings and errors. I think that this is an illness in many army collectives. The internal, psychological changes in people are the most difficult thing in developing democracy. How does one manage it? In other words, how does one teach democracy?

We will feel in the end that the lesson from the unsuccessful report will benefit everyone. The unit command and party committee undertook measures to create a healthier moral and psychological atmosphere in the collectives. In what way? What measures?

We might as well admit that for a long time many of us have gotten accustomed to our own infallibility. At times we feel that we cannot but argue with, and not listen to our subordinates. But in order to develop a democratic beginning in army life, we must also reconstruct the attitudes that officials have toward business and people. If the officers turn to their subordinates with feelings and break down the barriers of aloofness, they will know their subordinates' everyday concerns and happiness and the process of democratization will gather strength.

The issue of milk for the soldiers working in the battery storage area was timidly raised at one of our meetings. We jumped at the idea, made inquiries and found out that milk was actually available as a supplemental drink for soldiers. We therefore set about getting it issued.

This fact may seem insignificant, but it played a big role in the life of the company. The officers were convinced, to their shame, that they did not know the details about what was available for soldiers and the soldiers were convinced that the officers were concerned about them not only in word, but also in deed. I myself had not immediately noted that my subordinates had begun to openly talk about what was bothering them and what was painful. Today my subordinates are not afraid to raise important questions and speak out with their suggestions.

I must stress at this point that one cannot allow the situation to develop whereby no measures are taken after such questions and statements. I think that this truth has now been firmly digested in our regiment.

Deputy Regimental Commander for Political Affairs Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Zamarayev was at one of the company Komsomol meetings. And when the cadets began to discuss the unsatisfactory support to the subunit—there were not enough tank overalls in the required sizes—he did not even begin to write these critical observations in his notepad. Immediately after the meeting he invited the deputy regimental commander for rear services to come to the company and he readdressed that question to him in front of the soldiers. It turned out that the problem in obtaining the equipment had been caused only by sluggishness on the part of one of the warehouse chiefs. And the company starshina [sergeant major] got the overalls that same day.

One of the peculiarities of a training subunit is that the cadets serve there for only a short time and then personnel in the subunit are almost totally replenished. How is this on the officers? How can they get to know the souls of all their subordinates in such a short time? We hold individual talks and correspond with the parents of the soldiers and sergeants. This work provides much information and reflection. But it is not enough. The mood of the people and their wishes and concerns can change hourly. In order to constantly be abreast of all of these changes we decided to set up a Social Opinion Council in the subunit. This agency, as we now call it, is informal. There are no protocols or resolutions needed for it. It has one mission—to study the problems that soldiers have during their service and to contribute to eliminating those problems.

No hand is raised to write, "involved in the council were..." Rather the council combines people from among the commissioned and warrant officers, the sergeants and the cadets who are leaders in the collective and can win their fellow servicemen over. This agency helps me as commander to actively influence my subordinates in those spheres of life and business where I do not want to use command methods.

Its areas of concern are not limited. For example fellow workers once noticed that Private Mikhail Lashevskiy was under stress. Little by little they found out that the

soldier was having some difficulties in his family life—a problem had arisen between his wife and his parents. It looked like his family was falling apart. Council members came to me with a petition to give Lashevskiy a short leave and I had to go to the regimental commander with this request. The soldier left for his home and settled his personal problems.

Sergeant Oleg Kolmogorov also had some problems. His wife was not being paid his allowances after the birth of his child. We also found out about this through the Social Opinion Council. We wrote a letter to the Voenkom and thus solved the problem.

The council's area of interest also includes problems associated with intensifying military training and having soldiers qualitatively master the subjects that they are working on. Thanks to its influence (and, by the way, the council enjoys the complete trust of the collective's members) the soldiers themselves are organizing assistance for those who are lagging behind. The slightest attempts at establishing non-regulatory relationships in the subunit are nipped in the bud and as a consequence we have firm discipline.

The council holds daily reviews of the cadets' training. This measure is also informal. There is a discussion of the essence of training—who has mastered what during the combat training day and who should get additional training. One thing that is important is that the evaluations that one cadet or another receives is from his comrades. Glasnost and the fact that the soldiers themselves are extensively taking part in the collective's affairs are eliminating any indifference that the soldiers might have had toward the company's honor and prestige.

And I must say in this regard that we have taken obligations upon ourselves during the present military training period. Today it is somehow not accepted to take increased obligations because of increasing exactingness. It has become difficult to get an "excellent" review evaluation. Therefore many officers have oriented themselves toward getting a "good" evaluation. I myself also had this same opinion when I held discussions about obligations. But the council made some investigations independent of my own opinion and came to the conclusion that the company was coping with its "excellent" commitments. I as the commander had to agree with this opinion. True, if for some reason there was any sudden breakdown in combat training and it was through the fault of my subordinates, I quickly had a conversation not only with those who had made the mistake, but also with all the council's personnel, saying something like, "Look comrades, you suggested 'excellent' objectives for the company, but let us think about that..."

And thus we are learning to live and serve under conditions of expanding democracy. By the 70th Anniversary of the Komsomol I had already decided to provide

incentives to those who had distinguished themselves. The council offered to determine the candidates for incentives. They decided to try an experiment. Komsomol members were strict in evaluating the activities of their comrades and there were no undeserving people on the list that was presented to me.

This trust gave birth to a good reaction in people—it increased everyone's feeling of responsibility. People see that we are listening to their opinions and this means that they try to display independence and initiative in every matter.

We now understand that in order to expand democracy in the subunit and make soldiers and citizens out of the yesterday's urchins we have to arouse every local collective and every man to conscientious, purposeful action. We have to convince our subordinates that openness, inquisitiveness, creativity, initiative, mutual exactingness and mutual understanding will bring success. When we are able to do this, army life will take on a new tint for the soldiers. It will not be a burden for them, but, and I am not afraid to use a strong word, a joy. They will strive to improve the conditions of their service and their daily life without reminders from the commander or the political worker. We have organized amateur talent activities and excursions and we invite interesting people to meet and talk with our personnel. And it makes good sense for the commander to cooperate with these initiatives and support them.

Nevertheless, in actually granting people greater rights, we must constantly remind them of the responsibility that they have. I am deeply convinced that talks about democratizing army life are only empty chatter unless people feel they must make high demands on themselves and on others and unless there is discipline and organization.

I understand that our experiment is perhaps still not over and possibly has not yet been thought out to its end. But I am writing about it so that someone can develop it and if anyone has anything new, they can tell us about their experience.

Punishment No Panacea for Discipline Problems
18010153a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 11 Nov 88 p 2

[Article by Captain Lieutenant V. Dandykin, KASPNETS newspaper correspondent, Caspian Flotilla: "A Disciplinary 'Panacea' or How Indoctrinational Work Is Being Replaced by Senseless 'Bashing'"]

[Text] From the balcony of his quarters Captain 3rd Rank Ye. Avetisyan can clearly see the ships that are in the flotilla that he heads. Yervand Meyeropovich has only to arm himself with binoculars and he is right in tune with what is taking place at the moorages and on the decks. This is precisely the reason he spends so much time on his balcony.

And I must note that these activities are far from fruitless. After discerning deficiencies Captain 3rd rank Ye. Avetisyan rouses the duty officer, gives orders and tells him what measures to take with the person who allowed these shortcomings. And here I must again note that these supplemental drill activities with those who have violated military discipline enjoy the special respect of the division commander. This is because, according to Yervand Meyeropovich, an exceptionally measured step on the drill field can play the role of a unique pedagogical panacea.

By the way, I found out about all of this after I visited similar activities one evening. These are not mentioned in the daily training plan. And people view such activities very strangely: four sailors on stumbling legs plod around in a circle in a downcast manner...

After hearing the question, the duty sergeant had trouble answering who the senior man was. It finally turned out that Lieutenant A. Litsatov was that person. But apparently he had business aboard ship and had a formal attitude toward his additional duties. Meanwhile the time for the "bashing" had passed. The sailors lined up in an uneven formation.

The duty sergeant addressed them with, "Well, hooligans and parasites, you can go to your various ships..."

I asked him to hold the sailors for a short time and this is what I found out from talking with them.

Captain 3rd Rank Avetisyan "prescribes" drill activities for those who, according to the monthly results, have been negligent. Those who have been given this punishment must undergo drill training for the entire following month, four times per week for 90 minutes and sometimes longer. If they do not do this, the punishment is extended that much again. This, for example, happened to Starshina [Petty Officer] Second Class A. Lopatin. However, the sailor showed no apparent desire to turn over a new leaf. On the contrary, he became embittered and began to violate discipline even more often. For example he tried to compensate for the hours that had been spent on "bashing" by using minutes of service time for his own personal business.

Lopatin said, "It won't work any other way. At times we go 22 hours a day here..."

Senior Sailor R. Mukhamideyev and Sailors N. Zaynukov and Shch. Kumiyeu are in total agreement with him. All of them were actually punished twice for practically one offense—they were each given five days arrest and an additional month of drill.

In this case there is no doubt that this was a gross violation of disciplinary practice. But it seems to me that this happened not because the flotilla commander does not know the requirements of the Disciplinary Regulations and the rights that it grants him. This was his own

position and one to which, by the way, other officers in the flotilla hold. Here is the essence of that position: reach your goal at any price.

Unit Political Worker Senior Lieutenant V. Akishin told me, "You do not know what working with people is like. I use every type of means to combat these violators. I write the parents of these careless sailors letters about their abominable service and I invite their parents to visit the ship. And the drilling—it is a real means for educating them. Others will look at those who are walking and think before they violate discipline. They will be afraid..."

Alas, it is not only people in this subunit that hold to such an opinion. The people in the subunit of the ships where Captain Lieutenant V. Zavtonov is serving have also followed the example of Captain Avetisyan. True, as often happens, the copy was worse than the original. But Senior Lieutenant P. Mirzoyants from a trawler flotilla generally does not use anything other than this type of punishment to have an educational effect on his subordinates, and it therefore really grieves him that they are not still using drill as punishment. The brigade commander himself supports Avetisyan.

Mirzoyants asks, "What kind of pedagogics is this? Who is this Makarenko?"

"Where has there been enough! Where did you see Makarenko with us? You are an Utopian..."

Senior Lieutenant Akishin who was already acquainted with us said, "The easiest thing to do is blame. But can you, for example, offer something in exchange?"

What can you say when an officer annoyingly masters only one aspect of the entire arsenal of educational means and that one is punishment. And in addition that officer has come to believe that the others are not useful. Those others, he says, do not work because "the sailor of today has developed differently..."

It is generally not difficult to discover the foundations of such "refined" disciplinary practices. This is a vulgarization of both the missions and the people with whom one has to work. It has started everyone, both the innocent and the guilty, marching around in a circle and you don't have to learn the characteristics, select the key to your subordinates' spirits or become convinced about anything, i.e., expend emotion and cardiac energy. Some commanders are not at all shy in saying, "The main thing is for subordinates to fear me, and let them respect authority."

Why, obviously if this authority does not hinder Captain 3rd Rank Ye. Avetisyan's activities, he respects it. But what about his subordinates... Things are more complicated for them. There is good reason for the fact that

Yervand Meyeropovich cannot leave his observation post at the balcony of his quarters. This very eloquently characterizes the effectiveness of his disciplinary practice.

Central Asian MD Political Directorate Chief on Pacifism, Draft-Dodging
18010160 Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 20 Nov 88 p 3

[Interview with Lieutenant General Gennadiy Ivanovich Chuchkalov, Military Council member and Central Asian MD Political Directorate Chief, conducted by Nataliya Domagalskaya: "An Army of Pacifists—A Candid Dialogue"]

[Text] [Domagalskaya] Gennadiy Ivanovich, there have recently been very many events inspiring the hope for a stable peace in the world. We had the Soviet-American Summit Meeting and the treaty limiting arms and destroying an entire class of missiles and, as a result, the peaceful explosions in Sary-Ozeke and at the Kapustin Yar range. We get almost daily information in newspapers and television about Soviet-American approaches to peace and the creative activities for peace by not only entire classes and parties, but by individual citizens, children, the church and women's organizations. Our troops have left Afghanistan. The hotbed of the Iran-Iraq war has finally cooled. And therefore, in the views of a certain segment of people, the issue of military and patriotic training has almost become "non-urgent" today.

[Chuchkalov] Yes, unfortunately there are many such attitudes. And they are really rather dangerous. I will attempt to prove this. Yet such people, through their numbers and what they are expressing, can make up an entire army. An army of pacifists.

Imperialism still exists and there is still the threat of armed conflict. Even if you suppose that there are no nuclear weapons in the world today, does this eliminate the nuclear danger? Imagine that a World War II "conventional" weapon has destroyed a nuclear power plant... Western Armies have radically improved conventional weapons and weapons developed on totally new principles are appearing. No, it is too soon to "abolish" the army. But there is one thing that is very alarming—a significant part of the young people coming into the army are morally unprepared for service. And, even stranger, there is ignorance and even feebleness. People don't know—but we can teach and train them; but when they "don't see the sense..." When a man is in a frame of mind that is morally not suited for the service, it is dangerous to go into battle with him, for it means that the unit is not really combat ready and able to fight.

Do you know what this indifference and pacifism that is very innocent from a family point of view can become? The desire to use every means possible to avoid the service. And if that doesn't work, it becomes the desire to

"work out" something to endure this time. And this is why strong healthy fellows are now trying to get into construction battalions instead of the prestige units as was the case until recently (they asked for aviation, the navy and tank forces). There is less real military service there and people are not called in for assemblies afterwards.

[Domagalskaya] And what do we lose by this?

[Chuchkalov] At the beginning of this year Voenkomat [military registration and enlistment office] investigated one hundred and ten men throughout Kirgizia who had attempted to avoid service. We can realistically not call up all the young men who have reached the age for conscription. Many are not admissible because they are rejected by medical personnel, are drug addicts or alcoholics or are serving punishments after trials. But among those called up into the army are those who have police judgments out against them, those who have become enfeebled, those who have not mastered the Russian language, those who are not physically prepared...

For example, all of this increases the load on those lads who sit at radar screens in the PVO Forces. A serviceman has six hours of duty allotted, but he has to stand duty for 12 and instead of the allotted eight hours of duty in a communications center, the serviceman has to do 24 hours. One can imagine what problems this can cause.

[Domagalskaya] You have given a number of reasons leading to results that are undesirable. In your opinion, what is the reason for this?

[Chuchkalov] Antiquated approaches to military-patriotic work and the absence of a single coordination center controlling this work.

[Domagalskaya] Well, a center, yes, this is understandable. As far as I know, those responsible for training young people for the Army and Navy today include Health Services workers and people from Physical Training and Sports Commissions, Agencies for People's Education, the Komsomol and Veterans' Councils....

[Chuchkalov] And the fact is that no one is really responsible! That is, all seven cooks are somehow involved in it, but I have never heard of someone specifically being responsible for this work. For example, only 48 percent of those called up into the Army throughout Kirgizia meet GTO ["Ready to Work and Defend the USSR" physical training system] norms and in Moscovskiy Rayon, for example, this figure is only six percent. Has someone been held responsible for this? But if such a center did not allow schools to be built unless they had a military-sports base and held a specific person strictly responsible for the declined health of young people in a city or rayon, it would no longer be the concern of those who head initial military training in schools.... Only 12 percent of the military instructors themselves have ever served in the Army. Is this normal?

And not a single (!) member of the Kirgizia Komsomol Central Committee Department of Sports and Mass Defensive Work has served. I will give you one more curious figure—only 11 percent of the republic's Komsomol workers have gone through the Army school. And they are educating the Motherland's defenders of tomorrow.

[Domagalskaya] These numbers are really alarming. But in two years the Kirgizian State Institute for Physical Training will graduate its first secondary school NVP [initial military training] leaders. At a recent All-Union Junior Reserve Soldiers Assembly in Novorossiysk the "Rodina" Military-Patriotic Association operating in the Kirgizian capital was recognized as one of the best in the country...

[Chuchkalov] And this is excellent. You can add to these examples the names of Kirgizians who are skillfully and honorably serving in the ranks of the Soviet Army and those who have been decorated during peace time for displaying courage and heroism while carrying out their international duty in Afghanistan. But I would say that this is far from always because of the existing forms of military-patriotic education and at times is in spite of it. Perhaps this excludes the activities of the junior reserve soldiers.

Judge for yourself. An education, to include a military-patriotic education, begins in the family. And I am not talking about "incomplete" families and "female" pedagogics, as a result of which a seventeen-year-old youth often does not know the difference between a soldier and a policeman and is not able to fight an honest battle, run and play war. People often advocate distorted moral principles in those places where these are considered correct: the father brings nothing from the factory—and this is bad; he does bring something from the factory—and this is good. Does this have some direct relationship with the subject of our conversation? It has, and more! A man dodges, is crafty and adapts himself and grows and lives in this situation.

If you will, it was previously considered a disgrace for a man to avoid service. I remember that a woman in the Ukraine would not marry a man for that reason. Now social opinion has changed so much in this respect that, on the contrary, this is almost prestigious. It is felt that if parents have not been able to "protect" their son from the service, it means that they do not really care about him.

Well, okay. At home parents protect their children and lead them by the hand. But what about the schools? Things are far from right there. One can stand guard of honor, but please, does this seriously indoctrinate patriotism in these young souls... I have often seen the "Zarnitsa" and "Orlenok" para-military games. They are often a spectacle just for show. The games of today are not aimed at educating, but rather at entertaining. Comfortable buses take the children in their beautiful

uniforms, military people bustle about laying out tents, the kitchen is in readiness and adult military "uncles" prepare the food. And what about the fellows who join us in the barracks in three or four years? Well, they run around the fields a little, yell out chants and that is all. These children feel that they are on an outing and not assisting the military. What we need is to reach the point where the game provides moral and physical stress. Where the lads are able to at least rough-hew a stake, dig a foxhole, prepare their own food, use a map and compass to get themselves oriented ...

[Domagalskaya] Our reports are most likely still associated with the fact that military patriotic education is somehow conducted "in and of itself," is not linked with

moral and international education and doesn't indoctrinate the children with a love for the history of our Fatherland, regardless of how difficult and bitter this history may be... Often the young people who march around chanting do not know where and how their grandfathers died in the Great Patriotic War.

[Chuchkalov] And at times this lack of respect for history takes on very blasphemous forms—lack of respect for awards, civil infantilism, getting information from only one point of view and admiring the West. How do we overcome all of this? In my opinion, by suggesting from childhood that any new-born man is first and foremost the future defender and future soldier.

Vehicle Repair Problems Plague Northern Group of Forces

18010271 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Nov 88 First Edition p 2

[Article by Maj S. Babayev, Northern Group of Forces, under rubric "People's Control": "From Point A to Point B"]

[Text] Two LAZ-695 buses departed point A for point B, a distance of 70 km. One might ask how long they will be en route if the road is good, it is during the daylight hours, the drivers are experienced and the vehicle commanders have been briefed? Doesn't this resemble a school problem? But the answer is not at all as in the books.

One driver did not cope with his vehicle—the steering let him down. Then the engine in the other bus died because the fuel pump malfunctioned and they had to mess with it. After that the starter locked up. At the same time, in fixing the troubles they also had to tighten all the coupling bolts.

Now it is time to ask another question: What kind of unit is this where vehicles are maintained in this manner? Is there a KTP [equipment inspection station] at all there? What does the motor maintenance service do?

The answer also is not quite that simple because the unit is point B, the vehicles' destination, and point A from which they departed is an automotive repair plant.

Unfortunately this situation is not unique. I have had repeated occasion to hear criticism in many units addressed to the automotive repair personnel: they keep the vehicles a long time and they repair them in an inferior manner.

We are chatting with Col V. Skryl, the recently appointed chief of the automotive repair plant. Viktor Ivanovich does not conceal his concern. It becomes clear from plant documentation that in 1987 and the first half of 1988 the enterprise received eleven certificates of complaint about the inferior quality of automotive equipment repair from Northern Group of Forces military units. This does not appear to be many, but in fact these data are far from the real state of affairs.

The result of an inspection of the finished product performed by the military procuracy was proof of this. For example, in December of last year 55 of 85 repaired vehicles did not conform to established requirements of technical-standards documents and 32 of the 37 repaired in April, May and June 1988 were rejected. The defects were of a periodically repetitive nature and involved those troubles which threaten equipment operating safety: steering, brake system, and clutch malfunctions.

Inspections in military units succeeded in identifying another 35 pieces of inferior automotive equipment following repairs at the plant last year. And how much more unfinished work was there that local specialists fixed themselves after merely swearing at the plant "craftsmen"?

Indicators at the enterprise began to "drift" greatly since entry into force of the statute under which the entire sum is withdrawn as budget income in case of the sale of a product manufactured with a deviation from standards and specifications. Plan fulfillment was 95 percent of the plan in April, 85 percent in May and only 78 percent in June. The wave of rejects was growing literally with each passing week.

Maj G. Chukhlebov shifted 85 repaired vehicles to an area of one of the units for storage, but he did not document this fact and did not ensure the area's safe-keeping. WO S. Lutsenko, chief of the finished products depot, also remained aloof from this. As a result in just three months all motor vehicles had been cannibalized and more than ten had frozen up. But didn't someone guard this facility and didn't someone inspect the guard?

Just how did Col V. Vladimirov, the former plant chief, proceed with respect to WO Lutsenko, who already had allowed engines to freeze up once before? It was very simple: he gave instructions to understate the amount of damage. Was that not why Lutsenko again took a devil-may-care attitude toward his duties some time later?

Ignoring technical requirements in running-in the vehicles had a considerable influence on the increase in rejects: running-in was performed without a 75-percent load, and people often were content with a run of 25-30 km instead of the established 50 km. Certain technological processes were violated in the shops, there was an absence of necessary repair accessories, and there was a lack of measurement tools.

Of course the irresponsibility of officials—former enterprise chief Col V. Vladimirov, chief engineer Lt Col A. Ovcharenko, and deputy enterprise chief for quality Maj G. Petrov—above all was the reason for the sorry state of affairs involving automotive equipment repair. But how about the labor collective?

Not long ago they shifted to a new and more progressive system of wages here and work stations were certified, but all this was done formally without participation of party, trade union, and Komsomol organizations. The enterprise chief himself personally determined the rates in two days. Naturally there were reservations and resentment, and everyone knows that this does not improve the working mood or the moral atmosphere in the collective. By the way, one can say that there was even an indifferent attitude toward bad workers at the enterprise. There are many examples where a worker first would be punished for inferior workmanship or

absenteeism and then would be paid a monetary reward in one and the same month. By the way, some of these workers returned their bonuses.

In response to the question about why he did that, worker Mikhail Kirsanov answered tersely:

"Out of shame."

The party, Komsomol, and trade union organizations were aloof from the campaign against bad workers, and people's control was inactive. The following question also is legitimate: Did the Northern Group of Forces motor maintenance service really know nothing about the state of affairs at the plant and about difficulties

involving the specialists, the equipment, and introduction of the new wages? The fact is that inspectors had been there, and more than once. As a result the amount of material damage to the state was more than just a single thousand rubles.

Of course the equipment repair deficiencies which were discovered are being remedied. A considerable portion of the material damage also has been recovered from guilty parties. Honestly speaking, however, the new leadership of the automotive repair plant has no fewer problems because of this. The fact is that a very large amount of inferior work (if this term can be used here) was done in organizing labor and in working with people.

MVD Intervenes in Case of Deceased Officer
18010442c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Jun 88 Second Edition p 3

[Unattributed article: "You Do Not Belong Here..."]

[Text] "You do not belong here..." This was the title of a report written by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent Major N. Burbyga and published on 26 April. It related the circumstances surrounding a heartless and formal attitude shown I. Kozina, widow of an officer who was killed while fulfilling his internationalist duty in Afghanistan. Lieutenant General Admin Serv V. Durdinets, UkSSR Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, contacted our editorial office to confirm the facts presented in this report. For the heartlessness and formalism they displayed, I. Marusenko, passport section chief of the Kirovskiy Rayon branch of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Kirovograd, and L. Shut, passport administrator, have been discharged from their positions by order of the UkSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. A. Zaporozhchenko, chief of the Kirovskiy Rayon branch and V. Tereshchenko, branch political deputy, were delivered severe reprimands for serious deficiencies in the functioning of the passport section and in the training of its personnel; V. Molodets, passport section chief of the Kirovograd Obispolkom Administration of Internal Affairs, received a reprimand. Stern warnings were given V. Marusenko, chief of the Kirovograd Obispolkom Administration of Internal Affairs, and B. Yasinovskiy, chief of the political section, for serious deficiencies in the performance of passport service personnel. By order of the UkSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, specific measures have been drawn up to improve the quality of passport service operations.

The report "You Do Not Belong Here..." has been studied in all subunits of internal affairs agencies in the republic where citizens are received. The UkSSR Ministry of Internal Affairs is undertaking specific measures to improve the quality of service provided the general population.

Question of Officers' Pay Discussed
18010442d Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Jun 88 Second Edition p 1

[Article by Captain 1st Rank (Ret) G. Bronevitskiy, candidate of psychological sciences, lecturer: "Appeals and Incentives"]

[Text] In a discussion of the CC CPSU Theses, Captain 2d Rank V. Godunov touched upon the complex topic of officers' pay (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 31 May). For some reason such issues have not generally been raised in the press. I have decided to make a number of observations in this regard based on many years of experience.

I remember the care with which I scrutinized the report of Midshipman M. Fedotov (prior to retirement I served as department chairman at a senior naval academy) containing his request for discharge. There was a great deal here I could

not understand. Here a well-disciplined, conscientious second-year student was abandoning the decision he had made previously to become an officer. It was all the more surprising by virtue of the fact that, prior to entering the academy, he had served almost two years on active duty.

Efforts on the part of the command, Komsomol organization and instructors to convince him to continue his training at the academy led nowhere. Finally he was discharged.

Then last year, entirely by accident, I happened to run into Mikhayil. He was a sergeant in the reserves, working at a plant in the specialty he had acquired at a professional technical institute prior to his enlistment. We had a long and—more importantly—frank conversation. Fedotov was satisfied with the way things turned out and his intentions were to continue towards developing and mastering his working specialty. Did he regret the fact that he had left the academy? "It was the right decision," he believes even now. Certainly, Mikhayil admitted, a bitter taste was left in his mouth—service in the navy was and still is attractive to him in and of itself. But it was the officer's way of life, putting it mildly, which was not.

Certainly Mikhayil's position is subject to criticism—it is flawed on moral grounds. But it has a definite foundation. The fact of the matter is that, while undergoing training following his first phase at the academy, Fedotov found out what the group commander's pay and allowances amounted to. The officer was not provided quarters in the cruiser basing area and was therefore forced to accept housing at a fairly steep cost. His wife could not work since their son was not yet a year old, and there was no possibility of putting him in a nursery. In all, what was left for each family member amounted to 53 rubles. Officers do not have a standardized working day and, when their ship is in port, they are able—in the best case—to go home to their families just once every three days, after evening dinner.

Now is it clear why, in spite of his desire to become an officer, Mikhayil nonetheless decided to return to the plant? Working eight hours a day, five days a week, he earns more than a lieutenant, more than the commander of a ship's department...

We need to examine several other factors in this regard. Administrative arrangements for the families of officers and warrant officers during periods of reassignment are not even stipulated in any documents. But senior officers remember back when they would receive a certain monetary compensation for being required to live on the economy. In my opinion, this was a fair arrangement.

It is the main leitmotif of all basic documents to encourage the officer to "go all out." In the final analysis this leads either to administration by mere injunction or to "wheel-spinning" appeals in the leadership style not only of command personnel, but also of Komsomol and party organizations. Here, in my opinion, we completely ignore the financial prerequisites in providing incentives for our officer personnel. But these must not be ignored.

People's Control Investigation of Motor Vehicle Repair

*18010442e Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Jun 88 Second Edition p 2*

[Editorial: "Motor Vehicle Repair Again"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] "Black Holes in Motor Vehicle Repair" was the title of the satire written by Captain I. Ivanyuk and published on 29 January in the first issue of "People's Control." It discussed the poor quality of motor vehicle repair work at a number of enterprises and the delays encountered at the same time. Clients sometimes wait years for repair of their equipment and are unable to get it back.

Responding to our published account, Colonel O. Gordiyenko, chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense's Main Administration for Motor Vehicles, confirmed that the deficiencies reported at enterprises headed by Colonel S. Kozakevich and Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Medvedev did in fact exist.

During the course of an inspection at one of these enterprises, serious departures from prescribed motor vehicle repair procedure were uncovered. Six complaints were received there in 1987 for completed work which was below standard. Fines were levied against the enterprise collective for these infractions—3,100 rubles of profit was deducted.

For their neglectful performance, stern disciplinary measures were taken against Lieutenant Colonel V. Kapustin, the plant's main engineer; Major A. Polyakov, plant deputy chief for quality control; Major Yu. Penyagin, responsible for logistics and technical service support; and Soviet Army employee A. Makhnin, shop foreman.

Deficiencies uncovered on the UAZ-469 vehicle, belonging to the construction and repair section of the Armor Academy were eliminated.

Colonel Gordiyenko also stated that the report of an extended delay prior to commencement of repair work on two GAZ-53 vehicles belonging to the Korkino DOSAAF Motor Vehicle School is correct. This occurred at the enterprise headed by Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Medvedev and is the fault of receiving technician Derkach. The vehicles have been overhauled and returned to the client.

Additionally, his response states that the "Black Holes" satire became the subject of serious discussion in the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Administration for Motor Vehicles. The period of time a motor vehicle stays in the repair shop is being monitored more closely.

Our editors received a truly good-natured reply from the Moscow Military District motor vehicle service, signed by Colonel G. Vigrasov. His unit is directly subordinate to the enterprise currently headed by Colonel S. Koza, where you get the impression that nothing has happened

really, and that their supervision "gives positive results." Authorities at the motor vehicle repair service in the Central Asian Military District, where the second enterprise is located, have been completely silent.

Major General A. Borovtsev, director of the Main Administration for Construction Industry in the Ministry of Defense, informed our editors that an administrative investigation of the factual circumstances behind the satire has been conducted. Facts show that personnel at the enterprise headed by Lieutenant Colonel G. Klepach were unable for more than a year to come to grips with repair of a vehicle-mounted crane arriving from the Belorussian Military District. A complaint registered in this regard with the Main Administration for Construction Industry by our editorial staff was also lost without a trace.

General Borovtsev's correspondence stated that A. Kachkin, deputy chief of the production section, and Soviet Army employee Ye. Shustovaya had been negligent in their work using technical manuals and, as a result, were administered stern disciplinary punishment. Based on results of the investigation, a decision was made to reduce the price to be paid by the client by 23,310 rubles.

It is unfortunate that there is still no trace of another two items of equipment which have fallen into the "black hole" of the repair facility—a steam shovel and vehicle-mounted crane dispatched from the Siberia Military District to the Far East Military District. The Far East district staff and other authorities involved in this matter have failed to respond to an inquiry by our editorial staff.

We did receive a second letter from the client in which Colonel A. Popov informed us that the steam shovel was returned to the unit following publication of the news item. The only problem is that it was no where near being in operating condition. And it has been two and a half years now that nothing has been seen of the vehicle-mounted crane. Nor is its log book available, without which motor vehicle authorities of the Siberia Military District are unable even to write off the equipment. The editors hope that responsible officials will clarify matters once and for all and restore order to this sphere.

Declaration of Central Commission for Patronage by Creative Intelligentsia

*18010442 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Jun 88 Second Edition p 1*

[Text of the "Appeal of the Central Committee for Patronage of USSR Armed Forces Personnel by Those Engaged in Culture and the Performing Arts Directed To the Creative Intelligentsia"]

[Text] Dear Comrades!

The noble mission of Soviet military internationalists in Afghanistan is ending. The Soviet people warmly welcome the servicemen returning to their Motherland who

have provided invaluable assistance to the fraternal Afghani people. Faithful to the glorious traditions of patronage by our creative intelligentsia of the members of the USSR Armed Forces, our performers, artists, writers, cinematographers and journalists have always stood alongside our Soviet soldiers and officers. Their appearances in the units, subunits and at hospitals have raised the morale of our fighting men and afforded them minutes of joy.

Today as the units pulled out of Afghanistan are deployed to new stations, we call upon the patronage commissions, officials in culture and the arts, and members of creative unions and societies to keep up their patronage effort. Our servicemen are always gladdened by meeting with the great artists and arts collectives. They await them in Lenin rooms, in their barracks and clubs. Let us make these meetings, concerts, evening occasions and discussions lively and emotional events, devoid of ballyhoo and formalism.

We call upon students, those engaged in creative endeavor at higher educational institutions and mid-level specialized cultural institutes, to join in the patronage effort. This will serve as a mutual spiritual enrichment to military and creative youth.

We call upon artists, sculptors and designers to aid commanders and political officers in providing materials for and artistically designing Lenin rooms, clubs, museums, "combat glory rooms," and military posts.

We heartily support the initiative of those creative individuals who contribute free of charge their paintings, graphic art works, sculptures, artistic and socio-political literature, to our military units and subunits.

Many of our soldiers, sergeants, warrant officers and officers who have fulfilled their international obligation in Afghanistan now find themselves recovering in hospitals, often far from their friends and relatives. We are certain that, following the traditions originating in the years of the Civil War and Great Patriotic Wars, they will be warmed by the heartfelt attention shown them by our creative intelligentsia. Let no soldier feel he is forgotten or given less than his due.

We call upon masters of the arts, our creative youth, our performers working independently, to make more frequent visits to military hospitals and unite themselves, by their individual patronage, to our wounded.

The exploits of our internationalist servicemen have been invaluable in the patriotic education of our youth and those entering the army and navy. Heroism and loyalty to their military duty, the moral qualities of Soviet internationalist military personnel, have been highly acknowledged by all the Soviet people. Many of our soldiers and officers have merited state medals and

the finest have been awarded the august title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Their feats and military service await appropriate representation in publication, literature and art.

Dear Comrades! The Central Commission for Patronage of USSR Armed Forces Personnel by Those Engaged in Culture and the Performing Arts asserts its certainty that the country's artistic intelligentsia will accomplish specific actions to assist commanders and political officers as well as military cultural institutions in bringing up and educating our Soviet military personnel.

We wish you great success and new creative achievements in this noble cause.

Problems of Military S&T Sector Discussed
18010442b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Jun 88 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Major General R. Yusupov, doctor of technical sciences, professor, distinguished RSFSR figure in science and technology; Rear Admiral V. Kalashnikov, naval academy deputy director for scientific matters; Captain 1st Rank V. Shinkov, doctor of technical sciences and professor; Colonel B. Didusev, doctor of technical sciences and professor: "Back Again to Those 'Sore Points'"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] There is a sentence in the Central Committee Theses which, although short, encompasses a great deal: socialism cannot develop without the support of scientific and technological progress. And without such support a high defensive posture for the country today is unthinkable. How can we imbue military science with increased effectiveness, fighting spirit and depth? Many diverse opinions are today being propounded in this regard. Some are incontrovertible, others not. But practically all of them agree that restructuring requires an open and honest look at the "sore points" in science, that it demands soundly argued and well thought out decisions.

Building Our Forces

It is unfortunate, but must be stated nonetheless, that a certain portion of the creative personnel in military higher educational institutions have torn themselves away from the practical needs of the troops. Science personnel of the Scientific Research Directorate sometimes digress, get involved in drawing up and coordinating various documents of a bureaucratic nature, and "sink" in the morass of participation in numerous conferences on numerous themes. Significant effort is expended on the military-scientific appurtenances to projects, which themselves have begun to lose their primary significance. There has been a decline somewhat in the number of selfless individuals engaged in military science who remain nobly devoted to the cause, and the number of major science schools has decreased.

Today like never before it is essential to clearly define the sphere of one's research so as to prevent diffusion of effort on the same projects being conducted in different departments. We have no right to close our eyes to the fact that, in certain spheres of science and technology related to the country's defense, organizations within the USSR Academy of Sciences and industry have a more powerful experimental base. It is senseless to be competing with them. The main sphere of our research must be tied to the development of military science and technology proper.

Coordination of activities conducted by military scientists with those of their colleagues in the USSR Academy of Sciences, industry and civilian institutions of higher learning could be accomplished by an academic coordinating agency created under the Ministry of Defense. This highest scientific institution—established on an elective basis, and not by appointment, of prominent military scientists and leaders—will contribute heavily to the development of the theory and practice of military science, and will be able to present recommendations on the efficient distribution of scientific resources from within our institutes of higher education, the Scientific Research Directorate and our military forces in the development of basic and applied research and experimental design work.

Not many people today realize that one of the most important aims of science is to obtain new knowledge, to search for scientific truth and seek a profound understanding of developmental trends in one sphere or another. There is therefore a vital need to establish a well thought out system for enhancing the qualifications of officer personnel and conducting their retraining in view of long-range science and technology considerations.

The problem of producing today's modern scientist is inseparably linked both to perfecting the system of officer training itself and to prospects for the development of scientific work in the Ministry of Defense. It is possible that, in order to effect a more detailed and democratic discussion of this problem and draw up constructive proposals, it would be advisable to conduct an all-army scientific conference with the broad representative participation of scientists.

Braking During Take-Off

Resolving the complex tasks of science and technology using the old method to which we have become accustomed—the establishment of large "ad hoc" bodies—is today not only impossible, but inefficient as well. All the resources have been set in motion but no one is awaiting the signal to attack. We must therefore seek other alternatives, and this does not only involve increasing the number of computers and instruments, etc., at the science employee's workplace. A deciding role must be played here by ideas, new and progressive ideas enabling fundamental change in the course of scientific endeavor.

It is people who engender ideas, and this is why the problem of cadre is so critical. We recently experienced a slowdown in the natural process of continuity and renewal, a factor that could not help but affect the age of military scientists as well. We ourselves are primarily at fault in this regard—we neglected to give adequate thought to reserves; we failed to train them. Energetic measures to rejuvenate the officer corps can solve this problem. But we should not go to extremes here. We must treat our specialists with care and consideration, especially those who are highly qualified (doctors of science, professors, etc.).

In addition to extensive technical knowledge, development of our military in modern times requires practical skills as well. Even the most scientifically gifted institute graduate must serve his time on active duty in the fleet and acquire experience. Only then can he enter an academy or engage in graduate work for developing and expanding his knowledge in tactical and strategic matters. Moreover, the academy instructor must teach his students what they need to know in war. How can he do this if he does not know it himself? Such knowledge is acquired through the experience of military service, in positions equivalent to or higher than those the prospective graduates are preparing for.

With respect to graduate schooling, almost a year is devoted to candidate qualifying examinations. In our opinion, these exams could be taken while an individual was still training at the academy. This would facilitate higher quality training at the graduate school and a shorter term of instruction.

Another reason we poorly utilize many of the opportunities available for accelerating the training of scientific personnel is that we have inadequate information on our truly talented officers, on those who exhibit an ability for research work but who, for one reason or another, have not been admitted to graduate schools or institutes of scientific research. Assignment to a scientific research institute, however, must be based strictly on a candidate's performance qualities, not on his registration or residence in one place or another.

Enthusiasm Does Not Take the Place of Mission

Why is military science spinning its wheels? There are several reasons, it seems to us. No matter how good an academic program might be, no matter how much we increase the time devoted to one discipline or another, if the instructor is weak a great deal is never attained.

Many institutions of "higher learning" are so in name only—they have not become higher learning institutions in spirit or in the core of their training program, which can be insured only through a dynamism of perception and the assimilation of new, specific knowledge. Can we consider it normal if an instructor in an engineering institute of higher learning does not have an engineering degree?

Another reason can be seen in undifferentiated training. This, of course, undermines the effectiveness of the entire system. How can we change it? We can determine periods of training based on successful mastery of a program—two or three years for obtaining a higher specialized military education, six or seven years in preparation for scientific (or scientific instructor) work. For the second stage, it would be advisable in our view to conduct training in specialized areas where, for example, a common first-year program would be followed by one determined by requisition for the required number of commanders, staff officers, engineers, auxiliary and technical services officers, etc.

An expression has come into use recently: "The 'mediocre fellow' goes to graduate school." He doesn't do it on his own, but is rather recruited purposely. Then they assign the "mediocre fellow" to a talented scholar and, thanks to strict demands from the science supervisor, you get one more respectable but useless fixture in the science community. It is distressing, but we have forgotten the words of K. Marx: "Science does not have a main, paved highway. One can get to its glowing peaks only if he is unafraid of fatigue and is willing to scramble along its paths of stone."

We should also give some thought to adopting for ourselves that rule which has been in effect for a long time with regard to civilian institutions of higher learning: an academic department head who is unable to attain his doctorate of sciences after two terms in that office must yield his position to another.

Problems Introducing Computers into Military
18010117 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Aug 88 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Capt 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko with the Northern Fleet: "The Unofficial Computer—What is Slowing Up a Useful Initiative"]

[Text] Col L. Shkulev "fell for" computers while he was completing the military academy by correspondence. He had had to do a lot of work on a computer when writing his degree work, and its enormous capabilities had won Leonid Pavlovich over. Probably, therefore, being assigned to a new unit, he looked around practically first off with the aim: is there an area of life in the unit where it is desirable, even essential, to use computer equipment? And even a cursory glance showed that computer work was an untouched region in the regiment. The comparison of the planned flight tables—a primarily technical matter—took massive time and effort on the part of the squadron commander and his deputy commanders, the regimental commander and other specialists.

The commander chose a small initiative group that would set the tone. This group, naturally unofficial, was

made up of specialists who understood computer technology: Lt Col B. Solovyev, Capt V. Kotov, Sr Lt V. Balan, Warrant Officer V. Kolchin, sailor M. Kryzhevskiy and servicewoman N. Ostrikova.

At first, however, if creativity was demanded of these enthusiasts, it was not technical at all. The main question arose: where to get a computer? In a store? And the money?...

During that time the regiment had received a prize for its successes in ensuring accident-free flights. After a collective discussion, it was resolved to transfer the money to acquire computer machinery. Thus was bought a VK-0010 home computer.

The issue of the creation of the unofficial computer station, by the way, was also resolved via democratic means, as was the question of the purchase of the computer. The proposal of Col Shkulev was discussed at a general meeting of officers and warrant officers of the unit. And only after all had voted in favor of it did the idea come to fruition. They held to voluntary principles a great deal here in general. A personal television—for use as a monitor—was turned over by B. Zheludkov, a tape recorder by Maj V. Zhulikov... If the matter concerns the interests of the service, the personal always recedes into the background.

The memory capacity of the computer that was acquired proved to be relatively small, and the technical cleverness of regimental engineer Capt V. Kotov came to the rescue here—the memory volume of the machine was almost doubled through rationalization. They were able to hook up a printing device to the computer as a result of a number of alterations. Other technical problems were also successfully resolved.

The compilation of special machine programs required no small labor. They had to grope along, using trial and error. After all, no scientific recommendations existed on this score. All the greater their joy when, after the input of the essential information into the machine, it acquired the gift of "speech" and "asked": "What are you interested in?"

But the first raptures passed quickly, and in the regiment they fell to thinking about how to force the machine not only to store information, but to analyze it as well. Today the conventional home computer carries out an accounting and analysis of the training of helicopter crews, the performance of flights under various meteorological conditions and the guaranteed service life of aircraft equipment and other data.

"Look here," elaborates Lt Col B. Solovyev. "It can be seen from these tables, compiled on the computer, when and which of the crew commanders is completing clearance for the performance of this or that combat exercise, for flights under weather conditions of varying complexity. The computer can perform this analysis not only for

the current moment, but for any day out of the next few months. The computer not only gets rid of mountains of paper, but also of involuntary violations, such as when, as a result of imperfections in monitoring, crew commanders needing more training are allowed to make solo flights..."

But the unofficial computer hardly justifies the money expended on it by the fact that it compiles the flight-plan table. The economy of time is an average of 48 man-days a month.

Among near-term plans is the creation of new programs for the machine. The computer will perform navigational and engineering calculations and tactical calculations of the effectiveness of the use of manpower and equipment, determine the degree of reliability of aviation equipment based on an analysis of statistical data and compile monthly, quarterly and annual reports on operations to ensure equipment reliability. The needs of the political workers have also not been forgotten—assistance will be rendered in holding political classes through a network of monitors. It will also be able to compile waiting lists for the receipt of housing.

"We intend to improve our regimental computer station," Col Shkulev shares future plans. "And why not, if no one else is engaged in it?"

What does the regiment have to implement what it intends? A determination to achieve the goals that have been posed, the enthusiasm and passion of people, the moral support of all the personnel, the approval of creative inquiry by the higher command. All of this is so, but their own internal resources are practically exhausted here. They can't pass the hat to raise money for a new computer—the old one cannot "pull" the cart they want to "harness" it to.

And perhaps Col Shkulev is rushing, jumping ahead too far, in striving to be the possessor of a regimental computer station? Maybe it is suddenly not so essential? Practice is proving the opposite. But...

"I have personally received no answer from anyone about whether the centralized equipping of units such as ours with computer equipment is being planned," says Shkulev.

No one knows about such plans at fleet aviation headquarters either. It is, meanwhile, not difficult to conclude that the initiative of the helicopter regiment was called to life by a most urgent need of the day. Also convincing of this is the fact that the idea of creating their own computer base sprang up practically simultaneously in other units as well. A computer station was organized there, also essentially on public principles. It is true that Col Zhdanov was luckier than Col Shkulev: sponsors—a

sizable civilian organization—transferred several computers to him for free. One can only welcome such sponsorship, of course. But one doesn't get far on enthusiasm alone.

One must look at things sensibly, of course: no one can get and put on the table from God knows where a hundred or two personal computers—most likely there are simply no spare ones at all. But that is how one side of the matter looks. And the other... After all, just what is a computer today? Not just a sign of the times, some symbol of them. It is first and foremost an irreplaceable working tool, without which it is impossible to count on any qualitative shifts in work today or, say, a painless—for combat readiness—reduction in administrative personnel. Such is reality. And to neglect it is the same as stubbornly clinging to propeller aircraft when the sky has long thundered with jet aircraft.

UK Defense Minister on INF Eliminations

18010114 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 10 Sep 88 p 3

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA correspondent Yu. Sagaydak, Molesworth—Alconbury—London: "Missiles Flying Away by Plane"]

[Text] At exactly 1400 hours Greenwich time on 9 September 1988, the enormous mass of the American C-5 Galaxy transport plane, its four engines roaring with the strain, reluctantly tore loose from the ground and took a course to the northwest, toward the United States. On board the aircraft were two mobile launch installations intended to launch four cruise missiles apiece. Three minutes later a Starlifter transport lifted off from the same runway at the British Alconbury airbase carrying two American BGM-109 cruise missiles in the cargo section. These missiles, within the framework of the so-called NATO "dual solution," had been based in England at the U.S. airbases of Molesworth and Greenham Common and aimed at Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union along with 112 other cruise missiles. Each has an operational range of 2,500 kilometers.

According to the treaty signed in December of last year in Washington, the Soviet Union and the United States are obliged to destroy their ground-based medium- and short-range missiles with an operational range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. The first batch of missiles was destroyed some time ago in the USSR. The Americans set to fulfilling their treaty obligations later. And here were two missiles sent from Western Europe to the state of Arizona, where they would be destroyed over the next three years. As a Pentagon representative reported, there is still no concrete schedule for destroying them. It is known only that the 16 missiles still at the Molesworth base will be sent to the United States in the next two or three months, and then the withdrawal of the 96 missiles from Greenham Common will begin.

The road to the Molesworth airbase runs past Cambridge, then crosses central England from east to west. The trip from London is only one-and-a-half to two hours. A camp of the advocates of the nuclear disarmament of Great Britain is at the gates of the airbase. Today there are many people there, it is animated. People of the most diverse ages and professions have assembled to celebrate their victory, the path to which had not been easy: The English fighters for peace had been on the watch here through hot weather and cold, arranging meetings and processions, and sometimes even living barriers in the path of the tractor-trailers carrying ever newer American missiles to the base.

American territory begins behind the gates of the base, encircled with a very high fence made of steel framing and barbed wire. The brief and American-style business-like procedure for getting passes, and your correspondent was among other journalists on Army buses who went right into the heart of the airbase, where three tractor-trailers in camouflage colors were parked on an asphalt surface in front of the hangars.

Before the vehicles moved toward the exit in order to transfer their deadly cargo to the neighboring airbase at Alconbury (Molesworth cannot handle large transport aircraft), Great Britain's Minister of Defense, G. Younger, and U.S. Ambassador C. Price spoke to the journalists. Noting in passing that the Soviet-American INF Treaty was a significant contribution to international security and entailed real reductions in nuclear arsenals for the first time in history, the speakers began speaking expansively on how the initiators of the Washington agreement had been the NATO countries. The speakers remained modestly silent about how the NATO people had been in a state of shock for the whole first half of last year, when they were unable to reply to a series of Soviet proposals for a long time. It was as if there had been no efforts on the part of the NATO member countries, and first and foremost Great Britain, to block the progress at the Geneva negotiations with a mass of conditions and caveats.

The questions that followed the press conference, however, showed that the correspondents were least occupied with the historical digression in the speeches of the minister and the ambassador. They were interested in something else: weren't the NATO plans to modernize its nuclear arms an attempt to circumvent the treaty, and what fate would befall the warheads from the cruise missiles? In other words, wouldn't the nuclear weapons be returning to England, only in other weapons systems? For instance, on cruise missiles for the American F-111 aircraft?

As for the warheads, they are the property of the United States, said G. Younger. They could not be used, since they were manufactured especially for the medium-range missiles subject to destruction. The fissionable materials could in turn be employed for either peaceful or military

purposes, the minister noted. A decision to transfer additional F-111 aircraft or other nuclear systems to England has not yet been made.

Frankly speaking, I did not obtain complete clarity from the answers of G. Younger. When the sirens proclaiming the beginning of the movement of the tractor-trailers with the missiles began wailing, I was able to put several questions to the minister.

"In the Soviet Union they are concerned about the possibility of the compensation measures by NATO that could follow, the press asserts, in a very short time. What can you say about that?"

"We do not intend to replace these missiles. We never wanted to deploy them at all. But since a threat exists, we would like to preserve for ourselves the possibility of inflicting an answering strike."

"You were mentioning an intention to preserve a range of possibilities for the employment of nuclear weapons. Does Great Britain intend to compensate for the missiles being withdrawn with other types of nuclear weapons?"

"I hope that we will never have any ground-based medium-range missiles again."

"And what about the F-111s?"

"We should preserve them as long as a threat exists..."

The participants in the peace camp at the airbase entrance perceive the policy of the British government and their senior partners from the United States in a different fashion. Catherine Twelvetree [transliteration] from Leicester, a former actress, hopes that today will become a real beginning for the process of the complete destruction of nuclear weapons.

"I am happy that common sense has finally prevailed," she said. "After all, so many nuclear arms have been stockpiled that any attempt to use them would signify suicide. Chernobyl showed us all what radioactive infection is. And after all, the accident at the Chernobyl power plant cannot even be compared to the smallest nuclear explosion."

"Several minutes ago, Defense Minister Younger tried to assure me that no compensation measures would be undertaken. What do you think about the possibility of replacing the nuclear weapons being removed from England today with other ones?"

"I am sure that they will try to replace these missiles with something else. We therefore intend to preserve our peace camps at the Molesworth and Greenham Common airbases. And we will fight until we achieve what we want—the universal elimination of nuclear weapons."

The engines began to drone, raising up a cloud of dust and bending the withered grass by the runway. The takeoff runs, and the transports tore away from English soil one after the other, bearing the first two American missiles subject to destruction across the ocean. When the outlines of the aircraft were concealed behind the high hangar, those present looked at the cloudy sky for a long time: I was probably not the only one thinking that other aircraft would nose down from behind the clouds someday, by the will of the NATO strategists delivering other missiles to British soil. Would that it never happens!

**'Protectionism' in Cadre Policy of Moscow MD
Involved Kochetov**

18010218 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Oct 88 First Edition p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col V. Zhitarenko of Moscow Military District: "The 'Patronage' of a Commander—Work with Cadres: Trust and Exactingness"]

[Text] They began speaking of him as a possible successor to the commander of the Taman Guards Motorized Rifle Division imeni M.I. Kalinin as early as the spring. Such a placement would be natural, as Gds Lt Col B. Polyakov had sound experience: he had successfully commanded a regiment and been deputy commander of the division. By the way, largely thanks to the efforts of Boris Nikolayevich, an appreciable increase in combat training had been achieved in the division of late. He had expended much effort to raise the individual training of soldiers and the training of gun and vehicle crews to the proper level. Recall that the crew headed by Gds Sgt V. Pudovkin—from the Taman Division—took first prize at the latest infantry combat-vehicle crew competitions at the Ground Forces championship. And the victors owed their success to a considerable extent namely to him, Polyakov.

The Taman people also remember how easily the deputy division commander imparted a new quality to the competitions for best platoon commander in the formation. The winner is now officially included on the list of candidates for promotion. And when the skill and initiative of the lieutenants began to be encouraged in more than word alone, all suddenly saw how many talented and growing young officers there were in the formation.

The labor-filled days of the deputy divisions commander, of course, were not limited to this. And whatever Polyakov undertook, matters burned in his hands. They thus measured him for command in advance and were glad: a worthy replacement, they said, for Gds Maj Gen A. Marin, who had left a good memory of himself in the division.

But there were also skeptics who warned that it was too early to be glad, that we know, they said, that they will assign the Taman Division according to long-established

procedure, and such procedure, as is well known, is sometimes stronger than logic. And they proved to be right: another officer became division commander, and Gds Lt Col Polyakov was assigned to command the detached Sevastopol Red Banner Guards Motorized Infantry Brigade imeni 60th Anniversary of the USSR.

And now the discussions started. How could it be—it turns out that Boris Nikolayevich is demoted? He even lost out in pay... And the conjectures started: he had somehow displeased the new troop commander of the district...

Events, meanwhile, developed as follows. The unit that Gds Lt Col Polyakov had now accepted had at one time been outstanding. Indeed, it could not have been otherwise. Practically ideal conditions had been created there for service: modern barracks, an excellently equipped motor pool, a strong sports complex... And the personnel, as they say, were choice—the best graduates of the training subunits and military academies. They say that far from every academy graduate could even get the assignment of battalion commander here. In short, an excellent unit on all counts.

But after a time the motorized infantrymen began to cede their position. And this is largely explained by a lack of sufficient experience in the former commander.

Here, it seems to me, it makes sense to take a small digression and try, so to speak, to get deeper into the problem.

So then, why does it sometimes obtain that an officer insufficiently prepared in a professional regard proves to be the head of a subunit? After all, each has in principle the opportunity of preparing himself for a new and more complex role in advance, in leisurely fashion.

Theoretically, this is so. But in practice? We have already become accustomed to the fact that, for example, a battalion commander ranks no higher than a major. Or here's another instance: there is only one regimental commander of the rank of colonel for two divisions of the Moscow Military District—the Taman and the Kantemirov. And after all, it is probably not for nothing that the rank of lieutenant colonel is envisaged for a battalion commander, and the rank of colonel for a regiment. It defines the essential level of professional training of an officer with pretensions for this or that post, and the level of his, so to speak, worldly wisdom.

This is probably so. But for some time we have somehow come to forget this. Increasing the so-called practice of "de-aging" cadres has led, on the one hand, to the fact that a thirty-year-old officer cannot get into the academy, while on the other hand, some have obtained the opportunity of simply "bounding" up the rungs of the service ladder. After all, a battalion commander barely even had time to mess up what had been done by his

predecessor when he became chief of staff of the regiment. And so on... Some have already started figuring that to stay longer than two years in one post practically means to be deprived of one's rights.

Life itself, however, has erected a distinctive barrier to this thoughtless jumping up the service ladder. This barrier is the post of unit commander. They still say that all come up against it. And if so, you must have the corresponding practical experience. And where do you get it, if you are a company commander for just a year, battalion chief of staff not at all, and "tore through" the regimental staff in a hurry?

And here the newly fledged unit commander suffers "punctures" one after another. And sometimes there is no one to make suggestions or warn him away from errors—the division commander is far away, and it is somehow unseemly to be turning to him for advice every time anyway. Look and you see how those who quite recently moved so boldly up the service ladder have lost heart. So many regimental commanders have left in recent years for this reason, for example, in these same Taman and Kantemirov divisions. Perhaps no fewer than ten. A sad total...

All of this to the fact that the former commander of the Sevastopol Guards motorized rifle brigade was also a product of his time. And if it is less his fault than his misfortune—that is no consolation...

It is not for the sake of wit that they say that such the commander, so the unit. Gds Lt Col N. Bolshakov, today Polyakov's deputy for political affairs, does not conceal his admiration for the new commander: "He's just like a watchmaker: he took up a clock that ran in general but was losing a few seconds. He put a drop of oil into the mechanism, and the clock runs precisely on time... This drop is both the experience of Boris Nikolayevich and his organizational abilities and human qualities. In short—his personality..."

It seems that all of this answers the question: Why didn't the former commander of the unit "show himself" to the district troop commander, why was it namely Polyakov that was sent here "for a breakthrough"?

The rumors that the new deputy commander of the Taman Division was an old acquaintance of the commander and had been assigned here due to his patronage were also not confirmed. On the contrary, to be objective, it was namely Polyakov who had served as a motorized rifleman for a long time under Gen K. Kochetov, commanding, in the Carpathian Military District, the Samaro-Ulyanov and Verdichev railroad divisions.

"That means that Kochetov already then didn't like Polyakov for something..." says the idle lover of rumors. And erring once again. Because even then Polyakov was held in high regard by his superiors. Including the

division commander. Polyakov received two ranks ahead of schedule in the railroad division. He was sent from there to the military academy for training.

This, of course, does not mean that the division commander was indulging him somehow. According to the stories of witnesses, he was even extremely demanding of Polyakov. He reprimanded him sternly more than once.

"But the point is not Polyakov," the deputy commander of the Kantemirov Division, Gds Col V. Koshevoy, once remarked on this score. "And not some prejudiced attitude toward him. I served in the railroad unit myself at the time, and I can testify that the so-called excessive exactingness of Kochetov was made toward those who, as we say, are 'dragging a load.' And they were later thankful to him for that attitude toward them. It's not superfluous to note that there are district and group-of-forces commanders among the former subordinates of Kochetov."

Koshevoy has cited a quite fresh example testifying to the exactingness of a commander.

Gds Maj A. Sherstyuk has become perhaps the most prestigious battalion commander in the Kantemirov Division today. A teacher of his subordinates both as a professional tank soldier and as an organizer of the training process. And such a worker as is hard to find. Many of the officers and warrant officers of his battalion were promoted to other division subunits and units at the beginning of the current training year. But several months were enough for Aleksandr Vasilyevich for the battalion to take the lead in the unit once more.

Naturally, Sherstyuk was the first candidate to the academy. But here is what happened. The district troop commander came to the unit and inspected the fulfillment of regulations. The daily duty detail could not open the emergency exit from the barracks—they looked for the key for over half an hour. The commander's decision: Gds Maj Sherstyuk would not be able to enter the academy this year...

Then the gossip started: the biography of a man is ruined, they said, due to such a trifle!

The battalion commander himself had a different consideration: "Serves me right. What if, say, there had been a fire in the barracks? I'll be wiser in the future..."

Yes, strong personalities perceive a tough evaluation of themselves as subordinates in namely that way. The strong think first and foremost about business. They feel intuitively that there is something to reproach them for.

And as for the rumors, Gds Lt Col Polyakov had the last word in this story of the assignment: "I myself consented to take command of the Sevastopol brigade."

For some reason we see only the negative in the word "patronage." It means to us that someone has abused his official position. But the dictionary treats this word much more broadly: patronage is sponsoring someone in job placement or in official advancement.

Was the district troop commander, say, the patron of Lt Col Polyakov? Evidently so. In any case, he did not hide his disposition toward the officer. But the important thing here is something else: not to allow a "protege's" head to turn from what he has achieved, to help him evaluate his capabilities realistically.

Was Polyakov himself sure that he would "pull" a division, that it wouldn't be six months, as for some, or even a year to "get into the swing" of such a responsible position? If he was, then probably not a hundred percent. A commander could have doubts nonetheless. And the fact that Polyakov is successfully leading the Sevastopol brigade is not doubted by the one or the other. Such an approach to affairs, to work with people, we call statesmanlike. Let us have more such patronage. That means there will be more such officers of whom it is said: "A man in his place."

The only thing that is incomprehensible in this story is the rumors. Although there is probably at least an explanation for this. Maybe there would not be any rumors if we had more glasnost in our cadre work. For some reason, if a cadre problem is being resolved, they still prefer to maintain silence at certain levels. And that, as we know well, in no way facilitates making the human factor more active.

Military Commissariats ID Drug Users Among Draftees

18010121 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Oct 88 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel A. Ladin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Narcotics Package Did Not Arrive—But There Is Trouble All the Same"]

[Text] "How's it going, Andryukha?! This is your wife's brother writing—a personal letter for you. Read it while you are alone and don't show it to anyone. Better still—burn it. Andrey, I have a little something for you to do. I want you to send some 'center' or 'sniffer'—things are really tough here with this thing. Go out and buy three kinds of candy, get several of one variety. Hide the stuff in there in place of some of the candy, and put some in the shoe polish and in the toothpaste as well. Open the tubes of toothpaste from the back end, then seal them up—just make sure you can't see it. Throw in some cigarettes, matches and other small items. Don't forget money—the more the better..."

This letter was found in an envelope which had been opened by children on Vinogradov Street in Alma-Ata. The envelope bore an army postmark. The children showed it to their parents, who handed it over to postal

authorities. The parents understood what it was all about and became frightened. I became somewhat uneasy myself after reading such correspondence. The first thing that came to mind was a sense that we had to initiate an immediate search for the sender, no matter how much trouble it might be.

The letter was signed "Oleg." There was no return address. The postmark indicated it had been mailed from Chita.

It was evident from the envelope that the person to whom this letter was addressed, one Andrey Karpov, lived on Vinogradov Street. But it turns out that there is no such person in the district. With the help of the Auezovskiy District police department, we began looking for the likely addressee of the mysterious letter. We were persistent in our search because—allow me to decipher for the unenlightened reader—the words "center" and "sniffer" refer to narcotics. To be precise, they connote two varieties of hashish, a potion which is prepared from the hemp that grows in almost every empty field in Central Asia and Kazakhstan...

This is the "thing" Oleg had requested be sent to him in the army. And what a thing it is—a thing which leads people to insanity.

Beginning our search in Alma-Ata, we were hoping to clamp down on this right away. But it became clear after a few days that we were too late. The letter had been mailed from Chita several months ago and events taking place over that time span could not be rectified.

I met with Tugan Chagirov, director of the sports and mass-defense section of the Auezovskiy District Komsomol Committee in Alma-Ata. Tugan has frequent occasion to deal with drug addicts. Written down in his notebook are the names of "ours" (living in Auezovskiy District) and "others" (from various other parts of the city). An on-duty Komsomol detachment assists the district police department in its struggle with youthful law-breakers. Tugan is a member of this detachment and works an operational shift. Another reason it was useful to talk with him was the fact that he recently returned from a month-long assignment. This fertile region, well-known for its rich harvests of grain, fruit and vegetables, has yet another (albeit dark) claim to fame—vast hemp plantations, highly valued by drug addicts, are scattered all about here. There is no end to the motley riffraff that streams to this region in summertime from all parts of the country. It hasn't been that long ago—just some three or four years—that procurers of the region's hemp could make their way almost unhindered into the valley, and they have done quite a profitable business.

Times change. Today the poisoners—you can't call them anything else—are finding things more and more difficult. But what a long, long way we are from setting things right.

The complexity of the problem here is apparent. Moreover, we must keep in mind that the people who produce this hemp are not by any means "peaceful sheep." They are beasts with jagged teeth, who seldom go out on a "haul" without weapons. Let us consider some material extracted from the publication KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA: "Akchulak Motor Vehicle Inspection Station. An on-duty inspector attempted to pull over a motorcyclist. In response, the driver and his rider pulled out sawed-off shotguns and sped off..."

But more frightening than the sawed-off shotguns of these experienced criminals is that more and more frequently in recent times they enlist teenagers as couriers for their "grass," i.e., young people who are on the pre-prescription registers of the military commissariats.

I found out about one of these youth "sponsors" during a conversation with Police Captain V. Lyman, chief inspector of the Auezovskiy District department of affairs involving minors. Vyacheslav Vinnik, convicted along with his wife Tatyana, would entice young people with an offer to "smoke a joint" together, then suck them into a quagmire. The Vinniks have paid for their crime. But how many people like them are continuing to do their dirty work under our lenient legislation?! People detained while smoking, or while carrying a small amount of hash in a matchbox, are not brought to trial. Others receive moderate fines. Then there are still others who are simply released after being administered a warning. But the fact of the matter is that drug addicts do not carry a lot of drugs on their person and, as a rule, they do not keep drugs at home in quantities which would make them liable to punishment under the full extent of the law. And they guard their secret sacredly—where they bought or otherwise obtained their drugs. They deal brutally with those who have decided to assist justice in its battle against evil.

But what can the police do to stop this? In the entire city of Alma-Ata with its more than one million people, hardly more than 20 individuals are engaged in waging a purposeful struggle against narcotics. Other police department officials forced to deal with the drug situation are at best hacking away at it inch by inch; they never reach its roots.

"We have too little in resources," police colonel V. Artyemenko, criminal investigations division chief of the Kazakh SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, told me. "Now understand me correctly. In no way are the police backing away from the struggle with drug abuse. It's just that we cannot deal with it one on one. It is unfortunate that contacts between police agencies and military commissariats are not as close as we would like. For example, we have up to a hundred juveniles in the city right now who, as a result of checks made by the division for affairs involving minors, have been listed as prone to smoking hashish. Do the military commissariats know about all of them? Sometimes you can be sure they do not. Who is at fault here? Perhaps both sides. In other words, we are

going to have to show greater interest in one another's affairs; we will have to consult with each other and increase mutual cooperation.

This is all the more significant in light of the fact that 60 percent of all the crimes committed in the republic today are drug-related. The problem remains at a dangerous level. We must all work together in seeking new methods of prevention, new ways of conducting the struggle with drug abuse."

Generally speaking, drug abusers in the Kazakhstan capital do not experience any significant threat today. On the contrary, they even have their own—entirely legal—rest and recreation base here, which serves for some as a temporary place of concealment from agencies of law and order. I would not have believed it had I not visited this "base" myself. It is located in a quiet, secluded section of Turkebayev Street. A sign on the gate reads "Narcological Health Center." Accompanied by police lieutenant Valeriy Martynov, I spoke with medical personnel there. Three times during one half-hour period, on-duty nurses came in to report that narcotics were being brought in surreptitiously to some ward.

So you have a situation here in which, day and night, people at the health center are "high" under the influence of that very same evil poison they are supposed to be undergoing treatment for by order of the police. The doctors who work here, Olga Mikhaylovna Belenko and her colleagues, make no effort to cover up this state of affairs. And why shouldn't they be "high"? Conditions at the health center are splendid—the place is clean, they feed you well, and "grass" is available. What more could the so-called "patients" want? There are 29 of these loafers undergoing a two-month "treatment" and 20 medical and staff personnel in the division.

I compared conditions here with conditions at the home for the aged in the city of Kapchagay, near Alma-Ata, and at Children's Hospital Nr 1 on Chapayev Street. I am able to confirm that the drug addicts live more comfortably. Where would you find a treatment center with 15 free beds awaiting patients? That is what you have at the drug treatment center. And there is no lack of medicine here which, by the way, costs the government a fortune. This is all supplied to the drug abusers free of charge.

"The flow of people who come here 'for treatment' gets pretty great by wintertime," explained O. Belenko. Users have finished up their supply of drugs by this time and they go to the health center, where one form of treatment consists of administering narcotics in small doses. What more could you want? Medical personnel "remove" their patients' craving for the poison, or "reduce the dosage," as it is expressed. Hearty meals support and strengthen their health. Then in spring, as summer draws near, the patients scatter here, there and everywhere, including the

hemp fields. And when winter comes they again return to the health center "for treatment," and that's the way it is until they die. They die, by the way, in a fairly short period of time...

I found out that previously, when there was no fight against drug abuse, the police ran the health center and maintained an appropriate mode of operation there. Nowadays, when so much is said and written about the intensified struggle against the "white death," it is not under police watch and the gates are flung wide open. Who will answer for this deceit to the public, who are intensely being made to understand that something is happening when in fact it is not?

I became acquainted with two teenagers at the health center, both about to enter the army. Their lack of moral values was simply astounding—confirmed loafers, spineless good-for-nothings! They told me they weren't trained for work and had no desire to learn. They had been arrested by the police during an attempt to cart off sacks of the killer weed they were gathering up in the hemp fields. And now here they were, in a quiet, cozy ward. Lounging about in stately fashion, they strummed a guitar and answered questions condescendingly. The question came up as to the possible consequences of criminal charges brought against them. Both referred to prison as a "much nicer place than the army" in a way that made it clear they'd learned this a long time ago. And here these young men, if you can call them that, were already surrounded by every kind of nicety the "easy life" has to offer, and quite content with the prospect of sitting out their time. They speak openly with a strange voice of experience.

Now who else is going to listen to them? I am convinced that the district police physically cannot cover all the young men and women who "flirt" with drugs from time to time. Nor do the schools or specialized vocational and technical institutes pay any attention to them. The military commissariats are also, apparently, uninvolved in the problem.

Consider the following as typical. In the Auezovskiy District military commissariat, I spoke with Captain V. Yeruslanov, responsible official for work with conscripted youth. He had assumed his post one month prior and was not acquainted with anyone in the district police force. Nor did he know of the existence of the district drug abuse health center. Moreover, his predecessor left him no information in this regard.

I asked him about those two young men I had met at the center. Locating the personnel file of conscript Yalkunt Abdulkhairov, I discovered that the military commissariat had no way of knowing about his active use of drugs.

We looked for information on the second individual, Adil Zhirensin, and again found nothing. He was not registered. They do not know here about his predilection for drugs.

But they have to know, they simply are obliged to know!

This is what Lieutenant Colonel N. Brodunov, division chief at the Kazakh SSR military commissariat, told me:

"It is an extremely complicated matter to be able to identify users of marijuana or hashish at the time of conscription. Medical commissions at the district conscription centers—on the city and, more importantly, the village level—have no effective means at their disposal enabling them to detect a young man's predilection for smoking drugs. USSR Ministry of Health regulations make no provision for the participation of narcological physicians in the work of the draft boards.

"Today we simply must have effective diagnostic means. And scientists must help us in this area. Until such time as we have these means, we strive to get every young person—beginning at the age of fifteen—into a health center for a check. Unfortunately, we do not always succeed in this effort."

Military commissariats have now begun making more widespread use of personal contact with the parents of conscripts, with their teachers, Komsomol counselors and work collective leaders, so as to enable timely discovery of those beginning to fancy drugs. Police department personnel aid us in this effort, providing the appropriate information...

Of course it is no simple matter to identify drug users. But it is possible if we think about people more. We have to visit the schools, professional technical institutions and work places; we have to ask the neighbors and comrades of our conscripts about their behavior. In the majority of instances so far, no one—including the military commissariats—has been able to handle it.

"It seems too optimistic an approach to me," states one military commissariat official about the idea of expanding contacts with society.

With regard to the lack of narcological physicians, Professor M. Gonopolskiy, doctor of medicine and chief psychiatrist-narcologist of the Kazakh Ministry of Health, believes that having such a doctor on the draft board staff is entirely unnecessary. A narcologist-psychiatrist appointed temporarily to the draft board staff who has appropriate knowledge and experience in treating drug-related illnesses is quite capable of determining a young person's suitability for service in the armed forces.

Drug abusers find ample replacements for their ranks among young people who loiter on the streets and hang around the yards. And we have young people drifting around with nothing to do chiefly because the cities devote little thought to organizing their leisure time. Let us look at one of the densely populated areas of the city, the "Orbit" micro-district, where the kids in school may not find their studies to their liking. Parents here have long awaited the erection of either a youth technical

creativity club or a sports center on the lot near the Baykonur Theater, with two high schools right nearby. We still don't have either one. Yet the ground is being levelled for construction of a pay parking lot—at the very doorsteps of two of our schools!

I spoke with people at the Kazakhstan Komsomol Central Committee concerning all the facts here presented (which are related in one way or another to conscript quotas), and here is the kind of conversation I had with B. Baymakhanov, instructor at the division for preventing law violations and conducting legal propaganda among youth:

"Komsomol organizations are not uninvolved in the struggle against drug abuse. The Kazakhstan Komsomol Central Committee maintains good contacts with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. A comprehensive program has been developed for fighting drug abuse in the republic over an extended period of time. On-duty Komsomol detachments, which recently have come to contain anti-drug abuse sections, are providing substantial assistance to the police department."

"But do Komsomol members take part in police raids on narcotics dens? Do they meet face-to-face with young people who use drugs, enabling explanatory and educational work to be accomplished?"

"I am unable to cite specific instances, but it is possible that such methods of influencing young drug users are sometimes being employed."

"Now if a young man, a Komsomol member let us say, is brought to the police station for using narcotics, when do the Komsomol district, employer and school find out about it? Does someone immediately come out to the police station to talk with the perpetrator and exert some measure of influence?"

"We get information, but the reaction you're talking about doesn't presently take place. They're short on personnel at the district committees and very busy. But drug abusers are registered."

"Doesn't it seem to you that the Komsomol organizations are still not looking at drug abuse as an ever more dangerous phenomenon?"

"Yes, it's obvious that it's being underestimated..."

And this is how things stack up with respect to the Komsomol's struggle against drug abuse.

And now and again in back of the Baykonur Theater you can see groups of young people with that unhealthy red flush in their cheeks, squatting in a circle, having a smoke. Perched nearby are newcomers wondering just what is that stuff, waiting to try it. Not too long a time will pass and these "personnel resources" will be filling the ranks of our armed forces...

Let us return to the letter with which we began this discussion. With the help of the police we were finally able to determine that the request for the poison was sent from the Chitinskiy Garrison to Alma-Ata by Private Oleg Koshkarev. Prior to his army service he had been an active drug user. The military commissariat knew nothing about it, but they could have—Oleg's comrades and his mother, Liliya Aleksandrovna, took note of the boy's disastrous predilection but did not think it was necessary to inform others.

Neither did Koshkarev's subunit know about his inclination. Initially he resisted, but the lure of drugs finally got the upper hand—in his search for the drugs he was unable to procure from Alma-Ata, the young soldier went AWOL. A search party found him two weeks later in a state of incompetence. The sentence dealt him by military tribunal was severe—one-and-a-half years in a disciplinary battalion.

Police also found the individual Oleg had written to, and from whom he was awaiting the package. His name wasn't anything close to Karpov. Brought to trial earlier, he had broken off with his past and was not responding to renewed persuasive attempts.

All the same there is a real problem—a problem for Oleg Koshkarev and a problem for all of us.

Discussion on Improving Pensions for Officers' Wives

18010265a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Oct 88 Second Edition p 4

[Interview with Maj Gen E. Busarev, deputy chief, Central Finance Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Ye. Agapova: "Pension for an Officer's Wife"; place and date of interview not given; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Today we are openly discussing the need to strengthen our social guarantees, one of the most important of which is the right to work. For many reasons this right, which is guaranteed by the USSR Constitution, frequently becomes for the wives of military personnel only a stated right, which fails to correspond to the realities of life. And the realities of life are as follows: at a remote garrison and, incidentally, at a garrison which is not so remote from the capital or from any other large city, many of the officers' wives find that it is virtually impossible to obtain employment. As a result a woman is unable to build up enough years of employment and ends up without a pension. We are faced here with a social problem, and a most acute social problem at that!

Work is currently in progress on drafting a new law on pension provision for working people. Many readers ask in connection with this: will the law cover the interests of wives of military personnel who move from one place to another not by their own wish but rather on the basis of

orders which their spouses must obey? Our correspondent discusses these and other problems with Maj Gen E. Busarev, deputy chief of the Central Finance Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

* * *

[Agapova] It seems to me, Eduard Viktorovich, that we have somehow become accustomed to this agelong problem of finding jobs for the wives of officers and warrant officers, have simply accepted it, and talk about it as something inevitable. And we write almost nothing about it, that is, the mass media, including KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. And yet it is a disturbing situation. Take the Northern Fleet, for example. More than 50 percent of the women do not work, 24 percent of these for reason of lack of any available jobs. And yet one third of these women are college-educated. The lack of employment opportunities with such a high level of education is, you will agree, a socially-distressing situation, not to mention the direct losses to society and the state. The wife of officer G. Petrov writes: "I am not earning a pension. Should I be categorized as a true financial dependent? My husband has been transferred from one place to another, and it has been impossible for me to find a job. Believe me, I am not a person who avoids work. So why is it that I am going to be punished in my old age, with no pension? For wandering from place to place? For lack of employment? For my children's suffering chronic ailments due to hardships of life?"

[Busarev] That is a very typical situation. An officer's life is subject to orders. It is not of their families' choosing that they are taken away from settled localities. One of my colleagues recently calculated that he and his wife had moved 28 times during his years in the military and had lived a total of more than 10 years in space rented in a private apartment. On each occasion lack of housing would result in lack of official registration of residence. This in turn creates difficulties in obtaining medical care and makes it impossible to obtain employment, and therefore a pension as well. In addition, wives do not remain in one place long enough to earn titles or honors for their work performance.

One cannot help but come to the bitter conclusion that the wives of military personnel are essentially among the most socially unprotected members of our society. Obviously this problem is not solely that of the Ministry of Defense; it must also be considered today from the standpoint of the state as a whole. As we know, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo recently met. It was stated in particular at this meeting that measures are to be taken to overcome the lag in the sociocultural domain in the military and to improve the material welfare of military personnel and their families.

[Agapova] Up until recently we avoided this subject, creating in the uninformed a false picture of life in the military.... Here are some facts. I once took part in a round-table discussion sponsored by the newspaper

SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, dealing with the life of a serviceman's family. When participating officers' wives began describing the ordeal of obtaining housing at military posts, telling of cramped space rented in private apartments and about the exorbitant prices exacted for obtaining temporary shelter, a veteran female reporter threw up her hands in amazement: "And I thought that people in the military had no problems with housing. One family moves out of quarters, and another family moves in to replace them...."

[Busarev] People also frequently have false notions about an officer's wife obtaining employment. I myself have on numerous occasions heard nice little tales about pampered, extremely well-off military wives who have no need to go to work because they allegedly can get along quite nicely on their husbands' pay. But let us take a realistic look at things. Who forms the bulk of the officer corps? Young officers. That same platoon commander forks over 25-30

of his pay for a private apartment. His wife has no job. He has a child, and maybe more than one. In short, each and every ruble counts. Not everybody is aware of this. The life of a military man's family is usually invisible to outsiders; it frequently takes place at a restricted garri-son, away from the general public. A life which Konstantin Simonov very accurately called "a life which is neither hell nor paradise, a life precisely in the middle—a soldier's life...."

[Agapova] The rights of an officer's wife are often infringed thereby. Following the prevailing psychology, she is refused employment: she is a temporary resident, and therefore she is not hired. Nowadays a great deal is being said about womens' labor and life away from the workplace, about a shortened work week, a flexible work schedule, and other benefits, while an officer's wife must be willing to take any job on any terms. I shall quote from a letter written by N. Galtseva: "I am unable to find work, any work whatsoever. As soon as I tell them I am an officer's wife, they immediately turn me down, sometimes politely, and sometimes without any of the niceties. What have I done to deserve this?" Surely if labor laws provided guarantees for officers' wives, these women would not feel they were being treated so badly.

[Busarev] It is true that the wives of military personnel are frequently viewed as undependable, temporary employees. And yet almost none of them is aware that if a woman is refused employment without good reason, she can take them to court. But let us return to the new draft law. As has been reported in the press, it calls for the introduction of a so-called social pension. It will be awarded to persons who for one reason or another have not worked the required number of years.

[Agapova] It is my understanding that this law applies to persons who have been unable to work at all. But what about the interests of those wives of military personnel who will be reaching pension age within a few years but who for well-known reasons do not have a large number of years of total employment?

[Busarev] It is our opinion that if a woman has been unable to take employment because of the conditions of her husband's military service, her overall length of employment for pension purposes should include those periods of time when her husband was serving at restricted garrisons. Such a procedure has already been prescribed in awarding pensions to the wives of certain categories of employees of Soviet establishments abroad—their employment record is credited with the entire period of service abroad.

[Agapova] Here is how the matter is stated in a letter from N. Kharkov, from the Southern Group of Forces: "Among the officers' wives there are many teachers, accountants, etc. But almost all these jobs are filled by hiring Soviet civilian personnel and bringing them in. Is this financially advantageous to the state? Teachers must be transported from the Soviet Union, paid in foreign currency and rubles, and provided housing, while we officers' wives sit around unemployed, and in time our degrees become useless...."

[Busarev] The majority of wives of military personnel assigned to the groups of forces have no opportunity of employment. I believe we must approach resolution of this problem in a reasoned manner—to determine whether it is in all cases necessary to hire and bring in civilian employees from home when the officers' wives include teachers, sales personnel, and cultural-educational workers.... But this matter requires thorough study. As regards loss of professional skills and loss of diploma, I believe we should conduct certification of officers' wives, as is required of educators in general, for example, for many of them, in spite of lack of employment, work on self-education and do volunteer work in their area of specialization.

[Agapova] In your opinion is there a realistic solution to the present situation as regards finding employment for the wives of military personnel?

[Busarev] I do not believe that there are any insoluble problems. A great deal depends on the desire and ability to help. The problem of employment is resolved more easily when a unit has contacts with local party, soviet,

and economic administrative agencies. We are familiar with examples where small enterprises or factory branches are established at garrisons, and where employment in the home is arranged, where conditions are created for individual employment and where cooperatives are organized. I would like to see military unit women's councils take a more aggressive attitude in this regard, stating the problem and seeking a solution.

[Agapova] But does it not seem to you that there are situations in life when a women's council alone is unable to help? Let us say, for example, that a husband is seeking divorce, and his wife has not earned a pension....

[Busarev] In such a case the court will order payment of alimony if the wife is unable to work. But if her former husband dies, a woman finds herself essentially without means of support. One solution is the social pension, which we mentioned earlier.

[Agapova] What about the material welfare of widows whose husbands were killed at the front in the Great Patriotic War?

[Busarev] Approximately 50 percent of the widows of military personnel who lost their lives receive a pension in the minimum amount established by law. Unfortunately this is unable to provide them with a normal minimum subsistence. In my opinion pension provisions for widows are in need of substantial improvement, and therefore this matter should also be looked into when drafting a new pension law.

[Agapova] We hope that the editors will receive an official reply from the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems to all the questions raised today. Incidentally, at the beginning of this year I met with Mariya Matveyevna Kravchenko, deputy chairman of the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems. She is quite familiar with these problems. Something is already being done. There is a proposal, for example, to publish in military districts lists of available jobs and vacancies in a given region. It is high time to move from taking note of the problem to practical actions. I believe that specific proposals will be presented at the Armed Forces Conference of Senior Supervisors working with the families of military personnel of the political directorates of the branches of the Armed Forces, districts, groups of forces, and fleets.

[Busarev] I have been invited to attend the conference, which convenes on 18 October. I hope that this get-together will prove to be constructive.

Interdepartmental Conflicts Interfere With Air Defense Operations

18010214 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Sep 88 First Edition pp 1-2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel O. Falichev, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, under the rubric "Restructuring—A Look at the Problems": "How Many Aerospace Managers?"]

[Text] It happened in January of last year. Air defense radar stations of the Central Asian Military District picked up a target in their airspace moving towards the state border of the USSR which did not respond to interrogation from the ground.

Notifying his superiors, V. Labusov, the command post duty officer, brought in additional men and equipment to track the target and got on the line with the Air Force and Ministry of Civil Aviation. They informed him that they had no aircraft in the vicinity.

Time passed quickly and Labusov initiated emergency procedures—he launched the fighter-interceptor alert wing...

He never thought that this emergency situation would turn into the most ordinary event possible.

Soon the commander of the alert force wing reported: "I see a sounding balloon..."

It seemed there was nothing special here—a sounding balloon in the sky. But I could see how difficult it was for the duty officer and other command post personnel during the unauthorized balloon flight. I remember the sarcasm and bitterness with which Labusov responded when the stress had left: "It's awful when we have to chase marbles..."

As it turns out, such occurrences are, unfortunately, not infrequent here. "Incidents" involving sounding balloons have become the talk of the town. It is no secret that unmanned aerostats enter our airspace from the capitalist countries for the purpose of gathering intelligence. But here we are talking about our own. It is a regular event for our meteorological people to launch them—no problem to it. But for our air defense forces, every aimless object dangling in the sky is a target subject to immediate identification and destruction measures. Otherwise it will assign missions to other command posts and call many, many personnel up to combat alert, not to mention the consequences related to safety of aircraft in flight.

Identification is an easy thing to say. Radar provides the basic means for identifying targets, but in instances such as this it doesn't help very much. The response one sees on the radar scope is the same for friend and foe balloons. You get a similar response from a light-engine aircraft or delta plane. Where is the guarantee that it's a

balloon or one of our sports delta planes, and not, God forbid, another Rust? It's not a pleasant thought, obviously, but there is no such guarantee. And if we want to be certain of the security of our airspace, we must ask ourselves these questions today. Everyone must—from operator to minister.

Certain responsible officials, unfortunately, are not giving this any thought. There is a schedule of sounding balloon launches in the region we are talking about. It is drawn up by the Kazakh State Committee for Hydrometeorology and Atmospheric Monitoring and signed by Comrade V. Gordyunin. The air defense forces command post has a copy of it. It would seem that if meteorological and aerological personnel observed the schedule, there wouldn't be any problems. The trouble is, however, that this document is ignored.

"I don't know how many times we requested appropriate authorities to get this situation straightened out," lamented air defense representative Colonel Yu. Voronin. "But it doesn't change..."

So here you have air defense forces in a role of pleading. And they are asking for very little—just that there be no interference in their watch procedures. Yet...the fighter-interceptors are still launched. Significant radar resources, personnel and equipment, are diverted... And it is all to the detriment of combat readiness and—in the long run—to the country's economy. For a single hour of operation of certain radar equipment costs the state hundreds of rubles; launching the alert fighter wing—thousands.

But all this is just a small part of a huge problem. The intelligent person knows that the skies today are no longer a boundless "sixth ocean." Increased numbers of aircraft and more frequent flights have resulted in a more crowded sky. Every day there are about 80,000 aircraft of one type or another flying to various corners of the country for various purposes. More and more departments are utilizing the airspace, often thinking only of their own interests. This leads to departures from established regulations. And who should sternly oppose these violations if not our air defense forces, responsible for the defense of our air borders. This should logically give them certain rights. It is axiomatic that successful accomplishment of duties on watch is impossible without the cooperation of those for whom the sky is a working place and for whom it is the state border. But mutual understanding is often something just to be dreamed about.

In 1984 the USSR government undertook a measure which stressed the importance of close coordination of actions taken by various departments with respect to utilization of the airspace. The USSR Minister of Defense issued corresponding directives. However, these

documents failed to impart unity or the required coordination to the departments concerned. Figuratively speaking, the sky remains a blanket that everyone is tugging at. Here are the facts.

The following entries appeared in reports received by the air defense command post under discussion:

"15.02.87. Taldy-Kurgan Airport dispatcher Sausanov failed to report the beginning of chemical field-spraying operations, thus allowing unauthorized flights..."

"9.08.87. A helicopter carrying geologists landed without authorization in a border area..."

"02.01.88. Kzyl-Orda Airport dispatcher incorrectly reported the take-off time for flight 1905 and refused to give his name."

The lion's share of such violations falls within the jurisdiction of the Civil Aviation Ministry, especially with respect to light aircraft allocated to other ministries and departments—geological, agricultural, etc., whose representatives often force crews to violate established air procedure. Strange as it may seem, commanders knuckle under to their demands.

Among the violations observed are instances of failure of the radar transponder system for aircraft identification. Any target failing to provide a response in a border area is operating illegally. An aircraft which does not respond to interrogation from the ground must be identified and, if necessary, forced to land. It is on extremely rare occasions, of course, that air defense agencies must resort to such emergency measures, where passengers are primarily the ones to suffer. But it seems this would provide all the more reason for departments to get more deeply involved in preventing such occurrences. In actuality things work differently. Obtaining a negative radar identification response or, let us say, a deviation from flight path, dispatchers and other air traffic controllers in the Civil Aviation Ministry sometimes fail to report this to air defense agencies. Why? "It can have an effect on bonuses," said flight control shift supervisor L. Zabortsev.

But that is not the whole truth. Some organizations and ministries look upon air defense only as a controlling, supervisory agency and, therefore, somewhat meddling. And so it happens that the security of our air borders unintentionally turns out to be a matter of secondary importance, as it were. Let the reader understand me correctly. I am not trying to lay the blame at someone else's doorstep. I do not wish to transfer responsibility for errors committed by air defense troops (of which, as we know, there are quite a few) to other agencies. But the fact remains that, without understanding the problems associated with military watch over our air borders, without respect, if you wish, it is impossible to successfully accomplish the mission of effecting air defense for our country.

The fact, for example, that some light aircraft operating under the Civil Aviation Ministry do so without transponders can only be explained by departmental aloofness. Here we have instances where air defense forces are helpless overall in using radar to make aircraft identification. "How can this be?" the reader asks.

"Yes, we remove the radar identification equipment from a number of aircraft during chemical spraying operations," V. Fedotov told me matter-of-factly. "That's what we're ordered to do..." said the repair shop foreman for An-2 aircraft at Burundayskiy Airport.

Here, it is true, we must qualify this statement. The flight area, initial and final points for such missions are indicated in the flight requisitions submitted by departments to air defense agencies. But, frankly speaking, this does not help very much. As a rule, there is no direct communications between the air defense command post and airfields and runways. Sometimes it is literally necessary to beat out information concerning an aircraft in order to find out if it is ours.

Why does the Ministry of Civil Aviation remove identification equipment and thereby place the country's entire air defense capability, to put it mildly, in a difficult position? "Because that enables us to take greater quantities of pesticides on board," responsible officials tried to explain to me. I'm not going to give away any secrets, but let me tell the reader that the radar identification equipment doesn't weigh all that much; there is no great advantage gained here. It's a great deal simpler than that. The field airports lack facilities for the safeguarding of such equipment. It must be safeguarded, of course—this must be kept in mind. But it is the Civil Aviation Ministry and other departments primarily which must be concerned about this, not the air defense agencies. Right now, as it happens, our defenders of the sky are at their wit's end.

We have recently come to find out about more and more such instances, which previously were hidden—it was not seemly for ministries and departments to "wash their dirty linen in public." This is more difficult today. On 15 May KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA published an article by V. Peskov entitled "A Little Something About Fox Hunting." The article reported that a certain An-2 "ace" flagrantly violated every possible rule of airspace utilization and used the skids of his aircraft to crush foxes in Kazakhstan. But the article made no mention of the difficult situation this incident of hooliganism in the air put the air defense contingent in. They had to sweat it out, as the saying goes. They would be held strictly accountable for whatever might happen at that time in their zone of responsibility. There are many such instances.

It is the use of low altitudes that allows aircraft to make their way across borders. Let us just recall the most recent events that were reported in the press—in 1985, when former pilot Alimuradov stole an An-24, flying it

to China. The criminal Svistunov took an An-2 to Sweden. Air Defense forces bore and continue to bear responsibility for this. And the departments in which negligence and irresponsibility are tolerated are seemingly not directly involved. At least this aspect did not receive adequate press coverage or handling by responsible officials.

All of this supports the contention that special supervision is required for light aircraft. But it turns out that the supervision exercised here by departments is extremely low. This can be the only explanation for the numerous instances of poaching and hunting from aircraft and helicopters the press has been reporting all the more frequently in recent times. I put myself in the position of a duty officer during such occasions and think—how do I distinguish him from the crop-duster from which radar identification equipment has been removed, or from a border violator?

As it turns out, this is not such an easy matter to resolve.

"There are about 400 areas in Moscow Oblast designated for chemical spraying from the air," Major P. Lebedev, communications officer in one of the Moscow Air Defense District units tells me as he opens up a map. "In other words, aircraft without radar equipment can be flying in that many areas. But previously the Civil Aviation Ministry didn't even furnish us this map, although quite a few violations of different varieties were reported in the sector, commanded by Yu. Filimonov. It is true that things have improved recently. We have resorted to extreme measures—either we obtain flight information or the flight is prohibited. But even today we lack communications with certain runways and airfields, including DOSAAF facilities—they never have existed."

Studies of this problem lead us again and again to the conclusion that only extreme measures result in progress here and force the rusted gears of the mechanism to turn. Apparently this reflects our habit of living by directives and encouragement, to get along year after year with the minimum: "Perhaps this will get us by." The question arises—how can it be that we do not have a single agency in the country which regulates the activity of all departments with regard to airspace utilization, introduces necessary changes and takes into account the interests of each? There is such an agency—the USSR Unified System for Air Traffic Control (USATC). As stated in a number of documents, this air traffic control service is responsible for insuring security, standardization and economy in the air missions of all departments, and for creating favorable flight conditions for crews in the accomplishment of these missions. But experience has shown that, with all the effort of its uncoordinated agencies, this service is unable today to deal effectively with the ever-increasing burdens of providing flight security and effecting close coordination with air defense forces. Why has it suddenly ceased to respond to requirements of the time?

"This did not come about suddenly. Our air traffic control agencies were established in the 1950's and 1960's," explains USATC representative Colonel V. Kozlov. "Flight intensity has increased significantly as the years have passed, but the control system has lagged behind. It is an aged system, unfortunately..."

We might add that, to a great extent, the structure (bi-departmental jurisdiction of Civil Aviation Ministry and Air Force), staff, equipment and personnel assignment are also aged. USATC agencies today are not capable of effectively exercising air traffic control at all altitudes. As we are already aware, the "punctures" are made for the most part by low-altitude aircraft. What happens is that responsibility for controlling such flights lies totally with the air defense forces, although other agencies are directing these missions.

"There is another component to the paradox," continues Col Kozlov. "It turns out as though certain departments are using the airspace, others are regulating traffic in it, and a third group is finding itself responsible for the errors..."

Truly we have diverse chains of command here. The air traffic control agencies are subordinate to the Air Force and Ministry of Civil Aviation, departments which themselves tolerate violations in airspace utilization. It is amazing that we have a single organization, the State Motor Vehicle Inspection, to provide and maintain order over our road network, while our air network is managed by Cinderellas with many stepmothers. Could one even imagine a State Motor Vehicle Inspection official subordinate to motor vehicle management? That would be absurd. Such is natural for the USATC, however. Is this not the reason an agency intended to put obstacles in front of violations sometimes itself tears them down?

A representative of the Moscow Air Defense District, for example, informed us that numerous proposals have been directed to responsible agencies for improving airspace management in the Moscow region and procedures for accomplishing air missions there. Specifically, he mentioned the necessity of setting up direct lines of communication and of calling upon civil aviation authorities in the central regions to cease all air missions in the Moscow region—being a region of especially great flight intensity—which are not carrying national identification equipment, and to terminate chemical-spray overflights and flights originating from airfields in this region for which proper requisition has not been made. But things are, nonetheless, right where they started here.

These and other problems have been duly reported to the head of the USATC interdepartmental management commission and deputy chief of the Air Force main staff. Specifically, it has been reported by Col Kozlov, the USATC representative, that this kind of flight mission organization will hurt morale at USATC and bring material detriment to the state. The matter was raised of

straightening out complicated procedures for issuing and formulating flight requisitions, and of increasing departmental responsibility in each area. So what happened?

"This is an important problem area and we are trying to resolve it," says Lieutenant General Aviation M. Vaika. "But it doesn't all depend on us..."

Unfortunately, that is the way things are. And it must be confessed that the efforts of some responsible officials reflect passivity, an inability to get things done, and a fear of making bold decisions and raising issues. But the essence of the problem remains the same: fundamental measures—and not cosmetic repair—are necessary to solve the problem. Are these possible? Frankly speaking, it is still difficult to believe so. After all, this is not the first time we have had good and proper decisions made by an interdepartmental commission appointed to consider and combine the interests of various departments and resolve conflicts. But they have so often remained the good intentions of those responsible for carrying them out. Might it be because directorship of the USATC is exercised by a non-permanent agency, the interdepartmental commission which meets only twice each year?

"If we are talking about measures being taken to prevent airspace violations," states Colonel V. Biryukov, an officer on the air defense forces main staff, "then things are deteriorating."

He points to reference data showing that, whereas in 1983, 16 percent of all violators of flight procedures were returned to base, the figure for 1985 was 14 percent, and for 1986—only 11 percent. Air defense agencies have so often not known what kind of aircraft is headed where and they have been put in a conflicting situation. The fact that 10 percent of all air violations in 1987 occurred in border airspace is alarming. Flagrant violators have included the Yakutsk, Tyumensk and Krasnoyarsk civil aviation directorates and air force agencies of the Baikal and Far Eastern military districts.

How do we extract ourselves from this situation?

"Departmental barriers and ambitions can be broken down only under one condition—if the Unified System of Air Traffic Control is managed by a single agency," believes Col Kozlov, air traffic control representative. "And it should be an agency with state-wide jurisdiction."

Col Kozlov sees a solution in establishing, in the first place, a permanent structure under the state budget for all USSR USATC activity and, secondly, in releasing it from the "prison" of falling under the subordination of various departments. This view is shared by Colonel Biryukov, an officer on the main staff, Air Defense Forces; Colonel V. Smirnov, USATC representative; Major General Aviation V. Zaytsev, Moscow Military District air force chief of staff; N. Romanov, senior

research assistant at the USSR Scientific Research Institute; and other responsible officials whose views on this problem I had occasion to learn.

The experience of other developed countries in this regard prompts reflection. As I was informed by one of our USATC organizations, for example, the United States has a unified, integrated system for directing military and civil aviation flights. The Federal Aviation Administration has responsibility for organization and use of the airspace, and this arrangement has proved entirely justified.

In our country we have established the USSR Air Surveillance Agency, concerned with guaranteeing flight security. But it is not engaged in resolving the problems we are talking about.

The following fact must also be taken into consideration. The USSR is, of course, a member of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Annual dues to this organization comprise a substantial amount which is deducted in foreign exchange currency. But due to a certain lack of sophistication in our system of air traffic control, we cannot fully apply ICAO recommendations developed using our own money. To a lesser degree we are taking advantage of broad opportunities that arise through international cooperation. But we must achieve for the state a maximum return for its investments.

Problems associated with manual labor in the planning processes, coordination, air traffic control and supervision of flight mission requisitions are growing like a snowball gathers snow. The flow of information entering air defense organizations and communications centers today often exceeds established standards and sooner or later will exceed the limits of human capacity. There is no unified point of view, however, with respect to matters of introducing an inter-departmental automatic control system, and those low-power automated systems that have been introduced spasmodically are not always compatible—the algorithms of one are not understood by others. Requirements of the time call for automation on a country-wide scale of all planning procedures, processing and control of information.

Of course—and this must be especially emphasized—implementing such measures will require substantial capital investments which, even for a rich country as ours, are not easily obtained right away. It would be much simpler to resolve the problems gradually, step by step. But time which could be devoted to this was lost, unfortunately, during the stagnation years. The most important thing right now is to take the first step...

They are not sitting around at the Air Defense Forces main staff twiddling their thumbs, as it were. A great many measures are being taken towards developing and perfecting the organization of aircraft surveillance and taking maximum advantage of the technical engineering capabilities of radar equipment. The Unified System for

Air Traffic Control, Ministry of Civil Aviation, Air Defense Forces, Air Force and other interested agencies are developing a whole series of standardization documents and efforts in this sphere are underway in the USSR Ministry of Defense.

If approved, proposed requirements for airspace utilization will become more stringent. But will the overall situation change for the better? This publication makes no pretensions with respect to the final outcome. That will remain the prerogative of those in whom power is vested and other experts. But it is clear that the above-mentioned problems will be with us as long as departmentalization remains.

There can be but one manager of our skies.

**SGF: Shortcomings in Air Attack Capability
Against Objects with 'Direct' Air Defense**

*18010260a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Nov 88 First Edition p 1*

[Article by Guards Lieutenant Colonel P. Belenin, Military Pilot First Class, Southern Group of Forces: "Military Training: Quality and Effectiveness—The Commander Was The Leader"; last three paragraphs are commentary by Southern Group of Forces Aviation Deputy Commander for Military Training Major General of Aviation V. Kukhareenko]

[Text] Aviators in our regiment recently took part in a tactical flight exercise and had to carry out missions of varying complexity.

As for myself, I personally am not totally satisfied with my work in this exercise. There were annoying pauses and errors while the various commands were being carried out. But on the whole I feel satisfied, for the atmosphere in the regiment's subunits is changing for the better, there are fewer bragging reports and people are being more and more strict in evaluating their pluses and minuses. And it is precisely this approach that is moving every one of my fellow workers in the collective as a whole to a business-like work rhythm.

There were some excellent results during the tactical flight exercise and although the work at the range was distinguished by its extreme difficulty, the criteria by which aviator training was evaluated were strict. The flight commanded by Military Pilot 1st Class Major A. Komissarov was again noted as the best. The pilots in this subunit were ordered to attack from difficult types of maneuvers and destroy an "enemy" launcher that had heavy anti-aircraft cover.

Neither I nor my fellow workers had any doubts as to the success that Komissarov's subordinates would enjoy. And we had reason for our convictions. I would like to point out that one of these reasons is the excellent results

that the pilots of this subunit had constantly achieved. In addition to the excellent efficiency of the officers and the effective training methodology, this subunit also had the corresponding moral and psychological climate and the correct relationships among the aviators. Guards Major Komissarov sees training his pilots to fly as his mission as flight commander. This is regardless of whether they are in the classroom, in simulator exercises or in the air. Not even the slightest roughness in his subordinates' activities slips by Komissarov's attention and every problem, regardless of its difficulty, is always totally cleared up. And of course the personality of the Guards Major himself, an excellent leader and an extremely well-trained pilot, plays no small role in this. I can say this confidently for I have known this officer for a long time.

There was a heavy load on the shoulders of the specialists from engineering and aviation services during the LTU [tactical flight exercise]. They had had to reduce the crews available to prepare the airplanes for combat employment. Personnel worked at a fast pace while still rigorously observing work rules and guaranteeing flight safety. Guards Senior Lieutenants V. Tikayev, N. Yevchun and others distinguished themselves in this area. They were able to carry out all of the work quickly and at the required level.

The main thing that I got from this flight tactical exercise is that I was again convinced that the only ones who can constantly achieve excellent results are those specialists who have been faultlessly trained to have a professional attitude and who take their concern for over-all success to their hearts.

Commentary by Major General of Aviation V. Kukhareenko, Southern Group of Forces Deputy Aviation Commander for Combat Training:

Personnel from the Guards Fighter-Bomber Regiment completed their work on the firing range with excellent results. The regiment is now on the ascent and is accumulating quality indicators in many types of military training. And nonetheless the roughness in developing their combat employment is causing a certain uneasiness.

What I have foremost in my mind are the inadequate skills of some of the crews in overcoming "enemy" air defense systems that are directly covering the targets that they are attacking. And some aviators have still not learned to "get totally involved" in the tactical situation when developing their solution. This requires increased interaction among supervisory personnel. Regimental headquarters has still not learned to fully coordinate the efforts of all the services.

There are obviously still things we have to work on. We have to decisively eliminate "choke points" and bring up those sectors that are lagging behind.

**Readers' Responses on Improving Air Force
Firefighting Capability**

*18010262a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Nov 88 First Edition p 2*

[Article, published under the heading "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Presents: Replies, Responses, Results": "Behind a Smoke Screen"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]
[Text] An interview with Col V. Tkachenko, chief of the Air Forces Firefighting Service Inspectorate, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col A. Andryushkov appeared in the 7 October issue under the above title. The discussion dealt with providing military installations with reliable fire protection. The article examined problems of upgrading equipment, training firefighting personnel, and improving the structure of all components of the firefighting service. The editors have received more than 40 reader responses. Some of these letters appear below.

I agree with Col V. Tkachenko that it is essential to upgrade firefighting equipment in order to provide reliable fire protection to military installations. I believe that establishment in the USSR Ministry of Defense of a department of fire protection, with appropriate facilities and field testing ground, will help resolve this problem.

The high rate of firefighting personnel turnover in my opinion is connected with the lack of prestige of the position of chief of firefighting service at the unit level. Only a few officers can even become captains. Seeing no prospects for career advance, fire brigade chiefs transfer out at the first opportunity.

In order to improve fire safety, I feel that it is essential to revise the table of organization structure of firefighting service agencies and to provide fire brigades with new equipment; military installations should be provided with automatic fire-extinguishing, smoke detection and fire alarm systems; fire prevention sections should be established in firefighting service components.

Maj G. Borichevskiy, senior inspector, firefighting service, North Caucasus Military District

The article "Behind a Smoke Screen" raises questions which are very timely and demand answers and solutions as quickly as possible. One is particularly disturbed by the fact that deficiencies have long existed in the firefighting service and that no specific steps are being taken to correct them. The Air Forces continue to be inadequately supplied with fire trucks, equipping of installations with automatic fire-extinguishing and fire alarm systems is being delayed, and units lack highly-skilled firefighting specialist personnel....

Maj Gen Avn N. Goncharenko, Belorussian Military District

Fires are no rarity in the military, and they cause millions of rubles worth of damage. Equipment, weapons and property are destroyed in fires, and fatalities also occur. Everybody talks about the importance of fire protection in the Army and Navy, but nobody wants to work on solving the problems which have amassed.

Guideline documents require that facilities be provided with automatic fire detection and fire-extinguishing systems (they even specify timetables for installing these systems!), but who is responsible for this at the unit level? Comrade Tkachenko is correct in stating that there is a lack of specialist personnel.

In my opinion line units should be provided equipment, specialized equipment spare parts, as well as fire detection and alarm systems by a unified firefighting service agency, not by the Main Billeting and Maintenance Directorate, which is not familiar with our problems.

I support the view that in place of an inspectorate there should be a service which would be a component element of the Armed Forces Rear Services.

Maj L. Zhuravlev, senior inspector, firefighting service, Moscow Military District

A very needed discussion was held on the pages of this newspaper. I cannot agree, however, with Lt V. Tkachenko's suggestion that the firefighting service be left under the administrative jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of Defense but be placed under the Armed Forces Rear Services. That is only a halfway measure.

It is necessary to establish an integrated national firefighting service, since a "vest-pocket" ministerial-level firefighting service is not sufficiently effective. The ministries and ministry-level agencies will always find "objective" reasons for violation of fire safety regulations, and any person in authority can always shout at "his own" service. I know from practical experience how this is done.

I agree with Col V. Tkachenko that firefighting equipment at the unit level fails to meet today's requirements. How can one even consider the possibility of obtaining automatic fire detection, fire alarm and fire-extinguishing systems when it is virtually impossible even to supply fire brigades with common, garden-variety fire hoses?

WO Yu. Malakhov, Northern Fleet

I gave a sigh of relief as I read the article "Behind a Smoke Screen"—there actually exist people, genuine specialists in the field of firefighting who are truly enthusiastic about their job.

I graduated from the USSR MVD Cherkassy Firefighting School, and subsequently graduated from the USSR MVD Higher Firefighting Engineering Technical School in Moscow. I began my military service in the harsh Transbaykal Military District, and later served in the Carpathian Military District and the Kiev Military District. I am presently a firefighting service senior inspector.

I have always been bothered by the question of why a who-gives-a-damn attitude toward the firefighting service is so universally prevalent, and why do people think about it only when there is a fire? Probably because it is long since high time to change this stagnating mechanism.

Inspecting and finding deficiencies is no simple matter. And what happens when deficiencies are found? Take the matter of providing units with firefighting vehicles and equipment. Even fire extinguishers are in short supply, and where they are available, there are no replacement tanks, no equipment for charging them, etc.

I believe it is high time to reexamine the authorities and duties of firefighting service personnel. Perhaps they should even be empowered to impose fines for failure to observe fire safety regulations.

Capt A. Kovsh, Kiev Military District

I agree with Col V. Tkachenko that there is need for a radical reorganization of the firefighting service in the Armed Forces, and I am appalled at the lack of action by the firefighting service inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense during this period of perestroika. Personal inaction should not be hidden behind supposed concern about economizing in finances and materiel, for that is false economy! It is ludicrous that in the present day an airplane costing hundreds of thousands of rubles is "protected" by a fire extinguisher costing a couple of rubles, and which is not always in proper working order.

The line units are waiting for a radical restructuring of the firefighting service and will be grateful to the editors for their support.

Maj Gen Avn V. Kudryavtsev, Odessa Military District

From the Editors. An official reply was also received from the USSR Ministry of Defense Firefighting Service Inspectorate, signed by inspectorate chief Col V. Savkov and Lt Col S. Skoblikov, secretary of the inspectorate's party organization. They informed us that the article "Behind a Smoke Screen" has been discussed at an open party meeting in the Firefighting Service Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The authors of the letter of response write that in the course of the discussion party members noted the importance of the stated problems which, it was emphasized, on the whole had been known not only to specialists but also to the general public as well. Decisions have been made on these problems time and again, both at the national level and within the Ministry of Defense. Implementation of these decisions, especially as regards supplying firefighting equipment, is proceeding slowly.

The Firefighting Service Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense is completing elaboration of an aggregate of organizational, preventive and technical measures aimed at ensuring fire safety in military units.

They continue: "Unfortunately the article 'Behind a Smoke Screen' cannot play a positive role in these conditions of practical actions (it is unclear just what ones they are talking about—Ed.).... The interview with Lt Col V. Tkachenko, chief of the Air Forces Firefighting Service Inspectorate, going beyond the boundaries of his jurisdictional competence and level of knowledge, took on a tendentious character and as a result, under the guise of criticism, boiled down to statement of a philistine opinion—"the problem of fires exists for firefighters, and resolution of this problem is also the business of firefighters." The authors of this article, forcing the problems into a framework of narrow parochial interest, are in effect hindering all solutions. In addition, in a fit of arrogance Col V. Tkachenko twists the facts to his own benefit and is guilty of tactlessness and patent fabrication."

As we can see, the viewpoint of Ministry of Defense Firefighting Service Inspectorate officials differs in large measure from that of those involved directly in firefighting activities in the Army and Navy. The authors of the above letters fail to share that complacency which permeates the official response. It is their opinion that the danger of fire is not diminished by sending another circular out to the line units. Following is the opinion of Col V. Prilipskiy, senior instructor in the department of firefighting technology at one of our higher service schools: "The school received a circular (the editors are in possession of the full text of this circular—Ed.), signed by the chief of the Firefighting Service Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the secretary of the inspectorate party organization, addressed to all chiefs of firefighting service inspectorates of the branches of service, military districts, groups of forces, main and central

directorates, as well as to the commanding officers of schools for lower-rank specialist personnel and secretaries of party organizations, instructing them to discuss the article 'Behind a Smoke Screen' and to send a response to this article to the editors of the newspaper KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

"If this comprised the entire contents of the circular, everything would seem logical and correct. There is a tiny 'but,' however. The circular notes that '...the article is directed not toward solving the problems facing the firefighting service but rather falsifies the heart of the matter and is filled with a tendentious approach and self-praise.'

"I agree that the article solves the problems only in part. But the main objective has been achieved: the problems and their causes have been revealed. And nobody should shut his eyes to their existence.

"As for the terms 'falsification,' 'tendentiousness' and 'self-praise' contained in the circular, this shows disrespect not only toward the authors of the article but also toward the firefighting service as a whole. I state with conviction that there is no falsification in the article, that the revealed problems do in fact exist and must be solved and not be brushed aside with some paper shuffling. It is not the article in the newspaper but the circular which is tendentious. As for the authors' alleged incompetence, of which the authors of the circular attempt to convince us, this is fundamentally insulting. In my opinion Col V. Tkachenko is at the present time one of the most experienced men in the firefighting service.

"The contents of this circular provide additional evidence that neither the former nor the present ranking officials in the Firefighting Service Inspectorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense have wanted nor do they now want to see and solve the problems stated in the article. The stagnation continues; perestroyka not only has not commenced in the Ministry of Defense Firefighting Service Inspectorate but is nowhere in sight."

We should note that the circular sent out to the units in the field is already beginning to produce results, compelling some officials to put pen to paper, even if contrary to their own conscience.

A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA reporter attended an open party meeting at the Ministry of Defense Firefighting Service Inspectorate, at which the interview published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA was discussed. The party members' statements contained not so much concern about how to solve an important problem as the desire to reject any critical comments directed toward them. Discussion of the article essentially turned into statements of rebuke against the chief of the Air Forces Firefighting Inspectorate, who had dared "air dirty linen." There were also a good many complaints about "objective" causal factors. As Lt Col V. Maleykin stated: "...It is difficult for a USSR Ministry of Defense Firefighting Service Inspectorate chief to solve these problems when he is only a colonel. If he had a general-officer rank, things would be different." Such a statement needs no further comment....

Chernavin Interviewed on Eve of Navy Day
18010108 Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 7, 1988 (signed to press 27 Jun 88) p 2

[Unattributed interview with Navy Commander-in-Chief and USSR Deputy Minister of Defense Hero of the Soviet Union Flt Adm Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernavin: "The Prowess of Maritime Service"]

[Text] *On the eve of the traditional holiday for our military sailors, our correspondent met with the commander-in-chief of the Navy, deputy minister of defense of the USSR and Hero of the Soviet Union, Fleet Admiral SU Vladimir Nikolayevich Chernavin, and asked him to answer questions of interest to our readers.*

[Correspondent] Comrade fleet admiral, Soviet navy sailors have inherited the glorious revolutionary and combat traditions of the fleet. How are these traditions manifested in the martial affairs of today's generation of sailors?

[Chernavin] The traditions of our fathers are in no way abstract concepts for us. We evaluate ourselves and what we are doing to reinforce the combat readiness of the fleet through their prism. Verity to the oath, will, self-possession, discipline and the ability to evaluate one's own behavior critically, the skill to see one's own mistakes and eliminate them without false pride, stubbornness in achieving goals and persistence in the fulfillment of tasks, the constant striving for higher indicators of combat maturity—all of this we take from older generations, supplementing them with new substance, developing them further.

Naval service, especially on long cruises, creates much that is interesting and useful. It is namely on long cruises that the military sailors consolidate the knowledge obtained on shore and improve their training and skills. The ability of the ship's crew to execute its mission depends on their level of mastery of the armaments and technical equipment. That is why high professional training is an important link in combat readiness today. Constant combat readiness is in turn one of the affirmed traditions of the Navy.

And this task does not recede into the background, does not cease to be topical. Even today, when a number of important agreements concerning the armed forces of the USSR and the United States have been signed, when the world has warmed noticeably, when people are living in the hope of peace, we, as military people to whom the defense of the Motherland is entrusted and who bear responsibility before society for its security, do not have the right to excessive optimism.

The peace-loving foreign policy of the party should be reinforced by an even higher degree of vigilance and combat readiness and an even higher level of combat

coordination and military discipline. The defense of the country, in short, should be absolute. History, after all, has seen no few sharp turnarounds. We are obliged to be ready for them always.

[Correspondent] The Persian Gulf remains one of the "hot spots" on the planet. The interests of many states, the countries drawn into the "tanker war," coincide there. What is the state interest of the Soviet Union in that region and, if the presence of our vessels is necessary there, why are there fewer of them than U.S. and NATO ships?

[Chernavin] Yes, the conflict there really has taken on an international nature. Judge for yourself: enormous forces of the U.S. Navy, consisting of aircraft-carrier, multi-purpose and operational missile groups with offensive arms on board, are concentrated in the gulf zone, including by turns such powerful strike carriers as, for example, the Kitty Hawk and Midway with carrier-based aircraft equipped with cruise missiles, the battleship Iowa, missile strike vessels, assault craft with troops and equipment on board and other ships and auxiliary vessels.

The ships of many of the NATO allies of the United States are also there. Most interesting is the fact that just a few combat units would suffice to protect the ships passing through there flying the American flag. The United States, meanwhile, is maintaining an enormous strike force there which, if there is no political solution, is able to destroy several states in the region with a single blow, not to mention individual targets of a strategic or tactical nature.

Just what is the spark, what is it in the Persian Gulf that the Americans take as vital, what threatens the "vital interests" of the United States so far from its own borders? If we pose these questions, it turns out that it is not a "vital" interest, but rather an imperial and strategic one, that impels them to apply such a superforce and spend colossal sums. The largest reserves of raw materials, first and foremost oil, tin, rubber and gold, are concentrated in the Indian Ocean region, here a quarter of world freight shipping is done. It is moreover very important to the United States that the countries of this region follow in the wake of its policies...

And what is our country's interest in the Persian Gulf? At least that the gulf is just some thousand km [kilometers] from our southern border. When American carrier-based aircraft in the gulf are able to strike at ranges of up to 1,200 km, and cruise missiles up to 2,600 km.

Now on why there are considerably fewer of our ships in the Persian Gulf than those of United States and its allies.

Soviet ships entered the gulf in September of 1986 after our steamship Petr Yemtsov was shot up. They entered with the sole task of ensuring the navigational safety of

our vessels in this zone. And a minimum of Soviet ships are sufficient to do that today. This fully corresponds to our policy of preserving peace and averting conflicts.

[Correspondent] You have spent your whole life in the fleet, and your biography is linked with the emergence of the Soviet nuclear submarine fleet and the assimilation of Arctic expanses by our submarines. Can you say that there was in your life a warrant officer who aided in your emergence as a military sailor?

[Chernavin] In the life of every sailor, petty officer or cadet there was probably such a warrant officer, and not just one. There were some in my life as a cadet, of course, they were alongside when I became a young officer. These were people who had completed the harsh school of war, with enormous experience in life, unsurpassed in practice, truly professors of their subject.

I, for example, will always remember with gratitude the petty officer of the torpedo command, Warrant Officer Valternist, PO 1st class Markevich, commander of a detachment of torpedo boats, and many others. When I was taking my first steps as an officer, they were always alongside, and they taught me much. We had a surprising atmosphere of trust, mutual assistance and friendship in our combat unit overall. Imagine: the night before I got clearance to command BCh-3 [operational combat unit 3], no one went to bed for a long time, and the sailors, petty officer and warrant officer came up and proposed repeating once more with them the areas of responsibility, even though all had been repeated already. They could not have done otherwise, probably. They considered my success in these tests a matter of honor for the whole unit. I have learned well since then that an officer of any rank should never be ashamed of the fact that he learns from sailors, petty officers or warrant officers.

I feel that our main mission is to see that the warrant officer, petty officer or sergeant is in the right place, fulfills his purpose, is the first and most reliable assistant to the officer. Then we will resolve many of the tasks of restructuring more successfully. Unfortunately, everything is still not in order in our warrant-officer corps.

[Correspondent] There are still non-regulation mutual relations both in the army and in the navy. The editorial mail is confirmation of this. What can you say about this and what role do you assign to warrant officers, petty officers and sergeants in eradicating these phenomena?

[Chernavin] I can only say that each such instance is a shame not only for the unit or ship where it took place, but for everyone who wears the epaulettes. This is a stain on all that is noble for the sake of which military service exists in our country as an honorable and sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR. At the same time, I cannot agree with those who want to see the origins of this phenomenon in the army.

In fact, let's look at what is at the heart of non-regulation mutual relations. First and foremost, it is an aspiration to provide a certain living comfort for oneself at the expense of others under the conditions of military service.

And now recall the quite usual picture of the recent past in our society: groups of people united according to certain traits in order that, diminishing the rights of others, they could make use of shortages to obtain apartments, cars and other of life's benefits for themselves.

Aren't such combinations reminiscent of those existing in a number of units or ships with quite cohesive groups of soldiers from older drafts who strive, without stopping even at the use of force, to shift their duties onto those junior to them in service and thereby make their time in the army or the navy easier and more comfortable?

I can say with confidence that as a rule, these young people have grown up namely in those families, to put it mildly, where they have had an impertinent attitude toward their comrades in schools, vocational-technical institutes or tekhnikums—they took money and things, forced the younger ones to obey, diminished their human dignity and the like.

In short, it is a problem in our society, and not only the army, and it should be resolved jointly. We need to take most decisive steps.

And if we are discussing warrant officers, petty officers and sergeants today, the majority of them have not yet found their place in the fight against this monstrous phenomenon. Although it is namely they who are obliged to play the decisive role in the eradication of non-regulation mutual relations.

[Correspondent] The 19th All-Union Party Conference has taken place. How did the fleet prepare for this important event in the life of the party and the country and did that affect the results with which the military sailors are greeting Navy Day?

[Chernavin] The preparations for the party conference determined the preparations for Navy Day as well.

This was a time of energetic search for reserves to raise combat readiness, improve the organization of competition, reinforce military discipline and make the multinational soldiers' collectives more cohesive. Questions of social and cultural life, raising the activeness and responsibility of communist leaders and ensuring that every member of the CPSU be a model of service and discipline were at the center of attention.

We note as important achievements the expansion of glasnost in the soldiers' collectives, the democratization of life and the strengthening of the struggle against phenomena of stagnation and shortcomings and for the creation of a universally healthy moral and psychological atmosphere.

Today the fleet is living by the ideas of the conference, and intensive work on their realization is underway in the units and on the ships. I will cite several ships and units that are meeting Navy day with honor.

Goods results in combat and political training and in socialist competition were obtained in the summer training period by the crews of the nuclear-missile submarine Minsk Komsomolets, an initiator of socialist competition in the Navy, the nuclear cruiser Kirov, the missile cruisers Groznyy and Varyag, the large ASW ship Ocha-kov, the escort ship Bezzavetnyy and many others.

We are living at a very interesting time—a time of revolutionary transformations brought forth by restructuring. The decisions made at the 19th All-Union Party Conference are very important and fateful for the country and all of its people. I want each and every military sailor to recall today that Vladimir Ilich Lenin relied a great deal on the sailors as one of the most revolutionary and most reliable forces, and he called the fleet the lead detachment of the revolution. And that each sailor feel in his heart that his place is at the very front line of the fight for restructuring.

Activities of Cruise Missile Crews Examined

*18010155a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
22 Sep 88 p 2*

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank V. Mikhaylov, Black Sea Fleet: "The Custodians of Missile Fire"]

[Text] According to a tradition that began during the Great Patriotic War crews of ships that have distinguished themselves in battle are presented roasted piglets. And this is how military sailors who have successfully completed firing are honored today.

One day after successfully completing missile firing for first place in the Navy (and that year they also won two challenge trophies), out of good will launch sailors shared their trophy with sailors in the missile unit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel S. Ivanov. They unloaded two pink piglets and said, "Your work also helped in our success. Your missiles did not let us down!"

Often in seeing only the eternal side of a successful battle—the work of the artillery men, torpedo men and missile men who destroyed the "enemy" with their first rounds, torpedoes or missiles—we forget about the people who have readied these terrible weapons and forget that the work of those people who maintain and monitor that these combat assets are in good condition, keep them constantly ready and issue them to ships is also difficult and very crucial.

Cruise missiles, covered with camouflage canvas, look like soldiers in service blouses. There is cleanliness, order and surprising quiet in the premises. The missiles

are "asleep" in a micro-climate that was created especially for them and each of them is in its own bed. By the way, I should say something special about these "cots."

People from a design organization sent the Navy blueprints of structures onto which missiles were to be placed and a factory was to construct test models using this design. Experts in subunits looked at them, estimated what to do and made their own blueprints. The people who had made the test models were sent to the factory. They tested and this design turned out to be reliable, solid, took less metal to make than the institute version and was easy to work with. But the main thing was that it was economic because the hulls of old missiles that had already been written off were used in their construction. Captain 3rd Rank V. Gurov and Captain Lieutenant L. Golovnev got a lot of credit for this. And Lieutenant Colonel Ivanov's unit gave us a lot of examples of initiative and a creative economic approach to operations.

We enter the premises with the cruise missiles.

Ivanov explains, "This is where instrument checks are done. The process is difficult and requires not only excellent knowledge, but also exceptional, thorough discipline, for anything that is overlooked, any false step or inaccuracy in their work, can be costly. There simply must not be any. And there aren't. Just as the ships have no claims against defective work by this unit's collective."

The military sailors have also accomplished and invented a lot in the subunit where they are working with cruise missiles. It also appears that the collective's creative mood is not on the decline. This is understandable. The subunit is junior and was recently "renovated" with lieutenants. But this had practically no impact on the quality of work, as there are first-class experts even among the junior officers. Take Senior Lieutenant V. Mitrofanov for example. He completed the Naval Academy with honors and passed the examinations allowing him independent supervision before the normal time-period.

Here is one fact that shows the officer's competence and his excellent professional training. Once while checking equipment he noticed that one of the parameters was outside the normal range. As a rule, in such cases one does not look for the reason for the deviation, but immediately replaces the assembly since it is too difficult to find the defect. Mitrofanov felt that it was wasteful to replace the expensive assembly because one part was not working.

"There was no other way," industrial representatives who had been visiting the unit assured him. "Finding the defect in this assembly will be like looking for a needle in a haystack."

Mitrofanov did not agree with the experts and... he set out to find the "needle in the haystack." And imagine the surprise of those very experienced experts when the officer not only found, but also repaired the defect in a short time, thus saving the assembly of that expensive equipment....

We then went with the unit commander to drop in at one of the locations where weapons inspections were in full swing. Sailors forced an air defense missile out of the small container in which it had been stored and after placing it on a work bench, connected a cable to it. A minute later the missile was connected to sensing elements which had numerous wires stretching to a panel. Senior Lieutenants Ye. Filkin and A. Gorbachevskiy and Lieutenant G. Shmidt had to determine whether the assemblies and systems were in working order.

Yevgeniy Filkin carefully watched the indications on the electronic board where figures were now lighting up.

"This is new for Filkin," explained Sergey Leonidovich, "but he has already mastered it. Filkin is a communist and master of military affairs and pyrotechnics. He has just recently gone out with the combat engineers to disarm ammunition, has been awarded the badge 'For Mine Clearing,' completed the Penzenskiy Higher Artillery Engineer School..."

There was a "Rejected" sign on the electronic display, but it did not light up a single time, despite the large number of missiles that were checked that day.

At the exit I turned my attention to a fire panel. I confess that formerly one did not see a full set of instruments covered by plexiglass. I learn that during an inspection a commission had even noted that these panels were set up. It would seem to be a detail, but the overall picture is affected by such details.

I must say that the legacy that Lieutenant Colonel Ivanov was given was far from the best. There were many issues and problems that had to be resolved. Yet he rolled up his sleeves, began to work and worked enthusiastically. Then people began believing in the commander and followed him. This was because they saw that he was a man of today, a man of perestroyka.

A bright banner blazed on the ship and a swift missile left the guide rail with a jerk and moved toward the target. A little later the senior headquarters chief congratulated the crew for the successful accomplishment of its firing. But neither Lieutenant Colonel Ivanov nor his subordinates ever received these enthusiastic congratulations, although they always deserve some credit for the success of this crew and others.

Baltic Fleet: Increased Tension From NATO Tac Air Flights

18010268 Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
26 Oct 88 p 4

[SOVETSKAYA LITVA Interview with Vice Adm A.I. Korniyenko, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Directorate of the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet, by Capt 2nd Rank A. Dmitrikov under the rubric "I Serve the Soviet Union: Guardian of the Baltic": "We Have the Newspaper as a Guest"]

[Text]

On a Course of Renewal

[A. Dmitrikov] Today all of the Soviet people and the Armed Forces of the USSR are living for the restructuring, for renewal and the implementation of the great practical objectives defined at the 27th party congress, the 19th All-Union party conference, the July and September 1988 plenums of the CPSU Central Committee. How is the practical restructuring being carried out in the Baltic Fleet?

[A.I. Korniyenko] Perhaps never before has our life been marked by such a creative uplifting and by such a sense of responsibility for the accomplishment of large-scale tasks as it has been since the 19th All-Union party conference. It equipped us with programmatic decisions of key importance for accelerating the restructuring and for the fate of the homeland.

The most important indicator of the military cadres' professional and political maturity today is their ability to rely in their work on the party and Komsomol organizations and on the military collective.

This is precisely the kind of great demandingness and exactingness which is now being used to evaluate the performance of party organizations during the report and election campaign underway in the fleet.

Placing the stress in the work performed with the personnel on the study of the situation and the shaping of a wholesome psychological microclimate in the collectives, on the development of a sense of responsibility in each individual and on the establishment of a climate of pointed and earnest discussion of the 19th party conference in the daily practical work of the party—these are the main things for our party organizations today.

[A. Dmitrikov] What is the military political situation in the Baltic Sea today, and what are the conditions under which fleet personnel are forced to carry out their assigned missions?

[A.I. Korniyenko] As we know, a scheduled tactical exercise was recently conducted in the Baltic Sea by forces of the Baltic Fleet. They practiced defending the Soviet coast and improved the operational tactics of the

fleet's diversified forces. Observers from the GDR and the PPR, as well as a group of foreign journalists accredited with the Information Administration of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, were present. They could all see for themselves that the exercise was a defensive one, consistent with our military doctrine.

Tension in the Baltic Sea has recently increased somewhat. Exercises by American ships and ships of the NATO bloc are increasingly being carried out east of the island of Bornholm. American ships carrying cruise missiles and nuclear weapons are entering the Baltic Sea with increasing frequency.

Tactical aircraft of the NATO bloc are flying not just into the area of Bornholm, but also into the areas of Baltiysk and Liyepaya. This creates a certain degree of tension, and it concerns our people, of course. We would like to see the tension in the Baltic Sea reduced. We would like to see the reduction of armed forces planned and taking place in Europe occur also in the Baltic Sea.

In accordance with our defense doctrine the Baltic Fleet must keep track of the activities of naval forces of the states opposing us here. When ships of the NATO nations enter the Baltic Sea and conduct exercises, we therefore take defensive steps in accordance with our plans. We regard them calmly and are prepared to fulfill our duty to the homeland.

[A. Dmitrikov] The Baltic Fleet is deployed in the territory of four Union republics. How does this affect international relations?

[A.I. Korniyenko] In our multinational state any issue, whether it pertains to economics, policy, culture, the military service or any other aspect of our society, inevitably takes on national significance. The national significance is a specific manifestation of all the processes occurring in the society. That fact is particularly salient and important in the multinational state. This is the basis for the Lenin party's extremely important, basic conclusion that the social and economic development of the nation and of our people always proceeds more successfully in the national form. Another conclusion is inseparably linked to this one: that it is inadmissible and harmful when the national assumes such prominence that it overshadows the social and economic essence of the processes.

The Soviet Armed Forces are the embodiment of the great unity and the indissoluble friendship and fraternity of our nation's peoples. Their multinational composition is a source not of weakness, as it is in the armies of the bourgeois states, but of strength and power. The improvement of international relations in the nation will unquestionably contribute to the further enhancement of the qualitative aspects of our defense capability.

The Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet carries out its international missions with honor, reliably protecting the

homeland's borders. The Baltic Sea sailors are linked by ties of combat cooperation with their brothers in arms, seamen of the GDR and the PPR. The practical ties linking the allied fleets are developing and expanding.

The Baltic fightingmen have the closest, the most practical and friendly ties with the youth of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Belorussia and Kaliningrad Oblast, representatives of which serve on the fleet's ships and in its units. The fleet's combat formation has ships with honorary names such as Komsomolets Litvy, 60 Let Komsomola Belorussii, Kaliningradskiy Komsomolets, and so forth. Envoys from Soviet Lithuania make a considerable contribution to the enhancement of the fleet's combat readiness. Rear Admiral P. Kashauskas, Captain 1st Rank A. Leyshis, Officers V. Lashas and K. Renkevichyus, Warrant Officer M. Dumbrava and others set an example with their conscientious fulfillment of their military duty. Leaders of the republic's Communist Party and its government, the Komsomol Central Committee and sponsoring enterprises constantly meet with the seamen, look into their needs and requests and provide practical assistance. And this close interaction is a guarantee that our ties will be further strengthened and that the fleet's combat readiness will be enhanced.

The interview was prepared by Captain 2nd Rank A. Dmitrikov at the request of the SOVETSKAYA LITVA editorial office.

Problems of Weapons, Equipment Repair Raise Questions of Specialist Training
18010267 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
23 Nov 88 First Edition p 2

[Article by Capt 3rd Rank A. Lashin, Pacific Fleet: "An Ebbing Trend"]

[Text] Why has the experience in the restructuring of combat readiness born in formation "X" not been disseminated?

The on-shore laboratory which handles the routine inspection and maintenance of the surface-to-air missile systems received a call from the ship to send specialists immediately. The scheduled departure to sea was threatened....

Just what had happened? It turned out to be nothing more than a burned-out fuse in a module. A specialist 2nd class should be able to locate such malfunctions.

Unfortunately, examples like this are not unique in shipboard operations. Sometimes even the missile launchings are not accomplished without enlisting outside specialists, including plant specialists. Why is this? The officers with our armament and ship repair facilities finally decided to get to the bottom of these occurrences.

Our plan was actually to concentrate exclusively on studying deficiencies in the organization and the substance of the special training for seagoing personnel. It is far more simple to find deficiencies than to come up with constructive ways to overcome them. And the limited group of people was clearly inadequate. Collective counsel was needed. We therefore wrote letters to the local party organizations asking for ways to enhance the special training and its results and where to seek reserves. We assumed the role of coordinators providing the impetus for the "mental attack."

Yes, it was decided to act through the party organizations, democratically, in the hope that this would help to better overcome the departmental segmentation. When you get right down to it, there is practically no real exchange of know-how on these matters among the units or even among the various headquarters sections. Even the personnel on ships of the same class anchored side by side in port frequently do not know what is occurring in the daily life of one another. And they all have similar problems.

Our unusual approach, the use of letters, got results. Captain 2nd Rank Ye. Khudoyarov, Captains 3rd Rank N. Gamzin and V. Popov, Captains-Lieutenant S. Trunov, V. Bukharin and N. Zavyakov, and others, mainly flag specialists, sent in some worthwhile and thoroughly developed ideas.

Among the suggestions received I would single out as an example the discontinuance of heterogeneous training groups in favor of a system of individual assignments monitored by instructors. And what about this? The same amount of training time for special preparation is presently allocated for both the food supply specialist and the missileman. Is that proper?

At one time, on the missile cruiser Sevastopol, an entire day each week was allocated at the commander's orders for special training for personnel of the missile and artillery and the mine and torpedo divisions. And on that day no one could take the seamen away from their training from reveille to retreat. This procedure was not prescribed and was subsequently changed. Did things improve after the return to uniform training for all?

A summarization of the suggestions coming in from the sites provided the basis for working out an entire program for fundamentally improving the special training on a fairly broad scale. Both I, as secretary of the party organization of the armament and ship repair facilities, and the comrades who took part in the experiment were happy, for it appeared that a trend had taken shape.

Sadly, no fundamental advances have been made in the year which has elapsed since then, even though our ideas were given high marks at upper headquarters. I myself saw notations in the margins of documents indicating

that the individuals in charge were encouraging innovation. Capt 1st Rank N. Zakurin, for example, made statements to this effect several times in my presence.

As I said, however, nothing has changed to this day in the special training. With respect to the previous shortcomings, that is: the groups made up of seamen with different levels of training, the lack of monitoring of preparations for classes by the instructors themselves, frequent disruptions in the scheduled training, and so on, and so forth.

A trend had taken shape, but it turned out to be an ebbing trend, seeming to sweep toward the shipboard firmament only to recede.

Just what accounted for the rejection of a practice which had proven itself and for which so many Communists at the sites had voiced their approval? I can honestly say that I do not know. I could get lost in guessing. In any case, one could of all things not accuse Captain 1st Rank N. Zakurin of conservatism. The same can be said of other supervisory personnel with whom I come into contact in the service. Many of them, but not all. So perhaps it is all a matter of those "not all," not the most important people but people upon whom the implementation of the desires of those in charge depends to an enormous degree? And perhaps the "not all" actually covers a fairly numerous group.

"Seditious" thoughts such as these increasingly occur to me. It is truly disappointing that our party initiative came to naught. This sort of thing undermines people's faith in the possibility of carrying out useful and essential practical changes. And I do not believe that we are the only ones experiencing this kind of disappointment. The main thing and the obvious conclusion, however, is that things will not progress without an effective mechanism by means of which the social activeness of people can be given practical embodiment. The experience of the restructuring in all areas has shown that only real concern "activates" these qualities for the maximum return.

At one time I was in close communication with Captain 3rd Rank M. Abramov, commander of the escort vessel Retivyy. He had worked out a unique system for training watch officers and watch station commanders. When the ship was at sea, particularly during exercises, there were two watch officers alongside the commander on the bridge, one of whom dealt exclusively with air defense missions. A controversial innovation? Perhaps. Its merits and shortcomings can only be judged in retrospect, however, since Captain 3rd Rank M. Abramov has long been a student at the academy and is probably defending his views, now within its walls.

It is sad to know that one's creative ideas will not get the attention of others. The simple fact is that no one is interested in them. Just go ahead and experiment on your own. We do not have the time to spend on such

things; we are busy with our regular jobs. During the war, though, everything new was seized upon immediately and applied by one's colleagues, because without new things it was impossible not just to win, but even to survive.

There are many people in every subunit and on every ship today who have accepted the concepts of the restructuring primarily as a call for creative rethinking of the reality surrounding them, as a call for reformation. Their suggestions are sometimes unusual and do not fit into the traditions and procedures which have developed over the years. I am profoundly convinced that in general the fleet has great need of such people. And there is a constant "request" from above for these people to show themselves. Without a mechanism for supporting progressive changes, however, innovation will continue to bog down at the numerous echelons of fleet command. In my opinion, the Navy command element absolutely must have adequately reliable and democratic feedback channels. It needs them if only in order to have a clear picture of why orders and directives sent down from above are frequently carried out poorly, in truncated form and in a one-sided manner, on the "bottom floors," in order to know the form in which they reach there, why the transformation occurs, whether proper conditions have been established for their implementation....

Without good feedback any system is doomed to suffer breakdowns. And we are frequently witnesses to the fact that instructions are sometimes not implemented because certain local circumstances unknown at the top are not taken into account. It is believed today that "critical free-thinking" has been eliminated in this area. Even though the individual who takes this line among his subordinates sometimes cannot himself refrain from skeptical comments in front of those very subordinates when he reads the next "guiding" documents. They have to be implemented, however.

Yes, instructions do have to be followed. The breakdowns are most frequently caused by far-reaching factors, however, and they need to be understood. They

need to be understood in order not to have a situation in which everyone is "for," but things do not go forward.

I recently heard a staff officer I know say the following:

"Stop fretting over your ideas, Lashin. Your innovation regarding the special training is dead. Just accept that. And stop imagining yourself as a reformer."

Yes, unfortunately, there is pessimism today in the minds of those at the sites. It merely plays into the hands of the bureaucrat fighting for self-preservation, however. And using the excuse of "the bosses" is sometimes nothing more than a convenient screen, a cover.

I have heard that the army once had the institution of General Staff officers who represented it in the units. To some degree, from what I can understand, this safeguarded the implementation of military policy against the inclination to give priority to local interests and against distortions, and accelerated the adoption of progressive know-how. I am not suggesting that we establish a "state acceptance system" for checking out initiatives. I believe that there is something to think about, however. One way to counteract bureaucracy and conservatism might be to establish an institution of public experts, for example, which would be set up at the formation and higher levels out of representatives of units, headquarters, political organs and so forth. It would be a sort of select scientific council engaged mainly in studying innovative suggestions and debated issues, as well as initiatives emerging with respect to the most diverse aspects of our daily life. For example, the expert councils could be placed in charge of practical and scientific conferences and the performance of creative work with young officers and warrant officers. It would not be Ivanov, Petrov and Sidorov, unknown to one another, each in isolation, defending his own quest in the combat training and indoctrination, but a recognized and authoritative expert group performing a skilled investigation in advance.

**Strategic Rocket Forces Political Chief on
Missile, Artillery Troops Day**

*18010263a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in
Russian 19 Nov 88 First Edition p 2*

[Interview with Col Gen V. Rodin, chief of Political Directorate, Strategic Rocket Forces, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col V. Polezhayev: "Combat Readiness Is Mandatory: Interview With Col Gen V. Rodin, Military Council Member and Strategic Rocket Forces Political Directorate Chief"; place and date of interview not indicated; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] By edict of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 1 November 1988, Missile Troops and Artillery Day is to be celebrated on the third Sunday in November.

On the eve of Missile Troops and Artillery Day KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col V. Polezhayev interviewed Col Gen V. Rodin, military council member and chief of the political directorate of the Strategic Rocket Forces, and asked him to reply to a number of questions.

* * *

[Polezhayev] Comrade Colonel General, what performance results have our missilemen achieved as they approach their holiday?

[Rodin] Our holiday coincides with completion of the training year, and therefore one can talk quite definitely about performance results. Sixty-five percent of units have achieved performance results of good and excellent, and the number of excellent-rated crews and subunits has increased. All field training launches have been successful.

We are far from satisfied in all regards, however. Matters pertaining to improving the quality of combat training are not being resolved as precisely and thoroughly as we would like. We are also concerned by the fact that many commanders and political workers still fail to display adequate persistence, consistency and an uncompromising attitude toward rooting out bureaucratic attitudes and paper shuffling in competition, unnecessary relaxation of demands and unnecessary situation simplification in training and indoctrination of personnel, and diversion of personnel from combat training. There are problems in forming proper interethnic relations and in establishing genuine friendship and comradeship in the daily activities of all units and subunits.

[Polezhayev] The All-Union Party Conference advanced a principle according to which effectiveness of Soviet defense organizational development at the present stage

should be achieved primarily by means of qualitative parameters both in regard to equipment and personnel. How is this principle being implemented in the line units?

[Rodin] Our main task consists in ensuring that the human factor operates universally and with maximum activeness. As the minister of defense emphasized, without the human factor implementation of quality parameters in regard to equipment, military science, and Armed Forces force structure is impossible. In this connection we consider first and foremost the specific features of military service by members of the Strategic Rocket Forces, which consists in the fact that even during peacetime personnel are performing a combat mission. When he goes on alert duty, the missile unit officer is constantly, as we say, on "waiting mode," and must be alert at all times, day after day, year after year.

In order to ensure that a feeling of dull routine, dangerous to the missileman, does not develop under such conditions, in order to ensure that the acuteness of his perception does not diminish, his readiness to respond instantly to an alarm, he needs, as they say, a double or triple store of physical and moral-psychological qualities. The entire process of training and indoctrination of Missile Forces personnel is focused on forming these qualities. Paramount attention is focused on training specialist personnel to stand alert duty. The present international military and political situation, the complexity of its development, the need for a high degree of vigilance and combat readiness, and the role and place of the Strategic Rocket Forces in ensuring peace and security are thoroughly explained to missile personnel.

The men of the Strategic Rocket Forces stand at the front line of our country's defense. Indoctrination of these personnel in a spirit of thorough understanding of their special responsibility for ensuring the security of the homeland and for exemplary performance of assigned combat missions is a most important aspect of the activities of commanders, political workers, headquarters staffs, party and Komsomol organizations. The amassed arsenal of forms and methods of ideological indoctrination work is constantly being improved and enriched in order to accomplish these goals. The newness of content of these means as well as new approaches help to eliminate totally any element of dull routine in the attitude of specialist personnel toward their duties when standing alert duty.

Naturally this requires particularly effective, purposeful political and indoctrination work with personnel. An entire system of practice and training drills has been devised in order to ensure that acuteness of perception does not diminish and that preparedness to perform with sureness and unerringly when time is acutely of the essence is preserved. Toward this end appropriate training facilities have been established in the units and subunits. These facilities provide capability to reproduce any situation which missile personnel may encounter in

an actual combat environment. A specialist personnel candidate selection process has been devised and adopted, making it possible to determine with maximum accuracy the men's individual natural abilities and specific characteristics.

Methods of psychological stress relief and relaxation have been devised, and the off-duty activities and rest regimen for alert-duty personnel have been well organized. And the most important thing is the fact that the commanding officer and political worker are always right there on the line with their men. Their example of exemplary performance of job duties, consummate skill and flawless organization is a most important factor in improving the quality of performance of alert duty and a guarantee of successful performance of assigned missions.

[Polezhayev] Up until fairly recently, if the subject of perestroika arose, the following question would be asked: But is it applicable to the Armed Forces, where the daily life and activities of military personnel are strictly regimented? Now everyone can see that perestroika is under way....

[Rodin] Life in the Soviet Armed Forces is a part of the life of our state, and the military cannot stand apart from the changes which are taking place in our society. The search for ways to restructure all areas of activity of Missile Forces personnel has advanced into the area of practical implementation of mandated measures. Components include democratization of life in the military, activation of the human factor, and improvement of the operating style both of leader personnel and military collectives. Party and Komsomol organizations are to play a special role in perestroika.

Today genuine changes have occurred in many areas. More persistent efforts are being made to overcome stagnation phenomena in combat training. Intensive combat training is in progress in the line units. Positive results have been noted in strengthening discipline and orderly procedure. The activities of commanders and political workers in this direction is being assessed with greater firmness and integrity, especially in the area of getting closer to the men, and the military community has become more active.

Party organizations have begun working more specifically and militantly in the course of implementing the decisions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference. A spirit of innovation and an atmosphere of creative endeavor, firm principles and self-criticism is being manifested increasingly more distinctly in their activities. They are delving more deeply into the root issues of combat readiness, are working persistently to ensure Communists a vanguard role, and glasnost and a democratic spirit are becoming increasingly more evident in their practical activities.

We also see the fact, however, that many are not making a genuine effort to restructure their work from the position of the new demands. A fair number of party organization leaders still are assimilating the new approaches and are copying the work style of command-political personnel while continuing to hold on to the past.

Success in efforts to achieve firm military discipline, and consequently to improve qualitative parameters in combat training is determined in large measure by the leader-Communist, his experiential posture, and by his personal exemplariness in all things. Over the course of a year's time party members repeatedly directed serious critical comments at officer V. Fomin, but he failed to respond to a single one of them. What kind of respect can such a person command, and how can there be any talk of exemplary performance in such a case? And yet he was a party buro member. Ultimately this officer took the path of deceit and discredited himself as a commander.

The fact is that arrogance toward one's subordinates, and sometimes rudeness of behavior, and ignoring the men's needs and aspirations are totally incompatible with the process of democratization and a Leninist interpretation of the essence of Soviet one-man command.

The times demand of us vigorous effort to give perestroika a highly-dynamic character and a high degree of effectiveness. The times make it necessary for command and political cadres to improve their work style and methods, to be closer to personnel, and vigorously to combat that which impedes us from moving forward.

[Polezhayev] The readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA would like to know how the process of eliminating intermediate-range missiles is affecting the combat morale of missile personnel and wonder if it is not tending to inject an element of slackness or complacency.

[Rodin] Today, months after ratification of the INF Treaty, there is every reason to state unequivocally that elimination of missiles in our forces is proceeding precisely on schedule, without any problems or complications.

Missile personnel have always considered and continue to consider field practice missile launches to be the culmination of their combat training—the most rigorous test of their skill, proficiency, physical and psychological conditioning. But missile crews do not go out to the range every day by any means.

Quite a different situation in this respect has developed during implementation of the treaty, for missile crews were not going to launch one or two missiles, as is generally the case in combat training, but rather a large number of missiles, and in the presence of U.S. inspectors. The men performed flawlessly.

It was at the elimination facilities near Chita and Kansk that our missile crews, especially during those first hours and days, felt the attention of the entire world on them. What was commencing was not simply elimination, although of course elimination was the primary thing. Like it or not, it was also a demonstration of men and hardware. It was a demonstration of the quality and reliability of Soviet missiles, of the skill of our missile crews, of their profound comprehension of the aspirations for peace on the part of the people of the entire world.

I should like to take this opportunity to name at least a few of those who did an outstanding job. They include first and foremost officers V. Shapovalov and V. Karayev, A. Chernyshov and S. Nakonechnyy, A. Shevskiy and N. Seregin, V. Petrov and I. Goncharov, as well as many, many others.

As regards morale, mood and attitude.... They are presently giving the least thought to where they will be sent

tomorrow, after elimination of the missiles is completed, to what new assignments they will be given. The most important thing for them is to carry out the assigned task flawlessly and without a hitch.

All our missile personnel have a profound understanding of the fact that we are defending and upholding our socialist ideals, our choice of life journey in an atmosphere of new political thinking, that it is precisely socialism which has advanced a specific, realistic program of disarmament.

At the same time we are forming and shaping our consciousness of defense; we are not yielding to illusions about an immediate and firm peace soon to ensue. We proceed from a realistic-prediction assessment of events. And the realities are that there are no grounds for complacency, for lessening the intensity of military service, for relaxing or lessening combat readiness.

Private Describes Duties as Chemical/Smoke Specialist

18010221b Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 88 p 29

[Article by Capt A. Yampolskiy under the rubric "Military Specialties": "The TDM Prepares for Smoke Generation"]

[Text] *CW driver and specialist 3rd class Pvt Vladimir Mileshin, having completed the DOSAAF driver school, relates his duties.*

I serve in a smoke company as a CW [chemical warfare] driver. Along with managing the vehicle, I must correctly carry out the duties of a member of the crew of thermal-smoke machinery (TDM). What do these duties consist of?

The driver should bring the vehicle into position in accordance with the wind direction—the hood should be against it—immediately upon arriving in the designated area. A seemingly inconsequential detail. It has great significance, however, for us smokescreen soldiers. The CW driver then immediately sets about preparing the equipment for smoke generation in conjunction with the crew commander.

What do I do here? First, I place the fire-extinguishing equipment no closer than two meters from the vehicle. Second, I open the first fuel tank and check the presence and level of fuel for the thermal-smoke apparatus, using a measuring rod. I then attach the nozzle to a special cylindrical bushing. Although this is not a very complex operation, it nonetheless requires particular attention. The nozzle must be hooked up in such a way that the rubber gasket is evenly seated where the metal surfaces meet and guarantees against leaks of the smoke-generating substance.

Having prepared the machinery for smoke generation, I return to the cab and, together with the crew commander (he was doing work on the other side of the TDM), wait for the signal "Begin routine." As soon as it sounds, I turn on the power shifter, put the transmission gearshift into neutral and then into third. After this, increasing the engine RPMs, I watch the tachometer. The senior CW soldier (the crew commander) carries out his own duties during this. The temperature and pressure in the TDM combustion chamber should be brought to the necessary levels that make smoke generation possible.

The command "Smoke!" is executed directly by the senior CW soldier. He has only to open up a three-way valve for this. As for me, my work as a crew specialist concludes with the command "Stop smoke." In that case I blow out (clean out) the thermal-smoke apparatus using certain operations.

That is, strictly speaking, what the duties of a CW driver consist of. It is possible that the impression will be formed for some after my narrative that there is nothing especially complicated in this field. But everything I have related is executed in a strictly limited time. Standards are standards. And as practice shows, it is not so simple to keep within strict standard time frames. We are moreover operating in the field, as a rule, using individual-protection measures, which creates additional difficulties in preparing the TDM for smoke generation. Now you can judge: is it easy to be a CW driver?

I will say one thing more: my field is interesting and, moreover, very necessary. A smokescreen generated in timely fashion, after all, can camouflage an important target from the enemy and give troops the opportunity of completing this or that maneuver on the terrain concealed from ground and aerial reconnaissance.

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Chief of Railroad Troops Discusses Future Rail Construction Plans

18010221a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Oct 88 First Edition p 2

[Interview by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent A. Vorobyev with Railroad Troops Chief Hero of the Soviet Union Col Gen Mikhail Konstantinovich Makartsev: "The Soldiers of the Steel Mainlines"]

[Text] *Historical reference: The creation of rail troops was declared by order of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the republic on 5 Oct 1918. The military railroad workers selflessly supported the combat actions of the Red Army and took part in all of the most important operations in the fire of the civil war and the foreign intervention. Here is what was said by the Revolutionary Military Council on 31 Jan 1921: "The onslaught of the enemies of the workers' and peasants' republic has been repelled through the efforts of the valiant Red Army, and the exhausted country has gained the opportunity of moving on to peaceful construction. Enormous and crucial tasks in this struggle fell to the lot of the railroad units..."*

"In the marshes of Polesye, in the sands of Turkestan, in the gloom of the polar night in Murmansk, on ice and snow, the railroad units, inspired by revolutionary enthusiasm, gave their every effort to the work, patiently and uncomplainingly bearing all deprivations..."

After the civil war, the railroad workers took part in eliminating the ruin of transport and restored and repaired lines while laying new ones. They built over 3,000 kilometers of steel mainlines in various parts of the country in the prewar years. By 1941 the railroad troops met all the requirements of the times in their level of equipping and readiness. This was confirmed by the Great Patriotic War.

The railroad soldiers traversed the difficult front-line tracks shoulder to shoulder with the infantrymen and artillerymen, the tankers and the combat engineers. They rehabilitated and constructed 120,000 kilometers of railroads, 2,756 large- and medium-sized bridges and almost 8,000 stations and sidings, and they disarmed over two million shells and mines in conjunction with civilian railroad workers.

Tens of thousands of railroad soldiers were awarded state prizes, and twenty-six were given the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, for courage and valor displayed in battle and for their labor selflessness. A number of units and subunits of railroad troops received orders and honorary titles, and one brigade was made into the first Guards railroad brigade for the steadfastness and heroism of its personnel.

[Vorobyev] Mikhail Konstantinovich, your officer's biography begins in the postwar years and is linked with the railroad troops from that time. You have completed all stages of command and have been awarded the highest labor honors... What do you see as the chief changes that have transpired in the railroad troops over those years?

[Makartsev] I was able to begin service in years when the railroad troops were switching over to new construction after the completion of rehabilitation work. We were restructuring on the go—training skilled specialists, mastering the technology of capital operations and new construction equipment, increasing the productive base. We had to lay many thousands of kilometers of new lines and second tracks and take part in the electrification of lines and the development of stations and sidings. The transport construction projects, such as the Ust-Kamenogorsk—Zyryanovsk, Trans-Mongolian Mainline, Abakan—Tayshet, Ivdel—Ob, Tyumen—Surgut and Baikal-Amur Mainlines, also did not get by without the railroad soldiers.

Participation in transport construction according to the targets of the state plans for the development of the national economy has also undoubtedly enriched the personnel with valuable practical experience and facilitated growth in the professional mastery of tens of thousands of railroad soldiers. The technical-equipment level of the troops has also grown several times over during these years. They now have at their disposal powerful earthmoving machinery and devices, cranes, bulldozers and trucks. The subunits are also equipped with bridging and track equipment of various types. All of this equipment makes possible the comprehensive mechanization of operations in the rehabilitation, development and construction of railroads. I would say that the level of mechanization in the pouring of track roadbeds, the assembly of track rails and the laying and bedding of track could be brought to 100 percent.

[Vorobyev] You said "could be brought." Does that mean it is not always managed in practice?

[Makartsev] Unfortunately, that is so. The share of manual labor among the railroad troops is still too significant. And the problem here is not a lack of equipment, but of people, of their ability to use it, to organize labor competently, to provide everything needed for them to make them efficient and highly productive. We are far from always having clarity, organization and discipline at the proper level. It frequently happens that the soldiers' hands are making up for someone's irresponsibility or carelessness.

[Vorobyev] One feature of the railroad troops is the fact that the officers, warrant officers and soldiers on compulsory duty complete their combat and special training right at the construction sites in the course of production work. It is known that the plan is law. One even hears of officers who frequently put questions of combat training into second place, or else do not resolve them properly at all. Does this happen often?

[Makartsev] The process of training and educating the soldiers was not even displaced on the BAM during the most difficult years of the beginning of construction. Each taiga garrison had its own firing range, tactical field and training classes in the subunits. And this bore itself out.

It must at the same time be candidly stated that such tendencies have recently been manifested nonetheless, and quite noticeably so. The stagnation that existed for many long years, the stereotypes of thought and action, have had an effect, where many commanders, political workers and party organizations reduced all of their concerns to the single one of fulfilling the plan targets at any price, even at the expense of weakening attention to combat training, political-education work, maintaining regulation discipline and normal working, living and rest conditions for the personnel. The quality of combat and political training has not risen in a number of our subunits for years as a result, and military and labor discipline is weak.

Restructuring has forced a completely new approach to the concept of the "human factor" and has forced us to put the person, with all of his needs and aspirations, at the center of all of our work—organizational, political, ideological. And here it has proven that the overall under-estimation of the social and living conditions of the life and activity of people has not spared our troops either. Much will have to be done in this sphere. It is necessary first and foremost to provide officers, warrant officers and their families with housing, such housing so as not to blame the lack of conveniences on the remoteness of the garrison.

[Vorobyev] But the service of the railroad troops, after all, is of a clearly expressed nomadic nature. I experienced that myself in serving on the BAM: the facilities were scattered across tens and hundreds of kilometers, people live in "temporaries" for years, far from their permanent stations and separated from their families for

months. Proposals were advanced several years ago, I recall, to develop mobile pre-fabricated military settlement complexes instead of temporary tents. How are things with that today?

[Makartsev] The complexes you recall were thought up by the BAM workers themselves. They have outlived their usefulness. It was decided at the military council to reject tents and other "temporaries" and to switch to new types of military settlements. We are manufacturing 16 mobile housing complexes in two transport versions—truck or railroad—this year.

Each complex is a settlement for a subunit with all elements for the normal organization of the life and rest of the personnel. Such settlements will rid people of everyday disorders and allow the concentration of the efforts of the subunits on the fulfillment of training and practical matters from the first day of arrival at the new location.

But this is only a part of the social program that is projected for execution in the railroad troops. The problem of the territorial scattering of units and subunits is now being resolved, the quantity of facilities under construction is being reduced and efforts are being concentrated at start-up complexes.

One of the most difficult problems, of course, is providing for the families of servicemen. Since 1985 we have taken the course of rapid development of housing stock. By way of example, this year we are building twice as much housing as last year. In-house construction has fundamental significance for us since, after all, the combat readiness of subunits and units and the fulfillment of production plans ultimately depends on how the families of officers and warrant officers are set up.

[Vorobyev] What tasks are being resolved by the railroad soldiers today? How are they meeting the 70th anniversary of their branch of service?

[Makartsev] New frontiers in the development of rail transport were defined by the 27th CPSU Congress. The placement into operation of 2,300 kilometers of new lines, the construction of no less than 4,000 kilometers of second tracks and the electrification of 8,000 kilometers of mainlines are all envisaged by the state plans. Part of these plans, approximately a fifth if we take the volume of construction and installation work, lies on the shoulders of the railroad soldiers.

For example, the BAM. We have systematically been putting sections of the mainline into permanent service since 1984. We have already turned over about 1,000 kilometers to the Ministry of Railways. The section from Fevral'sk to Tungala, covering 170 kilometers, will be put into permanent service by the holiday. We will turn over the last 160-kilometer section of the line next year.

The construction of 21 settlements to house operational personnel is envisaged between Tynda and Komsomolsk. The railroad soldiers will carry out a significant portion of this program.

Aside from the BAM, we are building a great deal in other regions of the country as well.

Over the last three years alone, for example, we have put 120 kilometers of new railroad into operation in the Baltic republics, 170 in the Azerbaijan SSR and over 300 in the Kazakh SSR. There is in actuality no republic in our country where the soldiers of the railroad troops are not laboring.

The soldiers of the steel mainlines are living a revolutionary restructuring today, striving to make a worthy contribution to the realization of the party's designs.

Youth Paper Invites Debate on Value of Civil Defense System Given New Thinking
18010230 Moscow SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 9 Sep 88 p 3

[Article by Aleksandr Artemov, physicist, under the "Argument" rubric: "Let's Debate It!"; first paragraph is SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH introduction]

[Text] "Let's debate it!" is the suggestion made by the author of "Survival? No—Life!", an article published in a spring issue of "Argument." In polemic fashion he poses a question with respect to our country's system of civil defense. SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH had published a contradictory view as expressed by Yu. Kovalevskiy. The material we publish here today will probably elicit a mixed reaction as well. Let us debate it, but first let us clearly define the framework of the debate: in our view it should be conducted, first of all, with the author. And alas! We must again request that the rules of proper tact and tone of voice be observed—and that discussion deal with the essence of the problem, without the use of "labels."

If we are to judge by letters to the editor, reader reaction to my letter published in the 28 April issue of SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH entitled "Survival! No—Life!" is divided approximately half and half.

The majority of the "negative" replies, characteristically, come from people who are permanently employed in the civil defense system. One of these letters, expressing the opinion of reserve officer Yu. N. Kovalevskiy, was published in issue Nr 95—"We Have More to Learn in Protecting Life." But among the readers who share my point of view on the incompatibility of existing civil defense concepts with principles of the new thinking (the impossibility of victory or survival in a nuclear war, the concept of a non-violent, non-nuclear world) are also people familiar with civil defense other than through hearsay. They are P. V. Plotnikov, former serviceman and former civil defense chief of staff, and G. G. Molchanov, former civil defense engineer from one of the Riga enterprises. Later we will try to get into just to what extent such a correlation is applicable. But for the time being let us examine the basic arguments proposed by adherents of maintaining the "status quo" in the sphere of civil defense.

What I am talking about here is the fundamental concept of civil defense—the preparation and provision of a system of measures which, in the event of nuclear war, would allow a portion of the population to survive, maintain industrial potential and restore what was destroyed. This is a significant stipulation, since several readers from among this group (I. Markov, civil defense course director, and A. Shcherbenok, Moscow serviceman, among others) are calling for the civil defense system to be "improved and perfected." B. M. Ozherelyev, a Riga doctor, believes that "if we thoroughly know and skillfully apply defensive measures, then it is apparent that the majority of the people will survive," and that

instruction in civil defense gives people "confidence in the ability to survive." The honorable doctor has forgotten to inform us that he intends to survive under conditions of "nuclear winter" (that is, of course, if he is among those in the "surviving majority"). It must be noted that other civil defense adherents avoid discussion of this question although it is, in my opinion, a basic one. I believe that in declaring victory and survival in a nuclear war impossible, USA and USSR leaders have based their argument on the testimony of competent experts.

A. Shcherbenok is attempting to skirt the issue of "nuclear winter." He believes that a shift with respect to nuclear disarmament would lead to "the employment of modern conventional weapons in a possible war." He sees only the military aspect in the entire problem of nuclear disarmament. But there is also a political side—return to the pre-nuclear world is impossible! Neither the USA nor the USSR will destroy a single nuclear missile over the "guaranteed retribution" potential without having received reliable guarantees of security. But such guarantees are impossible without mutual trust—both between governments and between peoples. And the basic concept of civil defense—the possibility of surviving and winning a nuclear conflict—strikes into the very heart of trust. B. Ozherelyev writes that "the major thrust of our activity remains the struggle for peace, but civil defense must continue to be developed and perfected." R. I. Ivanov and V. N. Teorin, civil defense employees at the Latvian SSR Ministry of Auto Transport and Highways, see in civil defense—and quite justifiably so—"a system for preparing the country's economy for war." How are we to understand: "If you want peace, prepare for war"? Is it possible these people believe that we can today be guided by principles a hundred years old?

Forty years ago A. Einstein stated: "Everything changed with the splitting of the atom except the way people think. And this will bring us to the threat of universal catastrophe." The scientist was right. And here, forty years later, on the brink of an abyss, there are those who assert that "an army and its youthful personnel must be able to hate their enemy" (A. Kovalev, from Riga), who call for conducting negotiations with the United States from a position of strength (A. Shcherbenok).

Maintaining the might of our armed forces and the mobilization readiness of our society is not an end in itself, but a means for insuring our country's security. And if at certain times during the course of history it was the most powerful army in the world and the readiness of a people to inflict an armed response against any enemy that provided the best guarantees of a society's security, today the effectiveness of these means has been reduced significantly. A two- or three-fold superiority over an enemy in the nuclear era will not protect a state from practically complete devastation. On the contrary, such superiority serves as a destabilizing factor—in other words, it reduces security.

The concept of nuclear restraint has its ardent and intelligent adherents—M. Tetcher, for example. Now comrades A. Kozlovskiy, Yu. Kovalevskiy, A. Kovalev and others are filling their ranks. Our home-bred Tories declare: "A powerful armed forces is the guarantee of security!" But Western conservatives keep repeating the same thing.

We are told repeatedly that the arms race is advantageous to the capitalists, that it brings huge, excess profits to the military-industrial complex. But American society, like Soviet society, is not just the All-Union Industrial Office. It is not just the armed forces and the Defense Production Ministry (which, by the way, is also interested in increasing its budget—like any ministry). Tremendous, non-productive expenditures for defense are harmful to society as a whole. This is acknowledged by both American and Soviet economists. But the faulty logic of armed opposition leads to both sides imagining superiority over the enemy, even when parity is in fact the case. One side "evens things up" and the other responds in like manner—and a senseless, multi-billion ruble, multi-megaton whirlwind begins.

Let us return to the question of civil defense. "We all would like to have reliable means and methods of defense which would, under any circumstances, render 100 percent harmless the effects upon man of the weapons of mass destruction," writes Yu. Kovalevskiy. I do not know about "all," but Mr. Reagan has many times stated this as his desire. The SDI he is propagating is a variant of the civil defense—that Comrade Kovalevskiy wants so much—taken to its extreme. "'Absolute' means of defense are as yet, unfortunately, nowhere to be found." Thank God! Under conditions in which peace is maintained through parity, an "absolute" defense would be disastrous.

Among the destabilizing factors concerning SDI we see not only the introduction of nuclear weapons into space, not only the development of new varieties of weapons of mass destruction, but the very existence of the strategic defense itself! And the more reliable a defensive system is, the stronger its destabilizing influence—it gives birth to distrust and may provoke the other side to effect a preventive strike. Initial deployment of an effective—not to mention an absolute one (if such is possible)—defensive system is tantamount to a declaration of war.

And so what is civil defense? Its main task is to reduce damage from a nuclear strike to a minimum. So how does it differ from SDI? Only in the means of its technical implementation and its effectiveness. It is another matter that such a civil defense, implemented even to the maximum extent possible, would be fundamentally ineffective under present-day conditions. But this is only in the military respect. What about the political aspect? And the moral side? Its destabilizing role here is tremendous. The inculcation in citizens of a constant feeling of endangerment posed by other countries, implantation of the idea that conflict is inevitable, the ever-present "face of the enemy"—these are all the result of its operation. Readers I. Tronov and N. Tolmashov write about this.

Here A. Shcherbenok assures us that "it is not necessary to steer our people in an anti-war direction. But who will allow us to propagandize any point of view we may have among the NATO countries...? Tell us how we can specifically change the thrust of propaganda issued from the West—can we do so at all?" We can. For propaganda does not have to consist of rallies conducted during the working day, unanimous "approvals," the branding of slogans. Propaganda can also comprise peaceful initiatives, open criticism of native militarists, and the elimination of narrow-minded stereotypes. The feat of Bryan Wilson, when he lost his legs under the wheels of a train, does more to convince me of the peace-loving nature of the American people than ten speeches by President Reagan. And so it is necessary to propagate among our people an "anti-war orientation." We must foster trust.

Is trust possible? Yes—possible. Here is an example. Look at France and the Federal Republic of Germany. Could a psychologically normal West German or Frenchman be suspicious of the military intentions of the other? Have you ever heard French politicians express alarm concerning the Bundeswehr, the most powerful army in Western Europe? Or have you heard West German politicians express outrage at the presence in France of national nuclear forces? Why is this? After all, the entire history of relations between France and Germany is one of wars and reciprocal claims. The Germans occupied France during the latest war, at the same time that the USA and USSR were allies. And now we and the Americans are digging shelters to protect ourselves from one another, while there is not even a passport control system operating on the border between France and the FRG.

What is bothering us? American imperialism? Soviet totalitarianism? It is time to renounce such primitive clichés. The main source of hostility is mutual distrust. And it would be unfair to accuse only Truman and Reagan in the situation which has developed. Stalin and Brezhnev have made their contribution as well. For Soviet conservatives the logic is simple—we need a powerful army because the Americans want to destroy us. But let us ask ourselves the question—why? To gain what? Economically, we are (unfortunately) not able to compete with the United States. Perhaps the money-hungry sharks fear that the American working man will be tempted by the high standard of living under socialism and will revolt? Is it a struggle for world influence? But the struggle for economic influence between Japan and the United States, for example, is being conducted in an entirely peaceful manner. And President Reagan has even been appealing recently for a repudiation of protectionist measures. Military influence? But that would be a vicious circle—military influence for the sake of military influence, and you cannot explain the purpose of such actions.

The real, chief reason is that the Americans are afraid we will destroy them! But we are maintaining a huge,

ridiculously expensive army for exactly the same reason—we are afraid the Americans might destroy us. The reason for the hostility is mutual fear, distrust. Necessary conditions for trust are popular control of the government and a peace-loving people. And this is what we should be involved in—each in his own country—so that the topic of conversation is not “reducing losses and minimizing serious injury,” as Yu. Kovalevskiy writes, but rather the intolerability of these. Yes, we have not yet reached the third millennium, and in the USA and certain other countries (the USSR, for example) vast sums of money are being appropriated for armament. But if we are going to train our citizens in their youth on the machine gun, and then in their old age in heading for the shelters, then military appropriations will grow and we may not even see the third millennium.

I would like to touch upon another issue. Comrade A. A. Kuzmin, civil defense chief of staff of the Riga bus association, was so outraged at the publication of my letter that he at first took it as “another reprint of a Western concoction.” Reading it through to the end, however, he became convinced that “the author was, unfortunately, our own countryman.” A. Kuzmin believes that my “judgments, to put it mildly, express adventurism, give rise to rumors and negative phenomena,” that they “bring to mind the ideas of our ‘former’ fellow countrymen,” and that their chief purpose is “to arouse discontent by any means possible,” “to muddy the waters.” Comrade Kuzmin is asking: “Whose mill is this grist for?” Other readers (A. Kovalev, R. Ivanov, V. Teorin) drag out that painfully holy bugaboo we all know as “pacifism.” It is an interesting situation—when an American pacifist lies down underneath a military train, when British pacifists set up their Camp of Peace in Greenham-Common—this is fine. We applaud. But

when an individual tries to analyze the situation regarding the propaganda of animosity in our own country, the cries ring out: “On guard! Pacifism!” And we almost see a search begin for foreign agents.

In conclusion, I would like to take note of a problem whose path to resolution brings together the views of civil defense adherents and opponents alike—eliminating the consequences of accidents and natural disasters. As has recently become clear, we have our share of accidents, natural disasters and catastrophes—no less than in other countries. And there can be no doubt but that we need a special service (its name is not important) which would be engaged in eliminating the consequences of these sad—but apparently unavoidable—events, which would be involved in saving people.

The rescue teams must be comprised, however, not of partially trained, incidental personnel, but rather of high-class professionals—mountain climbers, firemen, etc. Otherwise the register of casualties will be filled up with the names of rescue workers. And if funds presently allocated to civil defense (how much?) were to be transferred from the bureaucratic civil defense apparatus, from those senseless air raid alerts and the like, to the organization of a high-class, professional rescue service outfitted with the most modern equipment, then we would have fewer casualties in all these emergency situations and our country's prestige would become greater.

One final question—how much does civil defense cost? Readers Ye. Vater and Ponomarenko believe it is too much. A. Kozlovskiy, excellently informed with respect to civil defense expenditures in England, FRG, USA, Japan, and even Switzerland, is keeping silent for some reason concerning the cost to the Soviet citizen of these “war games.” And, alas, the Soviet citizen is not all that wealthy.

Shabanov on Innovation Problems in Defense Industries

18010154a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Nov 88pp 1-2

[Interview with General of the Army B. Shabanov, conducted by Lieutenant Colonel B. Baberdin: "The Horizons of Technical Creativity—How to Increase the Effectiveness of Finding Army Inventors and Efficiency Experts"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The First All-Army Conference of Inventors and Efficiency Experts recently completed its work. The forces have been impatiently waiting for it and here it is, real grounds for interpreting and critically evaluating the situation and planning the direction for the further development of innovation. The conference had more than 700 participants, the best innovators and technical creativity organizers from all services of the Armed Forces, districts, groups of forces, navies, branches of service and main and central directorates of the Ministry of Defense. They held a serious, constructive discussion about how to get out of the rut they are in and increase their returns.

The editor asked Deputy USSR Minister of Defense for Weapons General of the Army V. Shabanov to talk about his impressions of the work that the first forum of army and navy innovators did and about the paths of *perestroika* in technical creativity.

[Baberdin] Isn't the role of the innovator being reduced today, a time when we have an ever-accelerating rate of scientific and technical progress?

[Shabanov] Quite the contrary, it is increasing immeasurably. Judge for yourself—there is no sphere of the national economy that is unaffected by the inquisitive thought of scientists, designers, engineers, technical people and progressive workers. The economic effectiveness from using the achievements of these creators of progressive technology and equipment is calculated in billions of rubles per year.

We all know Lenin's idea that it is impossible to construct an army without modern science and technology. But it is also impossible without technology that is constantly improving and developing. And this is where the role of army and navy innovators comes in.

[Baberdin] Vitaliy Mikhaylovich, the editor gets letters in which readers present interesting technical innovations. They would be exceptionally useful in the military, but their authors cannot get any understanding at the "appropriate offices." So much time, effort and technical energy is wasted on the endless "torment of searching..." One reads these letters and is extremely aware that everything is not going well in organizing technical creativity in the forces.

[Shabanov] Yes, we are often deluded by general numerical indicators. You analyze them and everything seems normal: effectiveness and the technical level of the innovative decisions that we have discovered are increasing; the quality of efficiency recommendations and inventions is increasing. However this is only a general impression. Things in reality are not going nearly as smoothly.

Our orientation on the qualitative parameters of weapons and military equipment is dictating the need for making more use of the achievements of science and technology, finding non-traditional ways to develop the means for armed fighting, and making daring technical decisions. We need radical methods for increasing reliability and the operating technology of weapons and increasingly automating and mechanizing the work of crews, combat details and service personnel. This requires that the level of combat training be drastically increased, the training process be intensified, the material training base be improved and developed, and material resources be expended in a rational and economic manner. It is inconceivable to resolve these problems without fruitful work by inventors and efficiency experts.

But these people are now operating as if they were on their own. In the majority of cases a plan only includes general indicators that are not always reinforced by specific thematic tasks. One has to be upset by the fact that technical creativity in the forces is subjected to irregularities: as a rule creativity peaks before the various inspections and before reports are compiled.

One very unpleasant statistic is that only 20 percent of the inventions are put into operation. How can we really talk about scientific and technical progress? Army and navy innovators represent a very huge potential, one which all of us, the leaders at the various levels, must undoubtedly learn to use. We still see at all levels of the command structure a lack of understanding of the importance of initiative and creativity by army innovators.

We have few officers at the regimental and division level who are engineers not only by their diploma but also by calling. However are there also not times in the forces when we suppress the very thought and very atmosphere needed for technical creativity? And this creativity has not only technical, but also exceptional social significance, especially for young people.

In short, this is a state matter and must be taken seriously in the Armed Forces, not only by the technical unit leaders, but also by all commanders and political workers.

[Baberdin] The social significance of technical creativity is obvious. But just the same the effectiveness, to include military, economic and technical effectiveness, must be the prime consideration in evaluating the activities of

the innovators... Do you believe that they are able to compete with KB [design bureaus], NII [scientific research institutes] and factory technological departments?

[Shabanov] They certainly can compete. They not only can, they have been competing for a long time. Clear proof of this are the exhibits and displays that have been developed during this conference's work. I will note that the most important features and principles in practically all training and range equipment currently being used to train forces were developed primarily by military inventors and efficiency experts.

And finally we must distinguish between missions. For example, we cannot develop weapons in the forces, but we can improve them and look for ways to effectively employ them, guarantee their reliability and improve the quality of their support and maintenance. This is totally within our capability. We should not count on any kind of large-scale invention. Streamlining is our primary direction in the forces. And we have to look at the broad picture. The innovator's field of vision must include not only military equipment and weapons, but also the technical means for propaganda and agitation, problems involved in improving technological equipment, and the technical problems for improving medical support, for example.

But we also have our "major scientific areas." These are our institutes, academies and schools. Here we have the right to expect major discoveries in basically new areas, inventions that could radically change the various types of weapons or military equipment. Unfortunately this is not happening. At the formal level, everything is going well. A lot of patent applications are being recorded. But under serious scrutiny all of them are of one-time, and not mass application and at times simply reflect the skillful use of abilities in developing the formula of an invention.

We must first and foremost focus special attention on the creative potential of our scientific organizations. At this time we should have newness literally everywhere. Every military scientist must take on this extraordinary task and bravely move toward it.

[Baberdin] However, Vitaliy Mikhaylovich, even what we do have is seldom used to its fullest. Here is one example. Training Company Deputy Commander Captain A. Bukharov constructed an instrument used in firing a small arms into the air. It was given high marks both during its evaluation, during firing in the district and at the exhibition during the conference, but... And the instrument's fate became somewhat clear only because of the note that the innovator sent to the presidium at the last day and hour of the conference, a note that was addressed to you personally. And the same applies to the case of the tank fire, the design for which was also presented at the exhibition.

[Shabanov] You are entirely correct in this. The introduction of new developments is generally a weak point in our country and in the Armed Forces in particular. We have an immediate mission of instilling people with faith in the need for their labor. How do we do this? By extensively introducing the best developments. The first of these are the exhibits in the exhibition that was held during the conference.

But this is only the first step. We must also develop an efficient information system, a system that is prepared to select technical innovation for introduction into the various levels—for example at the unit and subunit level, at the district, at the arm of service level and at the branch of the Armed Forces level. One important task is to find a constant industrial base, to direct repair factories and workshops toward this and to economically tie them to this type of production.

At times the ambitions of individual designers and our imperfect economic relationships with industry, not to mention our organizational ungainliness, are a hindrance. All of this somehow keeps us from getting our military innovators into industry's zone of activity and we have to fight against this.

And we still do not have a clear system for providing information. Reality suggests that we need a centralized information agency and we have to carefully work out this issue.

[Baberdin] Speeches by participants at the conference have often touched upon matters of patent support. I would like to hear your commentary on these problems.

[Shabanov] Thorough, comprehensive patent research is a guarantee that work is being done at a high level and is new. It is senseless to invent something that has already been invented and to waste time, effort and assets on this.

Here is an alarming figure. On the average almost forty percent of the patent applications are disapproved annually because they contain nothing new. And this rejection rate is particularly high in a number of institutions and organizations in the Rocket Forces and the Navy and in the Directorates of the Chief of Engineer Forces and the Chief of Armed Forces Communications.

This situation is further hampered by the fact that there are practically no organic patent subunits in scientific research institutions, planning and design organizations and military training institutions and there is not a single patent foundation in the Ministry of Defense.

The conference has even heard opinions to the effect that academies and institutions should now even introduce courses in the basics of inventing and patenting. I am also convinced of this. It is impossible to represent an engineer as a man of high technical competence if he

does not have patent literature at hand and does not know how to conduct a patent search, formulate an application for an invention or know where to send it for expert examination.

I cannot agree with those who maintain that the evaluation of a patent application must be done exclusively in non-departmental institutes. In my opinion, this is a manifestation of bureaucratic thinking. We have well-established institutes with recognized experts working in them.

We must certainly have non-departmental expert committees. We must have a court of arbitration, but its use must be the exception and not the rule. We must establish qualified commissions within the Ministry of Defense, especially for cases in which there is conflict. And this is our way.

True, things are certainly not going well in this area as well. We are clearly seeing a reduction in the quality of expert reviews of patent requests. Experts in main and central directorates have begun to accept for expert review recommendations aimed at solving general technical and often minor individual problems, and not tasks associated with the development of qualitatively new and specific types of weapons. Patent materials in the directorates and Goskomizobreteniy [State Committee for Inventions] foundation are practically not studied; the innovation, use and scientific and technical level of the inventions being presented are not fully analyzed; and drafts that are prepared for patent requests are not always of high quality. The review process for these requests drags on for long years. We must constantly work with these expert reviews.

[Baberdin] We have not brought up the problems associated with reviewing the basic staff structure. However, if we can make an exception? The People's Committee for Defense published Order Number 107 in April 1942, a time that was so difficult for the country and the Army. In accordance with this order the staffs of those setting up inventive work in central and main directorates were increased almost twofold. As sections worked during the conference, they often brought up the question of reviewing the staff structure.

[Shabanov] I would not raise this question. If one were to look at the entire picture, in my opinion the organizational staff structure for technical creativity organizers is not bad. Naturally we should straighten out and strengthen individual links. And we will do this. But this is not perestroika in its essence. My concerns are in another area. You may think that we can drastically improve inventiveness and streamlining if we strengthen an already rather developed structure. But this will bring about just the opposite results as it will produce more methodological recommendations, instructions, directives...

I assure you that new vacant positions will appear and there will be more than enough people wanting to fill them. The work will still be more calm than in the forces

and you will not be able to compare the responsibility. What we need is for this position not to be restful, but to be a volcano. You cannot make inventiveness a bureaucracy. On the contrary, what you need is to simplify accounting as much as possible and direct all the work of those organizing technical creativity toward the search for talents and daring solutions, to finding these solutions in the general mass and extensively putting them into practice.

You must have special people managing the organization of inventive work and these people must be known in the forces. People must come to them, share ideas, take counsel and count on their assistance. And we have such people. Lieutenant Colonel I. Tkachenko went to the GSFG [Group of Soviet Forces in Germany] from Leningrad, completely changed things there to his own way and got everyone moving. And things improved.

Retired Colonel A. Yezhov is a long-time member of the Military Engineer Institute imeni A. F. Mozhayskiy. He is a talented propagandist and an organizer of inventiveness. He gets a lot of the credit for the fact that the institute is really a school of technical creativity and a school that really attracts candidates. Judge for yourself. For several years in a row now the institute has been awarded first prize for taking part in reviewing KB students and cadets. Last year alone cadets there received 80 patents for inventions and made approximately 300 efficiency recommendations toward improving the material training base. Cadets also provided more than 600 recommendations during their practical exercises and on-the-job training period. This is valuable experience and must be expanded.

In summing up this discussion, I want to say that perestroika in the organization of technical creativity is now objectively necessary. This is dictated by the new conditions in which the army and navy find themselves. And this is reflected in the appeal that the participants in this conference are making to personnel in the Armed Forces. Yes, there is an important step before us—we have to develop a whole series of legal documents in connection with the up-coming publication of the "Law of Inventive Activities in the USSR." Changes are coming and we must be ready for them. We have made only the first steps and must not stop on the way.

Problems Implementing Perestroika in Military Construction

18010107 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Aug 88 p 2

[Article by Col Ye. Razdolskiy, chief economist of a military construction organization: "Economic Accountability by Order—The Construction Complex: How Are We Approaching Reform?"]

[Text] Replies to the editors are continuing to arrive on the features of Lt Gen L. Shumilov (June 16) and Col N. Karasev (June 5) in the paper devoted to problems in the

conversion of the construction organizations and enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Defense to the new conditions of economic operation. We are publishing one of those replies.

I feel that the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA features on construction issues are very timely and meet the spirit of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, at which much attention was devoted to reviving the economy. They reflected many serious problems, such as uniting construction administrations according to the territorial principle, raising the quality of planning, establishing direct ties among organizations and enterprises and eliminating stockpiles above the norms. All of this is very important. But other problems, in my opinion, exist along with these that are associated with the specific nature of the military-construction units, and first and foremost their mutual relations, in which administrative-command methods of management predominate. Today, the production commander who relies more on strong-willed pressure than on economic laws is, figuratively speaking, "in the saddle." But these latter, after all, are not obligated and avenge themselves with multi-million-ruble losses and other expenses.

Here is an example. Say that Uralmash gets into a conflict with the ministry it is subordinate to and, relying on the State Enterprise Law, is able to defend its rights. Is this possible under army conditions? Hardly.

A dispute recently took shape in the mutual relations of our installation organization and the Chief Military Construction Directorate headed by Maj Gen A. Makarychev. The essence of the conflict was the following. Fixed standards were set for us for a number of economic indicators in 1987. Steps were taken for conversion to a new system of salaries in our organization based on them. But when the work was completed, new standards issued forth from the chief directorate on the wage and economic-incentive funds that reduced the work that had already been done to naught. Despite a material reduction in the administrative apparatus, the new standards created a substantial shortage in wages. The plan for the second quarter for operations volume was twice corrected upward at the same time. And whereas Uralmash can permit itself speaking up against an erroneous decision at the ministry, this is not realistic for a military organization.

This conflict, like a mirror, reflects all of the sore spots impeding a restructuring of economic relations in the army and navy. Here is an inability to make use of a system of stable standards, an attempt to reduce a profitably operating organization to the level of laggards and the habits of the old methods of "squeezing" gross indicators. And, the main thing, a reluctance to reject the principle that he who has more rights is right.

How to explain now to our harmoniously working collective the cause for the non-fulfillment of the plan and the lack of material incentives? A way out of this

situation could probably be found. But the issue here is something else: how can conditions be created so that similar excesses are impossible, so that the labor collective depends on the results of its own work, and not on the inclinations of those who have the possibility of manipulating the numbers willfully?

There is another feature characteristic of the Ministry of Defense—the presence of military-construction detachments in which manpower is concentrated and which are on independent balance sheets. Formally subordinate to the office of the work supervisor [UNR], the detachment is economically isolated, and the monetary upkeep of its command personnel is paid by the customer regardless of the performance of an amount of operations and the economic indicators of the UNR. The sole real economic link in this chain is the payment of wages to the military construction workers, which is not, however, an incentive factor for the officers and warrant officers of the detachment. All efforts to plan production targets for the detachment produce no positive results. No command pressure is triggered, because there is no economic basis for raising production efficiency. I feel that there is as of today no solution on how to include the military-construction detachments in restructuring or determine their place in the transition to collective contracts and full economic accountability [*khozrashchet*]. And the need for such a decision is exceedingly acute.

Another specific feature of the work of military-construction detachments is the fact that they are a distinctive sort of supplier of unskilled manpower with a very high planned turnover rate. What could have brought about the decision to exact payment from military-construction organizations for labor resources? Receiving youth from the school desk, with neither any professional experience whatsoever nor, as a rule, the essential professional training, we engage in training them, essentially preparing them for later work in the national economy. The directly opposite solution suggests itself: pay the Ministry of Defense construction organizations for training personnel rather than exacting payment from them for labor resources.

One aspect of restructuring in the economy is the granting of production, operational and financial independence to organizations to which the State Enterprise Law extends. Unfortunately, a trend toward petty regulation, excessive monitoring and the direct supplanting of the leaders of production collectives with representatives of higher organizations has been extended more and more widely at military construction sites in recent years. These phenomena, in my opinion, are especially typical of the Chief Military Construction Directorate, headed by Maj Gen A. Makarychev. What independence of the lower levels can be discussed if, say, truck transport and machinery are distributed among the engineering-operations directorates and the UNR at the chief-directorate level on practically a daily basis? The placement of personnel is studied from above in the same "detailed fashion." At the same time the whole command corps,

beginning with the company commanders and ending with the chief engineer of the chief directorate, is set for certain sites, so as to meet their obligations. The drawbacks in the organization of labor and supply and other miscalculations are covered by increasing the duration of the workday or at the expense of days off.

The call for transition to full economic accountability and self-financing is doomed to empty phrases if the question of the stable financial position of the military-construction organizations is not resolved. The situation has become extremely bad for the subcontractors, to whom the general contractors remain in debt by a sum with many zeros every year. A modest line in the supplement to the rules of financing asserting that the general contractor has the right in essential cases to entrust directly to financial organs the transfer of funds to subcontractor organizations for sets and types of work that have been completed and accepted would not obligate anyone to anything. The natural desire of the general contractor is to hold onto money and use it for his own needs, while it is an excessive burden for the customers to deal directly with the subcontractors. It is essential to create a system in which the financial state of all participants in the construction process, including supplier enterprises, supply organizations and customers, depends exclusively on the results of their own activity.

The lack of economic training among the majority of commanders and chief engineers of the construction units and the poor theoretical knowledge and shortage of practical experience among the chiefs of planning departments is evoking great concern today. Officers are being assigned to these positions today who have, as a rule, technical education and experience in engineering work. The workers of the economic services are not trained in any educational establishment of the Ministry of Defense for economically accountable organizations.

It is true that since 1987, work has been expanded on economic training for commanders and chief engineers in short-term courses. The quality of training leaves much to be desired, however. Its principal drawback can be expressed in the words of one of the "students": they teach what to do, but not how to do it.

In conclusion I would like to say that we are trying once again to incorporate provisions in Ministry of Defense capital construction that are used in the national economy purely mechanically, without trying to interpret them for the real working conditions. Exactly the same way as, say, we have been trying for fifteen years running to incorporate the Zlobin method into practice without success. Is this really perestroika?

Meeting of the DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum

Informational Report

18010273 Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian
23 Oct 88 p 1

[Unattributed article: "2d USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum: Informational Report"]

[Text] USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Chairman Flt Adm G. M. Yegorov opened the Plenum.

The Plenum considered the following questions:

Practical work of DOSAAF organizations to fulfill resolutions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the July 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

Information about the work of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium and Presidium Buro for the period between the 1st and 2d USSR DOSAAF Central Committee plenums.

USSR DOSAAF Central Committee First Deputy Chairman Lt Gen V. A. Demin gave a report on the first question.

A. L. Mamayev, chief of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Mass Organizational Work and Military-Patriotic Propaganda Directorate, gave an informational report on the second question.

The text of the reports is published below.

Participating in the Plenum's work were I. A. Larin, first deputy chief of a CPSU Central Committee department; N. N. Dolgin, chief of a CPSU Central Committee sector; Lt Gen G. A. Stefanovskiy, deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy; A. I. Golyakov, first deputy chairman of the All-Union War and Labor Veterans' Council; responsible officials of the USSR Council of Ministers, RSFSR Council of Ministers, AUCCTU, Komsomol Central Committee and USSR Ministry of Defense; and representatives of a number of other ministries, departments and public organizations.

Also participating in the Plenum's work were members of the USSR DOSAAF Central Auditing Commission, chairmen of kray and oblast committees who are not members of DOSAAF central directing agencies, and Defense Society activists.

Speaking during discussion on the reports were B. I. Kharchuk, chairman of Ukrainian SSR DOSAAF Central Committee; A. S. Abdrakhmanov, chairman of Kazakh SSR DOSAAF Central Committee; G. P. Komar, chairman of DOSAAF Penza Obkom; O. Ye. Petrakov, chief of Kaluga DOSAAF Aviation-Technical School; Ya. Ya. Lochmelis, chairman of Latvian SSR

DOSAAF Central Committee; Yu. S. Pivnev, chairman of DOSAAF Committee of Leningrad and Leningrad Oblast; M. S. Temirov, chairman of Kirghiz SSR DOSAAF Central Committee; N. A. Barykin, chief of Lida DOSAAF Model Motor Vehicle School of Grodno Oblast; V. N. Tsurkanov, chairman of DOSAAF Ulyanovsk Obkom; and S. I. Kanarev, a reserve soldier-internationalist and chairman of the DOSAAF primary organization committee of Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayispolkom of the Soviet of People's Deputies of Stavropol Kray.

The Plenum adopted a decree on the first question of the agenda, which is published below.

The Plenum took into consideration the information about the work of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium and Presidium Buro for the period between the 1st and 2d USSR DOSAAF Central Committee plenums.

The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum considered organizational questions.

The Plenum relieved Flt Adm G. M. Yegorov of duties as chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and as a member of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium Buro in connection with a transfer to other work.

Plenum participants unanimously expressed fervent gratitude to HSU Flt Adm G. M. Yegorov for his many years of active and productive work in the post of head of the Defense Society.

The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum included Col Gen N. N. Kotlovtshev in the Central Committee and elected him member of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium and Presidium Buro, and chairman of the Central Committee of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy.

USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Chairman Col Gen N. N. Kotlovtshev gave a speech at the Plenum.

The Plenum relieved Lt Gen V. V. Mosyaykin of duties as deputy chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and member of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium Buro in connection with his departure on pension.

The Plenum relieved Lt Gen L. F. Kadatskiy of duties as deputy chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and member of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium Buro in connection with his departure on pension.

The Plenum elected Maj Gen D. N. Kuznetsov, a member of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium and Presidium Buro who previously was chairman of the DOSAAF Moscow Gorkom, deputy chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

The Plenum elected Lt Gen V. T. Kanastratov, who is a member of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and of the Presidium and Presidium Buro and chief of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Military-Technical Training Directorate, deputy chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum ended its work with this.

Biographical Information on Chairman, Col Gen N. N. Kotlovtshev

18010273 Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian
23 Oct 88 p 1

[Unattributed article: "USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Chairman"]

[Text] Col Gen Nikolay Nikiforovich Kotlovtshev was born on 5 September 1926 in the city of Troitsk, Chelyabinsk Oblast.

"I went to school there in Troitsk," says Nikolay Nikiforovich Kotlovtshev. "I recall that the school was considered model: there was a gymnasium, a target range, and a large number of circles of all kinds. I joined the aircraft model-building circle and even performed in oblast competitions. My father worked in criminal investigation.

"I finished seventh grade in 1942 and went to work at an evacuated aircraft plant as a tool maker. I did not get to the front but was sent to infantry school, which I completed in Novosibirsk in 1947. I commanded a machinegun platoon and a company and was battalion chief of staff. I was finishing ten-year school already as a captain. It was difficult, of course, with duty and a family. I have a daughter Vera who is in medicine. Now I already have two grandchildren, the younger in tenth grade and the older now serving as a soldier."

After completing the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze in 1961 Kotlovtshev served in various command positions in the Strategic Missile Forces. He was chief of the Military Academy imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy for the last three years.

He has been a CPSU member since 1951. He has been repeatedly elected to local party and soviet organs. He was deputy to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, 9th Convocation. At the present time he is deputy to the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.

He was elected delegate to the 25th, 26th and 27th CPSU congresses and to the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

He has been decorated with the orders of October Revolution, Red Banner, and "For Service to the Motherland in the USSR Armed Force" 3d Class, and with medals.

Report by Deputy Chairman

18010273 Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian
23 Oct 88 pp 1-2

[Report of USSR DOSAAF Central Committee First Deputy Chairman Lt Gen V. A. Demin: "Practical Work of DOSAAF Organizations in Fulfilling Resolutions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the July 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] Dear comrades! Today we are to discuss tasks of DOSAAF organizations stemming from resolutions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the July 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

How did Defense Society committees and organizations set about implementing these resolutions in practice? Why is the process of restructuring mass defense, military-patriotic, training, and sports work going so slowly and with such difficulty in defense collectives? What do we have to do to keep pace with the party's contemporary demands? The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium and its Buro see this Plenum's task to lie in answering these not-so-simple questions.

The 19th All-Union Party Conference was an event of milestone significance which opened up a new period in the life of Soviet society and in development of the theory and practice of socialism. Its principal result consists of the development of a program political position on all basic questions which were the subject of partywide and nationwide discussion based on the CPSU Central Committee theses.

Having taken the revolutionary initiative in restructuring, the CPSU thus demonstrated once again that it is the carrier of our program objectives and acts as the people's vanguard.

Public organizations are an important component of the Soviet political system. The conference came out in favor of renewing their activity in the spirit of restructuring, and of considerably elevating their role in realizing and coordinating the interests of different layers of the population for the benefit of all the people.

After approving the CPSU Central Committee's international activity based on new political thinking, the conference concluded that the military threat to our country has not been removed up to now. We cannot discount

the militaristic danger concealed in the nature of imperialism until guarantees have formed for the irreversibility of positive processes begun in the matter of disarmament and creation of a safe world. The militaristic danger remains a reality of our time.

The Soviet people deeply welcomed resolutions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, of the July 1988 and September 1988 CPSU Central Committee plenums, and of the extraordinary session of the USSR Supreme Soviet; and the election of M. S. Gorbachev as chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. Defense Society members regard all this as an inalienable component of restructuring and as a fundamental platform which should be used as a basis for further development of USSR DOSAAF.

Assess Work Results Self-Critically

A determined search for ways to restructure mass defense work is under way in the majority of Defense Society organizations. A study of the local state of affairs shows that certain positive results were achieved in the period since the 10th Congress, there was a departure from over-organization, and there has been more criticism, self-criticism, independence, initiative, and democracy.

The work experience of Belorussia's defense collectives is instructive in this respect. The republic DOSAAF Central Committee (the chairman is P. Maksimov) resolves problems of mass defense work collectively, with broad glasnost and with consideration for public opinion. An attempt is made here to ensure that every member of the DOSAAF Central Committee and of a DOSAAF obkom has specific assignments for assisting primary organizations and is responsible for their fulfillment.

The CPSU Central Committee welcome to the 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress and the Basic Directions for Restructuring Defense Society Activity are seen as an urgent program of action. Many DOSAAF organizations of the Ukraine (B. Kharchuk), Latvia (Ya. Lochmelis), the city of Moscow (D. Kuznetsov), Bashkir ASSR (Yu. Blokhin), Khabarovsk Kray (L. Tsukerman), Bryansk Oblast (A. Mikheyev), Pskov Oblast (S. Mostovoy), Rostov Oblast (I. Kondratov) and a number of other oblasts achieved certain positive results during restructuring of work.

A process of revival of organizational work is also seen in local Defense Society elements.

The change in the country's public atmosphere and the increase in Soviet citizens' social activeness created favorable conditions for improved military-patriotic propaganda. The Penza Oblast DOSAAF organization (G. Komar) is among those making skillful use of this

situation for reinforcing the military-patriotic and international indoctrination of workers and the youth. There is also much of interest in a number of other organizations.

The process of involving reserve soldiers in work with the youth is gathering force. Over 6,000 of them (more than half are soldier-internationalists) direct military-patriotic associations and special-interest clubs.

Some improvement has been seen in the work of fulfilling demands of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree aimed at further improving preparation of the youth for military service, and in fulfilling resolutions of the 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress on these matters.

Plans for training specialists for the Armed Forces are being fulfilled. Curricula in which up to 70 percent of the time is set aside for instilling practical skills in cadets have been revised to improve training quality. Mandatory firing of combat weapons has been introduced.

The work of preparing cadres of mass technical trades for the national economy has begun to be carried out more purposefully. The plan for the second year of the 12th Five-Year Plan has been fulfilled by 115.6 percent.

Technical and applied military sports are seeing further development. This year our pilots, parachutists, aircraft model-builders, radio sportsmen, and USSR national teams in motorcycle soccer, underwater speed swimming, motorcycle ice racing, and motor vehicle model-building performed well in the international arena. Shooters who are DOSAAF alumni gave a good account of themselves at the Seoul Olympics and rightly won Olympic medals.

The Society's logistic and technical support facilities are becoming stronger, the state of supply of DOSAAF organizations with all kinds of resources is improving, and funds for training equipment are growing.

The Society's financial status is stable, which allows developing the logistic and technical support facilities and creates a foundation for the transition of Society committees, organizations and enterprises to full cost-accounting and self-financing as of 1 January 1989.

In short, we have a certain amount of progress along the path of restructuring, but on the whole this process is slow and difficult. The level and effectiveness of the work of many DOSAAF committees and organizations are not up to modern demands.

There continue to be many deficiencies retarding the development of the Defense Society's independent nature in the work of elective organs of the Kirghiz, Orel, Kursk and certain other defense organizations.

Some leaders continue to substitute numerous papers for thoughtful, painstaking work with people and they make up reports about nonexistent successes, taking the path of deception.

For example, the DOSAAF Kemerovo Obkom submitted satisfactory accounts to the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee based on 1987 results, but an inspection revealed that the actual state of affairs in many primary, training, and sports organizations was unsatisfactory.

Omissions in military-patriotic propaganda are generating serious concern. The content of such propaganda is being renewed slowly; the behests of V. I. Lenin, party demands for defense of the socialist homeland, and Army and Navy combat traditions are being propagandized poorly; the Defense Society's patriotic activity is not being revealed persuasively enough; and an inclination toward uncritical dogmatism and stereotypes has not been overcome. These deficiencies are typical of defense organizations of the Yakutsk Autonomous Republic and of Kirov, Vologda and certain other oblasts.

Measures directed against negative phenomena in the youth environment such as pacifism and nihilism have not been found in indoctrinational practice. New non-standard approaches have not been found and realized, and equitable, open, honest dialogue has not replaced the edifying tone in contacts with the youth.

Events in Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Baltic republics demonstrated with special acuteness the importance of work for international indoctrination of the youth. DOSAAF must assume responsibility for the serious deficiencies in this work along with the other organizations engaged in it. In this work we make poor use of such powerful factors as the international character of the defense of socialism's achievements and the beneficial impact of the environment of defense collectives itself on shaping the qualities of a patriot-internationalist in young people. We carry out many activities of defense collectives in isolation from the acute, contradictory events occurring in society on the soil of relations among nationalities. The state of affairs here must be corrected.

There have been no serious qualitative changes in training specialists for the Armed Forces in a number of organizations over the period since the 10th USSR DOSAAF Congress.

Many drivers who trained in DOSAAF motor vehicle schools can work only under "hothouse" conditions and have difficulty operating a vehicle over rugged terrain, at night, and in adverse weather conditions.

Much that is unresolved has built up in DOSAAF aviation organizations, especially in the Kinel-Cherkasy, Kemerovo, Dushanbe, Ashkhabad, and 2d Moscow air clubs.

Unfortunately, many heads of committees and training organizations were not up to the burden of restructuring the training and indoctrination process. An organized transition to new training programs has not been provided everywhere. In practice this transition was not reinforced with a development of the training facility; this introduced confusion and formalism, especially in conducting practical classes and drills.

DOSAAF organizations of the Uzbek and Tajik union republics, of a number of Ukrainian oblasts, and of Kalinin and Saratov oblasts perform unsatisfactory work in preventing highway transport accidents.

The number of flying, hang gliding and parachute accidents is not dropping.

The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum has the right to place strict demands on DOSAAF committee heads G. Samofalov, V. Astapenko, G. Krokhin, P. Trenogin, V. Yaskovich and O. Ovchinnikov for poor quality of training specialists for the Armed Forces.

Deficiencies in preparing cadres of mass technical trades for the national economy are being eliminated extremely slowly. This explains nonfulfillment of established specialist training quotas by DOSAAF organizations of Smolensk, Kurgan and Tula oblasts. Thirty-seven DOSAAF committees reduced the scope of this training. The quality of specialist training remains low.

Proper persistence is not being shown in realizing resolutions of the 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress on wide development of all kinds of combined games, holding mass competitions in various applied military elements, and involving youth of draft and predraft age in them.

Some of our committees continue to look indifferently at the fact that a number of technical sports clubs are not acting as organizing centers for the development of sports in cities and rayons and are not performing their primary task of conducting practical methodological sports work and assisting primary organizations in this. For example, a fourth of the STK [technical sports clubs] in the Buryat ASSR have only one sports section each.

Realization of the capital construction plan is proceeding with difficulty. Only 31 percent of funds allocated for these purposes were assimilated in the first half of the current year. The Uzbek SSR DOSAAF Central Committee, the Krasnodar Kray Committee, and the Kalinin, Vladimir, Omsk and certain other oblast committees are making unsatisfactory use of funds.

Gross infractions of financial discipline, mismanagement, and losses and misappropriations of supplies and funds are of special concern. Despite the steps taken, the overall amount of shortages and misappropriations that have been discovered and unrecovered as of 1 January

1988 was over two million rubles. The largest shortages and misappropriations were identified in DOSAAF organizations of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Uzbekistan.

Instances of embezzlement and misappropriation of lottery funds have not been eliminated in the Society. In 1988 over R27,000 of the funds were embezzled in the Odessa Obkom. Such disgraceful facts also occurred in some other defense organizations.

As you see, comrades, there are serious deficiencies in all directions of our activity.

What are their reasons?

First of all, the work style of the heads of a number of DOSAAF committees and organizations is not up to modern demands. Many of them merely slip along the surface of the deep-seated processes generated by restructuring; they attempt to squeeze new phenomena into the rut of old formulas; they have not given up command-bureaucratic methods of management and of forceful pressure on the elective aktiv; and they have not been imbued with awareness of personal responsibility for eradicating formalism in work. Some defense collectives essentially have not begun restructuring their work.

For example, the heads of the DOSAAF Aktyubinsk Obkom spoke many high-flown words about the importance of restructuring, but actual results are negligible. The obkom heads merely register deficiencies and reconcile themselves with the fact that they are repeated from year to year. The majority of gorkoms and raykoms do not delve into the details of the work of primary organizations.

The DOSAAF Central Committee of Tajikistan and the Mordovian, Kalmyk, Tuva, Kalinin, Ryazan, Perm, Kirov and Kamchatka oblast committees are slow in restructuring leadership methods.

Secondly, the effectiveness of the work of many committees and organizations is reduced because of their absence of proper purposefulness, consistency, and determination in fulfilling the restructuring programs specified by resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress, 19th All-Union Party Conference and 10th USSR DOSAAF Congress.

The Altay Kraykom is organizing fulfillment of resolutions of the 10th USSR DOSAAF Congress unsatisfactorily. As the latest inspection showed, neither it nor the overwhelming majority of rayon and city committees have even begun this work.

There is every reason to ask the question: Have V. Bazhanov, B. Rakhmanov, V. Katayev, Ya. Kordetskiy, V. Boldyrev, N. Korotayev, N. Ananyev and D. Novikov fully realized their responsibility for restructuring the work in the committees they head?

Thirdly, restructuring of Defense Society activity also is being delayed by the fact that elementary conscientious fulfillment of duties by officials of DOSAAF committees and organizations has not yet become the norm in many defense collectives.

Fourthly, the rates for restructuring Society activity are set by its Central Committee. They depend directly on the promptness with which its own work is restructured. Unfortunately it must be self-critically admitted that both the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and its staff are doing this slowly for now.

When they work locally Central Committee commissions and groups perform a shallow study of the state of affairs, experience, and problems arising in the restructuring process and they do not always effectively assist those being inspected. The practice of preparing Presidium and Buro resolutions remains imperfect. USSR DOSAAF Central Committee members are rarely involved in this work. All kinds of agreement and coordination of fundamental issues of restructuring drag out decisionmaking for a lengthy time. Measures outlined in resolutions often are not backed up organizationally and are poorly supported by logistic and financial resources.

All this obligates the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium and its Buro to analyze their work self-critically and elevate its results decisively.

As M. S. Gorbachev noted in the report at the July 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, all of us must firmly attune ourselves to making a decisive turn to practical actions.

Conference Resolutions are a Program for Further Deepening the Restructuring of DOSAAF Work

The 19th All-Union CPSU Conference spoke out decisively for a democratization of the life of public organizations, a strengthening of their role and responsibility, and the development of independent principles.

Consistent democratization of DOSAAF activity is a demand of the time. It is the most promising path for a further deepening of restructuring, since it stems from the very nature of the Voluntary Society.

In fulfilling 10th Congress resolutions the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee implemented a number of measures aimed at eradicating excessive centralization and at giving committees greater independence. For now, however, ideas of DOSAAF's democratization largely remain only ideas and are being put into practice poorly.

Meanwhile life urgently dictates the need for creating that democratic mechanism in the Defense Society which, as specified at the 19th party congress, would preclude the possibility of a return of forceful administrative-command methods.

Just what elements should this democratic mechanism include?

Above all it is necessary to restore to the full extent the substance and meaning of Lenin's understanding of the principle of democratic centralism.

Unfortunately in our practice it is replaced by the principle of bureaucratic centralism. This is shown by the essentially unabated volume of correspondence, coordination and instructions and by the uneradicated formalism and mania for reports. We have not yet been able to counter this "paper wave" with a truly democratic discussion of problems of mass defense work or with businesslike efficiency and persistence in resolving them.

The democratic mechanism unambiguously demands an improvement in the process of elections of the Society's directing bodies.

In interpreting measures the party is taking to democratize its internal life (as applied to the Defense Society), we deem it advisable to advance the following proposals for your consideration:

- Recommend that defense organizations hold elections, as a rule by secret ballot, of chairmen of DOSAAF committees and auditing commissions and their deputies directly at meetings and conferences with several people nominated. We have had the first experience of competitive elections in DOSAAF organizations of Moscow, Maritime Kray, and Moscow, Irkutsk, Sverdlovsk and Murmansk oblasts;
- Create conditions everywhere for unrestricted nominations to all committees and other elective bodies. Give defense organizations the right to propose nominations to the higher elective body, leaving the final word for conference and congress delegates;
- Implement a procedure under which chairmen and deputy chairmen of DOSAAF committees and auditing commissions can be elected to the very same position as a rule for no more than two successive terms;
- Recommend that committees make more active use of the right granted by the Bylaws to expel those who have not justified trust or who have lost contact with the Society.

A comprehensive increase in the role and activeness of elective bodies must become a very important direction of democratization in DOSAAF. This means not only committees, but also those bodies prescribed by the

Bylaws which function on a voluntary basis such as non-T/O departments, commissions for basic directions of the Society's practical activity, federations of technical and applied military sports, and councils of sports clubs and special-interest clubs.

The initiative of local DOSAAF committees and enthusiasts and the work of clubs and sections on a public basis is a vivid manifestation of democracy. The Dolgoprudnyy Gorkom of Moscow Oblast and the Engels Gorkom of Saratov Oblast have interesting experience in this regard. People with initiative must be found and supported in every way and their initiatives must be propagandized.

Unfortunately some committees attempt to curtail the work of elective bodies and public formations and see them as a burden instead of placing firm reliance on them. There have been instances of violations of the norms of collective leadership and of irregular conduct of plenums and of buro and presidium sessions. Such facts were noted in DOSAAF organizations of Dzhambul, Ashkhabad and Tashauz oblasts, where some raykom chairmen had turned into office employees who punctually drew wages for going to work.

In short, comrades, all of us have to realize clearly that with a reduction of the authorized staff in accordance with party and government aims, a mass voluntary organization such as DOSAAF will not be able to function effectively without relying on public formations and without transferring very important management functions to them.

The Defense Society's democratic mechanism is inconceivable without developing the activeness of primary organizations, since broad involvement of workers and the youth in national defense and in military-patriotic work is achieved only through the work of primary organizations. Frankly speaking, however, we have not yet succeeded in getting rid of formalism in the work of primary organizations or in creating the necessary logistic and technical support facilities in the majority of organizations.

Underestimation of the role of primary organizations in a number of places (Altay Kray, Kemerovo Oblast and so on) led to a situation where the so-called "small" organizations (with from 10 to 25 persons) began to fall apart. Of course it is easy to disband them; it is more difficult to consolidate them into larger organizations on a territorial basis.

A number of places have not eliminated indiscriminate acceptance into DOSAAF membership, and at times acceptance in absentia. An artificial growth in DOSAAF ranks not backed up by propaganda of its activity or by positive practical affairs of training, sports and primary

organizations generates a skeptical attitude in Soviet citizens, especially the youth, toward membership in the Defense Society. This seriously damages its authority and its mass nature.

The 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress advanced the task of creating base primary organizations of large industrial enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes and assigning small DOSAAF organizations to them. The experience of establishing them in Moscow and Orenburg oblasts and in a number of other defense organizations indicates that this is a promising matter.

It is progressing extremely slowly, however, especially in the Vologda Oblast, Kirghiz Republic, and certain other defense organizations. We need closer contacts of primary organizations with technical sports clubs, DOSAAF schools, and the defense collectives of large enterprises and establishments.

Primary organizations of schools of general education, PTU [vocational-technical schools] and universities demand greater attention from us. The bulk of predraft-age and draft-age youth is concentrated specifically in them, but these organizations often escape the committees' view. Can the state of affairs really be regarded as normal when in many of them only up to five percent of young people are involved in technical circles and sections or technical and applied military sports?

The interests of consistent democratization of the Defense Society demand an improvement in public control. Auditing commissions of the Belorussian, Georgian and Moldavian republic defense organizations; Maritime Kray defense organization; Bryansk, Pskov and Tula oblast defense organizations; and many of our other defense organizations elevated the level of their work over the last 2-3 years.

Meanwhile far from all of them conduct audits regularly, stop financial violations promptly, and evaluate them correctly. Poor reliance on the public aktiv is a serious deficiency in their work.

There also would appear to be a need for us to discuss the organization of work of USSR DOSAAF Central Committee members in the period between plenums and at the plenums themselves, and to decisively increase their activeness in the work of providing local assistance.

It would be advisable to make it a practice to hold USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium Bureau sessions locally and invite representatives of interested organizations to them.

Principles of democratism and glasnost are the living soul of genuine socialist competition. It is common knowledge that DOSAAF organizations have been taking part in it since 1966. During this time steps have been taken to improve the competition, but it must be noted that as a rule the competition has been oriented

toward achieving quantitative indicators and primary attention has been given to the competition of defense organizations of union republics, krays and oblasts.

Obviously the time has come today to concentrate maximum competition in local collectives, the primary, training and sports organizations, subordinating it to an improvement in the quality of work and the accomplishment of practical tasks and bringing it closer to specific participants of mass defense work.

The work of expanding democracy and glasnost presumes a strengthening of military-patriotic and international indoctrination of DOSAAF members and practical realization of the party conference's conclusion about the need, under conditions of continuing military danger on the part of imperialism, not to let up efforts to form in Soviet citizens, and the youth above all, a dedication to the party and Motherland, high political vigilance, and constant readiness to defend socialism's achievements.

As you see, the problems of democratizing the Defense Society's activities are vast and many-sided and require considerable organizational and propaganda efforts.

The party conference's demand to orient ourselves toward qualitative parameters in the development of military affairs has a direct bearing on such important directions of DOSAAF activity as training specialists for the Armed Forces, preparing cadres of mass technical trades for the national economy, and developing technical and applied military sports.

The Defense Society's contribution to the job of preparing the youth for military service is generally known. Every third draftee undergoes DOSAAF training in military specialties. Every other driver in the country receives his license in our schools.

But how can the qualitative parameters of this contribution be increased? What has to be done to elevate the results of efforts by committees and organizations to fulfill requirements of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree aimed at further improving preparation of the youth for military service?

Above all it is necessary to persistently improve the training and indoctrination process in DOSAAF training organizations.

This task is being accomplished slowly for now, especially in schools of the Udmurt, Smolensk, and Kurgan oblast defense organizations and a number of other defense organizations. Moreover, mutual relations are built on an unhealthy, antidemocratic basis in some collectives.

All of us must remember firmly that training and indoctrination represent an inseparable, interrelated process. This is also confirmed by the experience of foremost

DOSAAF schools. Well-arranged heroic-patriotic indoctrination of cadets in the Syzran Model Motor Vehicle School of Kuybyshev Oblast, the Gukovo Motor Vehicle School of Rostov Oblast, the Novorossiysk Naval School of Krasnodar Kray and others contributes to the cadets' better mastery of vocational training programs.

This is why it is necessary to be more persistent in raising the ideological level of political classes in DOSAAF training organizations; striving for a spirited mood in such public formations as temporary Komsomol organizations, reading room councils, and wall newspaper editorial boards; and activating the work of assistant platoon commanders, agitators and so on.

We cannot speak seriously about improving the quality of training specialists for the Armed Forces without taking effective steps to raise their level of physical conditioning. This can be done only through their active involvement in technical and applied military sports activities and activities applicable to a specialty.

We should strive persistently to improve the make-up of instructors and masters of production training.

All this obligates the heads of DOSAAF committees and training organizations to devote constant attention to the qualitative selection of teaching personnel and an improvement in the system of their training and retraining.

High results can be achieved in training specialists for the Army and Navy only by relying on a contemporary training facility. Therefore re-equipping training facility installations in accordance with modern requirements; providing training organizations with new makes of vehicles, cutaway assemblies and parts, and visual aids; and introducing programmed training and monitoring equipment must be a daily concern of the heads of DOSAAF committees and training organizations.

It must be emphasized very forcefully that it is impossible to elevate the quality of training specialists for the Army and Navy without an accelerated solution of problems of the social sphere. A need has matured to perfect the system of pay for instruction in DOSAAF training organizations and to improve the organization of everyday life and leisure both of teaching personnel and of the cadets.

A few days ago the CPSU Central Committee Politburo analyzed progress in fulfilling CPSU Central Committee decrees on strengthening military discipline in the Soviet Army and Navy. Party and soviet bodies and public organizations were told to heighten attention to questions of preparing youth of predraft age and draft age for active military duty. This requirement as well as USSR Ministry of Defense and Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy documents on these matters must be made the basis of our practical work.

We should strive persistently for a fundamental improvement in leadership of training organizations on the part of DOSAAF committees. The plenum has the right to count on a more qualified solution of problems existing here by the central DOSAAF staff, and above all by its aviation training and aviation sport, military-technical training, naval, and radio training directorates.

And in the matter of improving the quality with which cadres of mass technical trades are prepared for the national economy, above all we have to improve leadership methods and form a flexible, highly effective training system ensuring timely and complete satisfaction of territorial needs for specialists of various profiles.

Our tasks in this work are to carry out a consistent transition to direct contractual relations with enterprises and organizations for training specialists for them as new conditions are introduced for economic management and development of cooperation. During 1988-1990 we must ensure full satisfaction of the population's needs for technical training for drivers of personal transportation.

We must persistently develop the network of technical sports clubs and promote the work of transferring them to full cost-accounting and self-financing. DOSAAF organizations have some experience in this regard.

For example, PRAVDA recently wrote about work of the technical sports club of the Lida Lakokraska Production Association of Grodno Oblast under conditions of full cost-accounting. Money earned here is used to buy equipment and spare parts. Some of the money goes to pay instructors.

We must comprehensively assist the independent creativeness of workers and the youth; establish technical circles, laboratories, shops, model-building clubs, and public design bureaus in DOSAAF organizations; and hold competitive reviews and exhibits of the people's creativeness.

The transition of technical sports clubs to cost-accounting and self-financing and removal of all prohibitions and limits on their purchase of sports equipment along with a democratization of the work of federations, club councils and judges' boards is the basic way to improve the quality of sports work.

A solution to the problem of the mass nature of technical and applied military sports is inconceivable without an improvement of sports work in primary organizations. The experience of foremost collectives indicates how much they can do to accomplish this important task.

We must disseminate such experience as widely as possible. We must build up efforts to establish technical circles and sections for technical and applied military sports in primary organizations numbering more than

100 persons. In defense collectives we must place emphasis on developing sports which do not require large financial inputs and a costly physical facility.

The 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress raised the question of having technical and applied military sports developed in labor collectives in a complex with other sports, for which it was recommended that unified physical culture collectives be established.

With the involvement of representatives of sports science, the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee worked out a draft comprehensive program for development of technical and applied military sports. It would appear that such objective programs should be developed in each committee and become a component part of a unified system of physical education of the populace of the republic, kray and oblast.

The Directorate of Technical and Applied Military Sports must show great determination and concreteness in the work of implementing these programs.

Comrades! The radical economic reform which has unfolded in the country and its principles directly affect the interests of the Defense Society, which has considerable material, labor and financial resources.

Current and long-range tasks of DOSAAF production enterprises and economic organizations basically are connected with realization of the principle of full cost-accounting, to which they will shift as of 1 January 1989.

We must introduce in enterprises on a planned basis new rational economic norms developed by the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee for distributing profits and forming economic incentive funds, and methodologies and normative instruments of the transition to full cost-accounting and self-financing. This will permit eradicating unwarranted leveling trends in wages and will permit raising labor productivity.

Replacement of enterprise equipment with consideration of demands of scientific-technical progress and the introduction of new technologies are envisaged.

All these measures will permit increasing production volume by 1.6 times by the year 2005. The output of profile products in the Society's interests will expand to 80 percent.

Work to perfect the system of supply of material resources to committees and training and sports organizations requires considerable improvement. One often has occasion to hear about poor supply of equipment, spare parts, and fuels and lubricants to them, and at the same time we do not always realize the funds allocated to us.

The role of conservation and economic expenditure of material resources increases under conditions of a transition to new economic management methods. Not counting on an increase in funds and limits but establishing a regime of strictest economy, increasing the responsibility of every official involved in the use of material resources, and carrying out economic and material incentives for the regime of economy is far from a complete list of questions requiring our resolution.

There can be no mention of any transition to full cost-accounting and self-financing without a firm financial position and without the ability to earn and spend money.

We have not yet seen the end of leaders with a broad "mercenary nature" who thoughtlessly squander public money. Illegal payments and overpayments of wages, bonuses and increments alone in 1987 were R262,000.

Obviously in order to erect a reliable barrier against the thoughtless and inefficient expenditure of funds and resources it is necessary to think through questions of adopting a credit system in the Defense Society as well as establishing a unified system of control.

Time and the state of affairs in the Defense Society demand faster and more decisive introduction of new forms of economic management and a persistent search for additional reserves for increasing incomes.

Possibilities of the lottery have not been exhausted in this regard. Each year it provides the Society with R21 million of net income. The heads of many DOSAAF committees consider it possible to increase lottery quotas and they are supported by the Directorate for Conduct of the Lottery, which proposes to increase the annual lottery quota by R20 million.

Many committees and training and sports organizations are successfully mastering the know-how of earning money themselves. Services provided annually to the population by DOSAAF organizations of Turkmenia amount to more than five million rubles. By 1995 it was decided to double this by providing organizations and the population with aircraft, tractors, motor vehicles, cadet dormitories and so on during nontraining time.

In short, businesslike, enterprising people are able to raise money from under their feet, as the saying goes, and use it to develop mass defense work. Their initiative must be comprehensively supported.

Restructuring of the system for managing economics and the transition of DOSAAF committees and organizations to full cost-accounting, self-financing and self-repayment make it necessary to form a new economic thinking in our cadres. In this connection we have to

adjust the organization of economic training, which now is being carried out extremely poorly. The DOSAAF central staff also does not serve as an example in this important matter.

All that has been said obligates the heads of DOSAAF committees and organizations to learn to work under conditions of cost-accounting and self-financing.

The 19th All-Union Party Conference sees an improvement of the organizational and staff structure and an improvement in the work of the management staff to be one of the very important directions of a reform of the political system. M. S. Gorbachev said in the report at the conference: "We have to fight for a new type of staff that is based on high professionalism, that masters modern information technology, that is democratically monitored by the people, and that is capable of furthering economic and social progress."

The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee took a number of steps to perfect the staff structure of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, DOSAAF central committees of union republics, and kray and oblast DOSAAF committees. The size of the staff for the Defense Society as a whole will be cut by 4,229 persons, or one-fourth, including by 121 persons on the central staff.

Functional duties of USSR DOSAAF Central Committee directorates and departments are being revised and some of their functions will be transferred to local entities.

The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium Buro worked out and sent to committees recommendations on improving the organizational and staff structure and reducing the size of the staff of DOSAAF central committees of union republics, obkoms, kraykoms, and rayon and city committees.

Guided by these recommendations as well as by rights granted by the USSR DOSAAF Bylaws, they can independently approve staff schedules within the range of limits of strength and wage fund established for them.

In the majority of republics, krays and oblasts staff reduction questions are coordinated and promulgated in party and soviet bodies, and this work is done on a planned, thoughtful basis with consideration of local capabilities. Some Society committees, however, have given a painful reception to requirements for a partial reduction of instructor personnel of rayon and city committees and representatives of primary DOSAAF organizations.

At the same time they do not take into account that in accordance with the decision of directing bodies, committees have the right to impose the functions of abolished staff personnel on public-spirited persons, with

their work paid from DOSAAF funds on the basis of pluralism. Experience indicates the advisability of such a practice, and it has to be widely used.

With respect to the rayon element, the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium Buro decree of 12 August 1988 specified that with permission of the higher DOSAAF committee all subordinate organizations including personnel of the technical sports club, air-gun ranges and others can be consolidated on a single staff in a rayon or city.

Thus an improvement in staff structure is a creative matter. Competence and a desire to find unused reserves and the most effective ways of accomplishing tasks at hand must be in the foreground here.

It can be noted with satisfaction that the overwhelming majority of personnel of committees at all levels, of training and sports organizations, and of DOSAAF production enterprises perform the tasks assigned them knowledgeably and, I would say, professionally and make a substantial contribution to the job of restructuring mass defense, military-patriotic, training, and sports work.

But not all our cadres withstand the test of restructuring. There continue to be especially many deficiencies in work with cadres in local elements. The turnover of rayon and city committee personnel in a number of places reaches 40-50 percent. For example, 56 percent of DOSAAF raykom chairmen were replaced in the Tatar ASSR in 2.5 years and 17 DOSAAF raykom chairmen were replaced in Karasuyskiy Rayon of Kirghizia over the last 10 years.

Proper persistence is not being shown everywhere for ensuring continuity in leadership of DOSAAF committees or in creating the necessary reserve of personnel for advancement. All this indicates a need for strengthening the work of selecting, placing and indoctrinating cadres.

Today it is necessary to pay more frequent visits to labor collectives, to teach cadres directly during their practical work, and to make better use of assemblies and seminars conducted in republics, krays and oblasts. It is necessary to be more active in attracting heads of party, soviet and trade union bodies for holding classes.

It is important to elevate the role of central and zonal DOSAAF courses. To this end the content of programs should be brought closer to the Defense Society's practical tasks.

The certification of leading workers, from the DOSAAF Central Committee to DOSAAF rayon committees, must be used widely for stimulating a growth in cadres' qualification and increasing their responsibility. This must be done objectively and democratically, with broad glasnost and the active participation of party and trade

union organizations and labor collectives, and from the standpoint of demands of the July and September 1988 CPSU Central Committee plenums.

In our view, comrades, those are the most important problems and tasks stemming from resolutions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the July 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. The active participation of DOSAAF organizations in their implementation and the persistent, purposeful work of deepening the restructuring of DOSAAF activity is a guarantee of further improvement in military-patriotic, mass defense, training, and sports work, a guarantee of a multiplication of our contribution to the job of further strengthening the Motherland's defensive capability.

Report on Work of Presidium, Buro Between Plenum Sessions

*18010273 Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian
23 Oct 88 p 3*

[Information Report of Chief of Mass Organizational Work and Military-Patriotic Propaganda Directorate of USSR DOSAAF Central Committee A. L. Mamayev: "2d USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum: Work of the Presidium and Presidium Buro of USSR DOSAAF Central Committee During the Period Between the 1st and 2d (1988) USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenums"]

[Text] The practical activity of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum and its Buro was aimed at realizing requirements of the 27th party congress, subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums, and the 19th All-Union Party Conference and resolutions of the 10th All-Union Congress of the Defense Society.

The Presidium Buro worked out priority measures for propagandizing and fulfilling resolutions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. DOSAAF committees were assigned to direct organizational and propaganda work toward implementing party conference resolutions and increasing the effectiveness of mass defense work.

In the past period the focus of attention of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum and its Buro consisted of questions of practical activity of committees and organizations in fulfilling tasks stemming from the CPSU Central Committee welcome to the 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress and Congress resolutions, and questions of realizing the Basic Directions for Restructuring DOSAAF Activity.

The Presidium examined results of work by the 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress and approved the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee's basic measures to fulfill tasks stemming from the Congress resolution and to realize proposals and critical remarks expressed at the Congress and during the report-election campaign in Society organizations.

The Presidium studied practical activity of the Kirghiz SSR DOSAAF Central Committee in restructuring mass defense work in light of resolutions of the 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress. It was noted that along with a certain improvement in the status of mass defense work, the republic DOSAAF organization has taken only the first steps in restructuring the content, style and methods of basic directions of its activity.

The Presidium Buro discussed accounts of the Altay and Krasnoyarsk kray and the Kemerovo and Orenburg oblast DOSAAF committees on questions of fulfilling demands of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree aimed at further improving preparation of the youth for military service, and resolutions of the 10th All-Union Congress of the Defense Society.

DOSAAF kraykoms and obkoms were told to intensify control over the work of subordinate organizations and to increase demands and exactingness on leaders for high-quality and effective accomplishment of tasks at hand. Special attention was directed to the need for fundamentally restructuring mass defense work, increasing discipline and efficiency, and intensifying control over the execution of adopted plans and decisions.

The Presidium Buro studied the work practice of Belorussian SSR DOSAAF committees and organizations in broadening and deepening democratic principles in light of resolutions of the 27th party congress and of the January 1987 and subsequent CPSU Central Committee plenums.

The Presidium and its Buro focused their efforts on a rebirth of Leninist principles of work with the Society's leading cadres and on a development of democratic principles in their selection and advancement. The practice of using a competitive basis in elections of DOSAAF committee and organization heads was supported; decisions were made on reducing the nomenclature of USSR DOSAAF Central Committee positions and on certifying cadres of Society officials; and the system for resolving personnel matters was simplified.

In light of demands of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th All-Union Party Conference, certain steps were taken to further increase the effectiveness of military-patriotic and international indoctrination of workers and the youth.

Practical steps were discussed for further increasing the effectiveness of critical articles of the newspaper SOVETSKIY PATRIOT. The results of practical activity of editors of the journal KRYLYA RODINY in propagandizing aviation knowledge, developing the mass nature of aviation sports, and improving the quality of preparation of the youth for service in the USSR Armed Forces were examined.

Problems of further increasing the quality of specialists for the USSR Armed Forces occupied one of the central places in the work of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium and Presidium Buro. The status of the training and indoctrination process in DOSAAF training organizations of Kirghiz and Uzbek SSR, the city of Moscow, Altay and Krasnoyarsk krais, and Vologda, Gorkiy, Novgorod, Orenburg and other oblasts was studied in the past period.

In light of resolutions of the Defense Society's 10th All-Union Congress, great significance was attached to the work of further improving the quality of training specialists for the national economy. The results of training cadres of mass technical trades in DOSAAF organizations for 1987 and tasks of fulfilling the plan for 1989 were discussed.

The Presidium and its Buro concentrated efforts on further developing the mass nature of technical and applied military sports. Results of the All-Union Review of the Status and Development of Technical and Applied Military Sports in Defense Society Organizations during 1986-1987 were examined. The question of progress in realizing the USSR Council of Ministers decree on production of sports equipment for technical and applied military sports during 1986-1990 also was discussed. Specific steps were specified for further developing the mass nature of technical and applied military sports and for strengthening their role in preparing youth for service in the Army and Navy. Plans of All-Union and All-Russian competitions and of training methods courses in technical and applied military sports for 1989 were worked out and approved.

Questions of expanding and strengthening the Society's physical facility were in the field of view of the Presidium and Presidium Buro. Results of fulfillment of the capital construction plan for 1987 were summed up.

Steps were taken to improve the support of DOSAAF organizations with various kinds of supplies and equipment and to improve observance of a regime of economy in the Defense Society.

Purposeful work was carried out to further improve the production activity of Defense Society enterprises.

Following the 1st Plenum the Presidium and Presidium Buro continued to deal with questions of improving financial and economic activity; using material, labor and financial resources effectively; and improving the organizational and staff structure of DOSAAF committees and organizations.

Results of Defense Society financial and economic activity for 1987 and tasks for effective use of physical and monetary assets in 1988 were discussed. It was recommended that DOSAAF committees take specific steps to restructure the economic mechanism in the Defense

Society, to introduce self-repayment and self-financing, to observe a regime of economy, and to eliminate instances of embezzlement and misappropriation of physical assets and funds.

The question of the transition of DOSAAF committees and organizations to new conditions of economic management was examined. It was deemed necessary to accomplish the transition of DOSAAF committees and organizations to new conditions of economic management during 1989-1991.

Measures were taken to further improve the organizational and staff structure of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee staff and the staffs of Society committees and organizations, and to use monetary and labor resources sensibly and effectively.

Necessary work was done to further improve the effectiveness of organizational and agitation-propaganda measures for DOSAAF lotteries.

Guided by 27th CPSU Congress demands, the Presidium and Presidium Buro continued to deepen and expand cooperation with defense organizations of socialist countries. USSR DOSAAF proposals for bilateral and multilateral activities in 1989 were sent to the defense and sports organizations of socialist countries. The results of an international conference of defense and sports organizations of socialist countries on questions of military-patriotic and international indoctrination of the youth and participation of a USSR DOSAAF Central Committee delegation in the conference were examined and approved.

Practical ways of resolving social problems were implemented. The Presidium Buro approved a comprehensive plan of activities for a radical restructuring of health protection and medical support of DOSAAF personnel.

Specific attention was given to fulfillment of party demands for improving work with letters and arrangements for receiving workers. The status of work with letters which arrived in central staff directorates and departments in 1987 was examined.

The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee received over 1,122 letters during the past period. All of them were examined and steps were taken to put the suggestions and critical remarks expressed in them into effect.

The complexity and novelty of tasks being accomplished predetermined an increase in the organizing role of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium and Presidium Buro and a change in their work style. The personal responsibility of Presidium and Presidium Buro members for assigned work sectors is increasing. The line continues toward a further reduction in the

number of decisions being made. Following the 1st Plenum there were three sessions of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium and 29 sessions of the Presidium Buro.

At the same time the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium and its Buro did not take full advantage of their reserves and capabilities for deepening the restructuring of mass defense work and improving the style and methods of practical activity of Society committees and organizations in light of demands of the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

The work style of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium and its Buro also requires further restructuring; some sessions of the Presidium and its Buro take place without proper exactingness and efficiency or a frank exchange of opinions. Members of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and Central Auditing Commission are poorly used to prepare materials. Some decrees duplicate each other and are not monitored strictly enough. The party's present-day requirements for reducing the flow of documents being sent to defense collectives are being put into effect slowly.

The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium and Presidium Buro critically evaluate the existing deficiencies and the unused reserves and capabilities and are taking steps for restructuring all directions of the Defense Society's practical activity in light of demands of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and decisions of the 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress.

Session of the Central Auditing Commission

18010273 Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian
23 Oct 88 p 3

[Unattributed article: "In the USSR DOSAAF Central Auditing Commission"]

[Text] A routine session of the USSR DOSAAF Central Auditing Commission was held. The report of its chairman, A. Khankov, about the Commission's work in light of resolutions of the Defense Society's 10th All-Union Congress was discussed. It was noted that in the current year the Commission performed nine documentary audits of the financial-economic and production activity of organizations and enterprises of central subordination at the prescribed times.

In addition, fulfillment of proposals based on documents of audits by the USSR DOSAAF Central Auditing Commission in the Leningrad Patriot Production Association and in the Kaluga DOSAAF Aviation-Technical School (above-plan audit) was checked. The Central Auditing Commission completed the inspection begun in late 1987 of work with workers' letters, complaints, suggestions and petitions in all USSR DOSAAF Central Committee staff directorates and departments.

It was emphasized at the session that the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the July 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum demanded an acceleration of restructuring. This demand also concerns DOSAAF. Changes occurring in its activity, the developing democracy and glasnost, and the upcoming transition of committees, organizations and enterprises to full cost-accounting, self-financing and self-repayment elevate the role of control-auditing work. There is an acute task of giving it a preventive, prophylactic character and seeing to it that it contributes to the adoption of competent, prompt management decisions and that it has a stronger effect on improving the economic mechanism and strengthening discipline and order.

Speakers pointed out that the Commission is called upon to act in a modern manner always and in everything. It must not only boldly uncover deficiencies, but also ensure their fastest elimination and prevention in the future. More persistence should be shown in seeing that workers' suggestions, petitions and complaints are resolved effectively within time periods strictly prescribed by legislation.

A nonproprietary attitude toward commodity stocks causes concern. For example, during the period from 1 January 1986 through 1 April 1988 their reserves at the central commodity supply facility more than doubled in terms of price just for needs of the Directorate of Aviation Training and Aviation Sport. Above-norm reserves of commodity stocks generally are dropping slowly everywhere. This is a serious "ailment," and it can hamper the transition of committees and organizations to full cost-accounting and self-financing.

The working rhythm of enterprises is being disrupted due to deficiencies in logistics. For example, from 80 to 100 percent of products of the DOSAAF Kropotkin Plant are put out in the third decade of the month for this reason. Can we speak seriously about their high quality?

Specific proposals were made for improving the Commission's work. The adopted decree points out that the Commission must intensify control over fulfillment of Commission recommendations and proposals by audited USSR DOSAAF Central Committee organizations, enterprises and directorates and must achieve swift elimination of these and other deficiencies and omissions. For this it is necessary to broaden democratic principles in work and glasnost, and to develop criticism and self-criticism. USSR DOSAAF Central Auditing Commission members must provide more active help in improving the work of local leaders and accountants and assist them in developing new economic thinking and strengthening financial and economic discipline.

The Commission approved the plan of work for 1989.

Present at the Central Auditing Commission session were USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Chairman Col Gen N. Kotlovtshev and USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium Member Flt Adm G. Yegorov.

Resolution of the Plenum

18010273 Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT in Russian
23 Oct 88 pp 3-4

[Decree of the 2d USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum: "Practical Work of DOSAAF Organizations in Fulfilling Resolutions of the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the July 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] The 2d USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum unanimously approves the program political position developed by the 19th All-Union Party Conference, resolutions aimed at providing guarantees of the irreversibility of restructuring, and measures of the July 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum putting into effect the resolutions it adopted.

The Plenum expresses complete support for the Conference line toward further democratizing the life of public organizations, strengthening self-management principles in them, and elevating their role in society's political system.

The radical changes in the ideological-political and social atmosphere in the country and the Conference's aim at qualitative parameters in defense organizational development are an important potential factor for increasing USSR DOSAAF's contribution toward implementing Lenin's teaching and CPSU Program provisions on the nationwide character of the socialist homeland's defense.

But the Plenum finds that existing preconditions for restructuring Society activity are not being fully put into effect, and a number of committees and organizations are allowing sluggishness in fulfilling measures provided in the resolution and in the Basic Directions for Restructuring Mass Defense Work adopted by the 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress.

DOSAAF organizations of Kirghiz SSR, Altay and Krasnoyarsk krais, and Kemerovo, Orel, Aktyubinsk, Dzhabul, Bukhara and certain other oblasts have not ensured perceptible qualitative indicators in performing mass-organizational and military-patriotic work, preparing specialists for the Armed Forces and cadres of mass technical trades, developing the mass nature of technical and applied military sports, and improving the training facility.

New forms of economic management are being introduced poorly for deepening the economic reform in many Society organizations. The problems of resolving social questions, of cadets' living arrangements and

everyday life, and of providing housing for authorized Society personnel, especially flight personnel of DOSAAF aviation organizations, remain acute.

The 2d USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Plenum decrees:

1. The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium and Presidium Buro, DOSAAF central committees of union republics, and Society kray and oblast committees are to continue persistent work of implementing 19th All-Union Party Conference resolutions and the July 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum requirements as applied to basic directions for restructuring DOSAAF activity.

Primary attention in organizational and propaganda work is to be focused on a detailed understanding of Conference ideas by the Society's authorized personnel and activists and on ensuring their personal participation in restructuring mass defense work. Progress in fulfilling 10th USSR DOSAAF Congress resolutions is to be analyzed in the DOSAAF central committees of union republics and Society kray and oblast committees during the first quarter of 1989 and additional measures are to be adopted for putting them into effect.

2. Creating reliable mechanisms for developing democracy, glasnost and openness in the work of all leading organs from top to bottom; forming public opinion against self-complacency and self-satisfaction with what has been achieved; and creating conditions for objective evaluations of the state of affairs, for a search for bold approaches, for criticism and self-criticism, and for initiative and creativeness is to be regarded as an urgent task of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, DOSAAF central committees of union republics, and Society kray and oblast committees. Ensure the constant participation of all members of elective bodies in studying, generalizing and discussing key issues of the life of defense organizations and ensure strict compliance with the principle of the staff's accountability to committees in all DOSAAF elements by the chosen democratic way.

Introduce preliminary publication of drafts of USSR DOSAAF Central Committee decrees being prepared on major problems of mass defense work and their discussion in the press and at meetings of defense collectives.

Assign the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium to set up the following USSR DOSAAF Central Committee commissions prior to 1 January 1989:

—for restructuring mass defense work and military-patriotic indoctrination and democratizing Defense Society life;

—for restructuring preparation of the youth for service in the USSR Armed Forces and preparation of cadres for the national economy;

- for putting into effect demands of the 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress on increasing the mass nature of technical and applied military sports.

Draw up a statute on USSR DOSAAF Central Committee commissions.

Recommend the following as practical measures for democratizing the Defense Society:

- restore the Leninist principle of collective discussion and decisionmaking to the full extent, change the nature of meetings of DOSAAF organizations and DOSAAF committee plenums, and increase their efficiency and their critical and constructive approach to issues being discussed;
- broaden the participation of USSR DOSAAF Central Committee members and members of other Defense Society committees in their day-to-day practical work;
- improve democratization of the elective process in forming Society leading bodies. Make it a practice to hold elections of chairmen of committees and auditing commissions and their deputies directly at meetings, conferences and congresses with the nomination and preliminary discussion of several candidates in defense collectives;
- make more active use of the right granted by the USSR DOSAAF Bylaws to expel from committees those who have not justified the trust placed in them or who have lost contact with the Society.

Deem it advisable:

- to recognize the right of defense organizations, simultaneously with the election of delegates for a conference or congress, to propose nominees to the Society's higher body, leaving the final word with conference or congress delegates;
- introduce regular accounts by presidiums and presidium buros at plenums of corresponding DOSAAF committees about work that has been done.

3. The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium and Presidium Buro, DOSAAF central committees of union republics, and Society kray and oblast committees are to bring the system of cadre selection, placement and indoctrination into strict conformity with Leninist principles, aims of the 27th CPSU Congress and the 19th party conference, and demands of the 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress.

In approving USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium Buro measures for improving the structure and reducing the staff of the Central Committee and Society committees, the Plenum deems it necessary to continue work with the objective of further improving leadership style, overcoming parallelism and duplication, decisively

rejecting command-administrative methods and bureaucracy, and establishing democratic principles in DOSAAF life in accordance with the new stage of restructuring.

Recommend that the rayon or city element of the Society be strengthened by consolidating personnel of subordinate organizations, including technical sports clubs, air-gun ranges and others, into a single staff.

Decide the question of preserving or reducing the staff positions of committee chairmen of primary organizations uniting over 5,000 DOSAAF members with consideration of local conditions. Where these positions are being abolished, elect public-spirited persons as committee chairmen, paying for their work from DOSAAF funds on the basis of pluralism.

Precisely delineate functions of elective bodies and the staff of Society committees. Specify as the staff's principal task the work of implementing and checking the execution of decisions, assisting lower Society elements, and making a detailed study, generalization and dissemination of foremost experience of defense organizations.

Elevate the role of DOSAAF committee instructors and inspectors and ensure their appointment to the staff and advancement to leading positions on the basis of full glasnost with consideration of the opinion of the public at large. Assign the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium Buro to consider in 1989 the question of transforming central and zonal courses into USSR DOSAAF higher courses with local affiliates.

4. The Plenum obligates DOSAAF central committees of union republics and DOSAAF kray and oblast committees to continue the work of deepening the restructuring of mass organizational work and of strict, precise fulfillment of the Society's 10th All-Union Congress resolutions along this direction.

Lend dynamism to the work of primary DOSAAF organizations, especially schools of general education, vocational-technical schools, tekhnikums and universities, and elevate the rayon and city committee role in their leadership.

In accordance with requirements of USSR DOSAAF Bylaws, complete organizational measures for creating a network of primary Society organizations uniting DOSAAF members of small enterprises and establishments prior to the end of 1988.

Hold account-election meetings and conferences in primary DOSAAF organizations during October-November 1989. Deem it advisable to change the procedure for organizing socialist competition, concentrating it in the Society's primary, training and sports collectives for the purpose of further increasing the activeness of DOSAAF organizations.

Assign the Presidium Buro, with the participation of USSR DOSAAF Central Committee members, to develop in 1989 new conditions of socialist competition in DOSAAF organizations.

In 1989 the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium is to revise the procedure for organizing controlling work in the Defense Society.

In the first half of 1989 the Presidium Buro is to draw up recommendations for DOSAAF committees and organizations on involving the public aktiv in mass defense work.

5. The Plenum emphasizes that an improvement in the military-patriotic and international indoctrination of DOSAAF members remains one of the most important directions of Defense Society activity under conditions of the continuing threat to peace on the part of imperialist militarism.

In the interests of comprehensively accomplishing tasks of military-patriotic indoctrination of workers and the youth, DOSAAF committees are to continue to expand and deepen ties with trade unions, the Komsomol, the Znaniye Society, the Soviet War Veterans' Committee, the USSR State Committee for Education, Army and Navy commanders and political bodies, Civil Defense staffs, and other state and public organizations based on improvements and introduction of appropriate changes to joint documents.

The heads of DOSAAF committees and training, aviation and sports organizations are to take a personal, active part in political and military indoctrination of cadets and athletes, striving for a rebirth of spiritual closeness with draft-age youth. Without allowing excessive coddling and over-organization, direct the efforts of defense collectives toward developing a patriotic and international awareness and proper ideas about honor, dignity, friendship, comradeship, social activeness, the high authority of military labor, and unwavering allegiance to military duty in future soldiers.

Specify that the principal criteria of effectiveness of military-patriotic work are high patriotic and international qualities of draftees and their moral and practical readiness for military service on the basis of firm mastery of the basic military training program and of a military specialty in DOSAAF training and aviation organizations.

Recommend that in the first quarter of 1989 DOSAAF central committees of union republics and DOSAAF oblast and kray committees analyze the status of joint work with military-patriotic associations of young reserve soldiers and outline ways of improving it.

Assign the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium Buro in 1989 to draw up a new system for planning and USSR DOSAAF Izdatelstvo publication of book and graphic products and for prompt supply of the products to DOSAAF committees.

6. The Plenum regards the unconditional and complete fulfillment of demands of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers decree aimed at further improving preparation of the youth for military service as a priority task of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium, DOSAAF central committees of union republics, and DOSAAF kray and oblast committees in preparing the youth for service in the USSR Armed Forces.

Restructuring of the training and indoctrination process in DOSAAF schools must consist of a steady increase in training quality based on adoption of new equipment and foremost methodology, on an individual approach to cadets, and on instilling in each of them firm skills in operating and maintaining equipment and making effective use of it under any situational conditions.

During 1988-1989 fully support the training organizations which are shifting to new training programs with new equipment and fuels and lubricants. Concentrate basic efforts, equipment and resources above all in those schools where the training facility is assessed as unsatisfactory.

Continue to improve the training of technical flying cadres and the basic flight training of youth in aviation sports organizations.

In 1989 conduct an experiment to study the effectiveness of DOSAAF regional aviation directorates.

Expressing concern over the unending traffic and flying accidents, the Plenum directs the attention of Society committees to a strengthening of demands on leadership and teaching personnel of training organizations for eliminating preconditions for traffic accidents and air disasters.

7. To improve the quality of training of cadres of mass technical trades with an applied military importance, as new conditions of economic management are adopted and cooperation is developed DOSAAF committees are to make a consistent transition to direct contractual relations with enterprises, organizations, kolkhozes and sovkhozes and expand population training in driver trades for work in agriculture and microprocessor equipment specialist training.

Overcome the trend toward a reduction in the scope of this work and achieve fuller satisfaction of needs for specialists locally, especially in intensively developing areas of the Far North, Siberia and the Far East.

8. The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium, DOSAAF central committees of union republics, and Society kray and oblast committees are to regard implementation of directions of the 27th party congress and the CPSU Program to the effect that sports activities are to contribute to a strengthening of the health of Soviet citizens, a growth in their labor and public activeness,

and preparation for defense of the Motherland as the principal task in the job of developing the mass nature of technical and applied military sports.

Assign the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium to discuss together with the USSR Goskomsport [State Committee for Physical Culture and Sports] and AUCCTU measures for practical fulfillment of 10th All-Union DOSAAF Congress resolutions about creation of unified collectives developing both classic as well as technical and applied military sports at enterprises and in establishments, kolkhozes, sovkhozes and educational institutions for the purpose of concentrating material and financial resources for developing the mass nature of sports.

Be more persistent in resolving questions of the development and production of contemporary models of sports equipment, weapons, inventory and property by industry and by DOSAAF production enterprises and supplying it to Society organizations in the necessary amount and nomenclature.

See to it that technical sports clubs become centers of sports training work in the city, rayon and primary organization.

DOSAAF central committees of union republics and Society kray and oblast committees are to conduct a certification of all technical sports clubs during 1989, bring them into conformity with the Statute approved by the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium of 20 March 1985, and draw up long-range plans for their further development.

9. In accordance with 27th CPSU Congress demands for restructuring investment policy and with 19th All-Union Party Conference directions for deepening economic reform, the Plenum assigns the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium, DOSAAF central committees of union republics, and DOSAAF kraykoms and obkoms to take more effective steps for complete assimilation of funds allocated for capital construction and their concentration above all on projects under construction and on the most important carry-over projects for the purpose of accelerating the development of the Society's logistic and technical support facilities.

Focus primary attention on unconditional reduction of incomplete construction, especially of projects intended for aviation training organizations, as well as on the use of above-norm supply reserves.

Go to the USSR Ministry of Defense with the proposal that construction of projects connected with preparation of specialists for the Armed Forces be covered by planning quotas in military districts on an equal basis with Ministry of Defense projects.

Elevate the quality of work of DOSAAF production enterprises by introducing progressive technological processes to production, raising labor productivity and

strengthening the regime of economy. Persistently increase the proportion of the output of products intended directly for the needs of mass defense work. Develop democratic principles more widely in the work of labor collectives on the basis of electivity and use of a competitive system of selection and replacement of leaders and production specialists.

Perfect the system of economic and moral incentives for DOSAAF workers on the basis of consistent adoption of cost-accounting, an overcoming of the unwarranted leveling of wages, and observance of principles of social justice with consideration of the end results of mass defense work.

Increase the social direction in the activity of leaders of all degrees and completely reject the principle of remainders in allocating funds for cultural and everyday arrangements and medical support for cadets of training organizations. Use all opportunities to expand the proportionate participation of DOSAAF committees in housing construction. Direct special attention to fulfilling demands of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers about providing all training organizations with well-built dormitories for cadets.

10. Guided by 27th party congress resolutions and by subsequent CPSU Central Committee decrees on further developing and strengthening the USSR's friendly ties with other socialist countries, the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium, DOSAAF central committees of union republics, and DOSAAF kray and oblast committees are to continue the work of further deepening and improving the Society's ties with defense and sports organizations of socialist countries on the basis of principles of socialist internationalism; with consideration of each one's position and interests and under plans of local party bodies, they are to take steps to activate and further improve traditional ties of DOSAAF committees with corresponding organizations of defense societies of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Hungarian People's Republic, GDR, Polish People's Republic, Mongolian People's Republic, and CSSR.

11. Editorial boards of the newspaper SOVETSKIY PATRIOT and of Society journals, and DOSAAF Izdatelstvo are to provide wider coverage of the positive work experience and contribute to fundamental criticism of shortcomings in the work of committees, organizations and leading officials and to the establishment of glasnost, democracy, and new approaches to restructuring mass defense work.

Make wider practical use of the experience of mass work among Society members by editors of the journal ZA RULEM.

12. Assign the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium to generalize critical comments and suggestions expressed at the Plenum, adopt resolutions on them, and inform appropriate Society committees and USSR DOSAAF Central Committee members.

**Military Education Chief on Restructuring,
Qualitative Parameters in Schools**
18010234 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Sep 88 pp 1-2

[Interview with Col Gen V. Vostrov, Chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense's Main Directorate of Military Schools, by Major V. Kazakov, correspondent: "Military Higher Education Institutions; Parameters of Quality"; first paragraph is a boldface introduction]

[Text] Yesterday, the new school year began at military schools. On this occasion, our correspondent asked Colonel General Vladimir Andreevich Vostrov, Chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense's Main Directorate of Military Schools, to answer several questions.

[Kazakov] Comrade Colonel General, what can you say about the early results of perestroika in military schools, and in particular, about the results of the past academic year?

[Vostrov] Approximately 2 years have passed since party and government decrees aimed to restructure the country's specialized high schools and the higher education system have been adopted. The time has been relatively short, but a lot has already been accomplished. New curricula have been adopted, which place the main emphasis on the study of the student's specialty. Officer training has been made to conform to the principles of the defensive military doctrine adopted by the Warsaw Pact member states.

A number of measures has been adopted to increase students and cadets' motivation and personal responsibility for the results of their schooling. A system of material incentives for excellent and good work has been introduced. Best students and cadets showing inclination to scientific work have been permitted to use individual curricula. Leading schools use computers to model combat situations; land army schools use mobile instruction centers, which allows cadets to acquire solid tactical control skills quickly.

Still, both the reach and the pace of perestroika in military school have remained inadequate. At higher education institutions, stagnation phenomena such as sluggishness of thought, fondness for established patterns and inability or unwillingness to think in a new way are still in evidence, slowing perestroika. Many undertakings are still carried out merely for the sake of marking them off the list.

[Kazakov] How do you assess perestroika in military school compared to the pace of renewal in higher education as a whole? Has it been lagging behind?

[Vostrov] In my opinion, it has not. Military school, while quite specialized, is nevertheless inseparable from the education system as a whole. A number of complex problems related to the strengthening of the scientific

and educational potential of higher education institutions and democratization of the life of the student body remain unsolved. In the case of military school, the work of bringing the educational process closer to real-life combat situations and replacing or selecting new study aids, especially for field training, requires a great effort. Additional measures are needed to better equip higher education institutions and create appropriate living conditions for the student body. Finally, we must persistently and systematically fight superficial attitudes, red tape and petty regulations of all aspects of life in the administration of higher education institutions.

[Kazakov] Which areas can be singled out as the most important, decisive in the current phase of perestroika?

[Vostrov] The most important figure in perestroika at higher education institutions is the teacher, as was noted at the February 1988 CPSU Central Committee's Plenum.

Our academies and officer training schools have a large number of excellent innovative teachers who bravely seek new approaches to education and training and enrich military school with their fresh ideas and methodological discoveries. Among them are Colonel A. Malyshev, Department Chairman at the Armored Troops Military Academy imeni USSR Marshal R.Ya. Malinovskiy, Colonel G. Serov, Deputy Department Chairman at the Air Force Academy imeni Yu.A. Gagarin, Captain 1st Rank A. Bubnov, Education Department Chairman at the Sevastopol Higher Navy Engineering School, Colonel Yu. Fomin, senior instructor at the Moscow Higher Combined-Arms Commanders' School imeni the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and many others.

Today, every military school instructor must be innovative, basing his innovativeness not only on total expertise in his subject but also on a solid and systematic pedagogical training. It is often thought that almost any officer with active duty experience can teach at a higher education institution. Experience has shown that this is far from true. Military teacher is a profession requiring serious training. This is why in addition to post-graduate study and a doctorate, a systematic, formal psychological and pedagogical training must be required of all officers appointed to teaching positions.

Since we require teachers to be innovative, we must exclude petty supervision. How can one be creative if every little thing is unambiguously regulated and all actions and teaching methods in every subject have been passed down from above, whereas the teacher's freedom is constrained by an entire code of plans, methodological regulations, directions, recommendations and even "technological charts"? While broadening teachers' authority and increasing their accountability, we should pay more attention to organizing their labor, freeing them of various tasks that are alien to their work, of endless meetings and conferences, so that they could devote more time and effort to their main job of training and educating.

We must also radically improve the process of selecting officers to work at higher education institutions. It is no secret that those who work at academies and officer schools are often luckless people, indifferent to their work and strange to institutions of higher learning. This is dead weight that slows down perestroika and harms officer training, since mediocrity inevitably breeds mediocrity, and incompetence in the teacher, incompetence in the pupil.

[Kazakov] An equally important question is, perhaps, what should students and cadets be taught, isn't it?

[Vostrov] Absolutely true. The educational curriculum is a second key problem of perestroika in military education. Graduates of military schools must be able to organize and control combat engagements using complex combat equipment with maximum efficiency, lead their subordinates with confidence, train them and build their character.

All this and many other requirements are contained in the qualitative parameters, which serve simultaneously as a kind of state order for qualified specialists and a quality standard for their training. The main question is how to meet these parameters in a standard course of study. Studies have shown that curricula and school programs are often grossly overloaded with educational materials, including those that are by no means crucial to officers' professional training.

The desire to cover all bases at once and offer students a volume of knowledge and skills much in excess of their ability to learn often leads to a situation whereby the main goal is lost in the ever-growing flow of information and the forest can no longer be seen behind the trees. The great shipbuilder and mathematician academician A.N. Krylov once likened this educational system to the way the wives of Moscow merchants used to fatten geese for Christmas: they would stitch them into a bag up to their necks, hang the bag on the wall and stuff them full of dry peas soaked in water. This kind of education, whereby students are crammed full of ready knowledge leaving them no time to think about what they have learned, digest the material and diligently study the subject on their own, often serves no purpose.

We must clearly understand that the goal of a higher education institution is not to fill as much as possible of the student's head with ready solutions for all of life's situations, but to build a foundation of military education, shape the student's innovative personality, instill in him respect for knowledge and teach him to acquire it independently.

Yet, the link between higher education institutions and the armed forces should not be one-sided. Military service is the continuation of military education. Unfortunately, in many units we all too often encounter insufficient care and assistance to military school graduates during the period when they mature as officers.

This causes unnecessarily lengthy on-the-job learning periods, loss of purpose and even disillusionment of many young officers in military service. The result is reproaches—frequently unjust—to military schools and the desire on the part of some commanders to blame the schools for the deficiency of their own work with young officers.

[Kazakov] The question what to teach is inseparable from the question how to teach. Could you briefly describe the problems and difficulties facing military schools in this area?

[Vostrov] Currently, we are systematically working to develop and introduce new, more efficient teaching methods and techniques. I could cite many examples of active, creative experimentations, whereby higher education institutions boldly introduce new forms and do not hesitate to break established patterns. For instance, the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze and the Armored Troops Military Academy imeni R.Ya. Malinovskiy adopted this year a new system of administering state examinations in social sciences and tactical training. This has already been reported in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

The same method is becoming increasingly popular in specialized training. The Ryazan Higher Military Automotive Engineering School, the Gorkiy Higher Military Construction Commander School and other schools pioneered this area.

Unfortunately, the situation is different at other schools. Many teachers have for many years remained prisoners of the set way of thinking, unable as they are to part with their familiar methods and curricula developed once and for all. If we are indeed serious about active search and experimentations in educational methods, we must give more freedom to departments in their choice of teaching forms and methods and support and encourage experimentation.

We urgently need to increase the role of independent study. This is why we must be bolder in moving the study process out of the lecture hall and into the library, the lab, and especially the study center and onto the tactical training ground, where future commanders and engineers could test their ability to act independently.

The questions of character building at higher education institutions is inseparable from those of education. Today, such personal qualities as self-reliance, ability to take initiative and social responsibility have become especially important for officers. They should be built continuously, in all forms of scholastic activity, with the help of everything that surrounds the student or cadet. It is impossible to train a self-reliant, initiative-taking officer without constantly placing him into situations which demand these qualities. Moreover, training benefits from the teacher's personal example, his self-discipline, high professionalism and responsible approach to the subject.

[Kazakov] Will the rules of admission to military schools be changed?

[Vostrov] USSR State Committee on Education has adopted an entirely new set of rules of admission to the country's higher education institutions. The radical difference is that practically all advantages and special treatment have been eliminated in the selection process. Selection and admission of those who meet admission standards are based, first of all, on the results of the entrance examinations in the most important subjects in the student's field.

A review of the great number of letters that we get indicates that the process of selection and admission to military schools also needs improvement. The responsibility for setting military professional requirements and organizing and carrying out the selection process should lie primarily with military schools themselves. We feel that we must pay more attention to applicants' knowledge as they enter school and increase the importance of the entrance exams. In the selection process, we must primarily take into account the applicants' preparation level and learning ability.

[Kazakov] Which tasks in managing perestroika in military education do you view as most important for you personally?

[Vostrov] The responsibility of military education management is to identify practical measures needed to carry out perestroika in the near and long term, and to organize and ensure their implementation. The Main

Directorate of Military Schools, as a USSR Ministry of Defense entity, sees its task in coordinating and providing scientific and methodological supervision to higher education institutions in the course of perestroika. Its attention is focused on solving perestroika's fundamental questions, coordinating its solutions with those of the USSR State Committee on Education.

Pressing problems include, in my opinion, improved management of military professional requirements, increased use of computers in education and introduction of information management and computer technology. The need to staff management entities of higher education institutions and of military schools with officers who have strong military and teaching qualifications and hands-on experience both on active service and in teaching at higher education institutions is more acute than ever.

One of the goals of perestroika is democratization of all aspects of student life and restoration of real, not just formal, authority of schools' social organizations, especially of teachers' councils at institutions and departments. We must review the composition and the selection process of teachers' councils, broaden their authority and provide for practical participation in them by students and cadets.

To conclude, I would like to remind students and cadets who have just started their studies at military schools of the following words of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin: "Our only motto should be to study military science seriously..." I wish you great success in your studies.

Gareyev et al Comment on Yom Kippur War

18120035 Moscow NEW TIMES in English
No 45, Nov 88 pp 18-22

[Two-part article—first part by Journalist Igor Timofeyev—under the rubric, "War on the Day of Atonement: 15 Years On: Facts, Opinions, Lessons"; first three paragraphs are source introduction]

[Text]

The Past and the Present

October 6, 1973. On the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, Egyptian troops crossed the Suez Canal, broke through the powerful Bar-Lev defense line and established a bridgehead on the East bank. Early on the morning of October 7, Egyptian tanks approached the Mitla Pass, and the following day the Egyptians liberated Eastern Kantara, the second biggest city on the Sinai Peninsula. In mid-October Israel seized the initiative. On October 16 Israeli tank units crossed the canal and broke through between two Egyptian armies. On the night of October 22 Israeli troops surrounded the Third Egyptian Army and advanced as far as the 101st kilometre of the Cairo-Suez Highway.

These were some of the highlights of the fourth Arab-Israeli War which was fiercely fought and involved great loss of life on both sides. Further expansion of the armed conflict was prevented by the joint diplomatic efforts of the Soviet and U.S. governments.

The Yom Kippur War brought about a dramatic change in the face of the Middle East crisis. The events of 15 years ago throw sidelights on the vicissitudes of Soviet-Egyptian relations under Presidents Nasser and Sadat.

* * * *

The road to the October War of 1973, which shattered the myth of the Israeli army's invincibility, began in June 1967. At that time people in the Arab countries were still reeling from the psychological shock of the sudden military debacle. But Egypt's political leadership, headed by President Nasser, was already weighing up the situation and trying to assess it. The depressing picture of the June tragedy was brought home to Nasser gradually. To some extent he was helped towards an objective view of the situation by Marshal Zakharov, the then Chief of Staff of the Soviet armed forces, who arrived in Egypt a fortnight after the end of the 1967 war. What he saw on arrival left little room for illusions. Of the 1,364 tanks and self-propelled guns the Egyptian army had had on the morning of June 5, 700 had been lost in Sinai. More than a hundred of them were undamaged and another 200 had suffered insignificant damage. Of the 280 combat planes, only 50 had survived. Anti-aircraft forces had also suffered heavy losses. Considering that the radar detection and warning system had been virtually knocked out, the country was in effect defenseless against an Israeli air raid.

During his June 1967 visit to Cairo, President Podgorny of the USSR was handed a long list of items of military hardware, which, in the opinion of the Egyptian command, were urgently needed to restore the combat capability of the armed forces. The Soviet side readily responded to the request to make good the losses in weapons and equipment.

Rising From the Ashes

To forestall possible Israeli attempts to cross the Suez Canal and strike at Egypt, Marshal Zakharov suggested that the Egyptian command urgently set up a forward line of defense on the west bank of the Suez Canal. As a long-term goal, he set the task of building a modern army in Egypt. During the discussion of these issues—President Nasser insisted on discussing not only the general objectives, but all the particulars—the idea arose of asking Soviet military advisers to help the Egyptian army.

In the autumn of 1967 there was unusual activity in the corridors of the General Staff in Moscow. Officers, urgently recalled from their service in Soviet army units were arriving in the capital daily. After being briefed and issued with foreign passports containing Egyptian visas, they flew to Cairo. The situation was made still more unusual by the fact that they were all wearing civilian clothes, and one could only guess at their military rank from their age and behavior.

Upon their arrival, the Soviet advisers were temporarily lodged right in the center of the city in the bustling, noisy Republic Street, at the Victoria Hotel which had seen better days. Later they moved into apartment blocks in the former Olympic Village. Most of the time, however, only their families lived there, as the advisers themselves were assigned to army units immediately on their arrival.

Dressed in Egyptian uniforms, but with no insignias, the advisers shared the hardships of military service with their charges. They were billeted with their units, usually in dugouts, issued the same food rations as the Egyptian officers, drank the same tepid, cloudy water, which was delivered daily in tanks, and they were exposed to the same dangers when Israeli planes swooped down over the desert, out of the dazzling blue sky.

Working under daily artillery shelling and frequent air raids, which Israel resumed from early July 1967, Egyptian engineers and technicians, aided by Soviet experts, quickly repaired the radar detection and warning system and the military airfields. The training of pilots resumed at the Egyptian Air Force centers.

By November 1967 a reliable defense line had been built in the Suez Canal zone. The Egyptian army was growing stronger every day and gaining confidence as the constant artillery exchanges were becoming increasingly fierce in the course of the so-called "war of attrition."

"The war of attrition" took a heavy toll on both sides. From July 1967 to August 1970 Israeli casualties amounted to 700 dead and 2,700 wounded, far more than its total losses in the June 1967 war. Egypt sustained much heavier losses. In 1969, alone, at least 4,000 civilian workers died in air raids on the missile sites that were under construction. Losses were considerable in the troops, especially in the forward units, where not only Egyptian officers and men, but Soviet advisers were killed.

The situation was growing increasingly tense, but the Israelis were frustrated in their hope that Nasser would give in and call off "the war of attrition." In March 1969 the Egyptian army dramatically increased the scale of its activities in the Suez Canal zone. While in 1968 artillery engagements had taken place several times a week, they now occurred several times a day. In late 1969 the Israelis concentrated their efforts on delivering air strikes on civilian targets outside Cairo. Simultaneously they staged daily air raids on the anti-aircraft missile sites being built in the Canal zone. "Air reprisals" reached their peak in early 1970, when Israeli planes bombed a plant in Abu Zabal and a secondary school in Bahr-el-Bakr. The number of civilian victims, including children, soared.

It was against this background that Nasser made an urgent visit to Moscow in January 1970.

Supremacy in the Air Begins on the Ground

The President left Cairo on board an air force plane at dawn on January 22, 1970, and landed in Moscow at 10 a.m. At the very first meeting with the Soviet leaders, held the same day, Nasser asked for missiles capable of hitting low-flying targets. He was very candid in describing the crisis situation in Egypt, which threatened to undermine his authority in the eyes of the people unless he found a way of protecting civilians against Israeli air raids.

In agreeing to meet Nasser's request, the Soviet leadership was aware that it was making a serious political move which could have grave international consequences. Colonel General Katyshkin (Ret.), then chief Soviet adviser in Egypt who was present at the talks, recalls the following conversation.

"Can you guarantee that these missiles will provide 100 per cent cover for Cairo?" Prime Minister Kosygin asked Defence Minister Marshal Grechko.

"No," replied Grechko. "You can never be a hundred per cent certain in a war-time situation."

The sharp exchange between Kosygin and Grechko was interrupted by the General Secretary of the CC CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev.

"Stop arguing," he said. "Obviously we must adopt a constructive decision."

The decision was taken at a Political Bureau meeting on Sunday, January 25. That same day, Brezhnev told Nasser that the Soviet Union would shortly send anti-aircraft missiles to Egypt to provide air protection for the interior of the country.

Time was pressing, and the Soviet side got down to business without delay. To increase the combat ability of the missile force, it was decided to reinforce the air defenses with fighter planes.

On a frosty night in January 1970, the first trainload of technology and personnel set out on its way. The southern seaport where the troops were to board the ships for Egypt was like a war camp. For the sake of secrecy, military hardware was loaded at night. The bulk carrier Rosa Luxemburg put to sea before dawn and arrived in the port of Alexandria several days later.

Throughout March 1970 there was an uninterrupted flow of military hardware. The anti-aircraft missile complexes and MiG-21 fighter planes were put on combat duty at dawn on April 15. On the first day two wings were alerted, but the Israeli planes that had invaded Egyptian air space avoided an engagement and swung back towards Sinai. On April 18 the Israelis curtailed their raids on inland areas of Egypt.

The struggle for supremacy in the air, which began on April 15, had reached its peak by mid-summer. In July and early August the Israelis lost 13 combat planes. This had a sobering effect on the hotheads in Tel Aviv, who decided that there was no point in prosecuting the air war in the Canal Zone.

The cease-fire agreement that came into force on August 8, 1970 put an end to the "war of attrition." The Yom Kippur War was still three years off.

General Staff Prepares for War

The Egyptians drew lessons from the Sinai tragedy. It was obvious after June 1967 that one of their main tasks was to streamline all levels of the Egyptian General Staff to turn it into the brain center of the armed forces. As a result of personnel shake-ups in 1967-69, many competent and talented officers with practical experience in the field joined the Egyptian General Staff.

Work on the plan for the offensive operation code-named Granite started to go full stride in 1971, which President Sadat proclaimed to be "the year of the final solution." Operation Granite was planned in total secrecy by a narrow circle of people, including Egyptian staff officers and their advisers.

The first signs of a rift between the Egyptian and Soviet sides emerged during the discussion of different scenarios for Operation Granite. Reporting on the state and morale of the troops, some Egyptian generals were increasingly doubtful as to the success of an offensive operation, arguing that the troops lacked this or that kind of military hardware. On the other hand, complaints about the quality of Soviet armaments became more frequent. These complaints, openly encouraged by Defence Minister M. Sadek, sapped the morale of many commanders, who were now able to put the blame for shortcomings in the training of personnel on the "poor quality" of the fighting equipment supplied by the Soviet Union.

Subsequent developments showed that these sentiments in the army were deliberately fomented by those who wanted to see Soviet-Egyptian relations curtailed and were pushing President Sadat towards a decision to discontinue the Soviet military advisers' mission in Egypt.

The Soviet military advisers left Egypt in July 1972. By that time the Egyptian army, risen from the ashes, was ready for the operation to liberate Sinai. The plan for the offensive, code-named Badr, developed under General Shedhli in 1973, reflected the complex evolutionary process the General Staff and the whole of the Egyptian army had undergone in the five years of Soviet-Egyptian Military cooperation.

The Badr plan was set in motion 15 years ago, on October 6, 1973.

[Second part of article is discussion by Vladimir Vinogradov, former USSR Ambassador to Egypt (1970-74), now Foreign Affairs Minister of the RSFSR; Colonel General Mahmut Gareyev, deputy chief of staff of the Soviet Armed Forces; and Air Force Colonel General Grigory Dolnikov; compiled by Yakov Borovoi and Ivan Menshikov]

Vladimir Vinogradov: At 2 p.m. on October 6, 1973, President Sadat rang me up using the city telephone and not as usual the special line. He said the Egyptian troops had crossed the Suez Canal. I heartily wished him every success.

Mahmut Gareyev: The hostilities lasted 18 days, from October 6 to 24. In military terms, the Yom Kippur War was a major operation, involving as it did 1.5 million troops, 6,300 tanks, 13,200 guns and mortars, and 1,500 combat planes. By way of comparison, 6,300 tanks were involved in the Soviet side in the Berlin operation during the second world war.

While in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, the Arab troops were passive, in 1973 the Egyptian and Syrian troops were more resolute and active. Take, for instance, the massive operation to cross the Suez Canal, in the course of which the Egyptian troops breached a powerful Israeli military defense line. This was a veritable feat which testified to the high morale of the Egyptian officers and men.

As a rule, the level of military skills and fighting prowess can be judged by the losses of both sides in the course of hostilities. While in the 1967 War, the ration was 1:10 - 1:20 against the Arabs, it was dramatically different in the Yom Kippur War. The Egyptian and Israeli armies each lost about 3,000 men; the Egyptian side lost 890 tanks and the Israeli about 700 tanks. Each side lost about 500-600 pieces of ordnance.

All this needs to be stressed, as there is still a widely held view in the West that the Arabs are no match for the Israelis as fighters. The Yom Kippur War gives the lie to this idea. One must give their due to the Soviet military advisers, who had managed to boost the combat ability of the Egyptian and Syrian forces in a short time from 1967. I have pleasant memories of my work with the General Staff of the Egyptian Army, Air Force Commander General Baghdadi, and Air Force Chief of Staff General Mubarak, who proved to be a talented commander.

Grigory Dolnikov: ...In 1967, the Egyptian Air Force and Air Defenses were practically wiped out. Israeli planes bombed the suburbs of Cairo with impunity.

We arrived in Egypt in March 1970. At that time, the Soviet military advisers and Egyptian generals and officers had no secrets from each other. We were working for a common cause.

Initially, while the Egyptian pilots were being trained, Soviet fighter planes took part in the defense of Egypt. We lost several of our men.

Dispute Over Arms

Mahmut Gareyev: We provided Egypt—on easy terms—with anti-aircraft missiles, 2,500 tanks and 1,200 combat aircraft. This was the most advanced weaponry for its time: T-62 tanks, MiG-21 and MiG-23 planes and the Kvadrat (Square) anti-aircraft-missile complex. The Soviet Union trained more than 8,000 military experts for the Egyptian armed forces.

It is generally acknowledged that the Soviet military hardware acquitted itself well during the October 1973 warfare. From my own experience of work in Egypt, I can say with confidence that complaints about the quality of Soviet military hardware came from those who did not want to or were afraid to fight.

Vladimir Vinogradov: First-class military hardware and the presence of Soviet military advisers in Egypt not only strengthened the country's defense capability, but served as a deterrent to the Israelis.

All the more of a surprise was President Sadat's decision to send the Soviet military advisers home. It was an unpleasant piece of news. This was how it happened. I was briefing Sadat on the results of U.S. President Nixon's visit to Moscow. Incidentally, during the visit

the Soviet Union was upholding the interests of the Arab states, including Egypt. Then all of a sudden President Sadat declared: "Please tell Moscow that Egypt has no more need for the services of the Soviet military personnel." Well, to make such a decision was Egypt's sovereign right, although it would not be out of place to recall that the Soviet military advisers had come to Egypt not of their own accord, but in response to prolonged and persistent requests from President Nasser.

Politically, Sadat's decision was a gesture designed to please the Americans, signifying that the Egyptian leadership was ready to cooperate with the U.S.

Mahmut Gareyev: In those difficult days, the Soviet Union, as always, came to Egypt's aid. With fighting still in progress, the Soviet Union, in reply to Egypt's request, airlifted military technology, spare parts and ammunition to Egypt. The operation involved 4,000 military transport planes, carrying large amounts of military hardware and ammunition. An additional 1,500 tanks and 109 planes were delivered.

Vladimir Vinogradov: When the Israeli tanks came to within 100 kilometres of Cairo, Sadat at first said I shouldn't pay any attention to this. But as early as October 21 he approached the Soviet leadership asking it to get the Israelis to stop their offensive. Using every diplomatic lever available, the Soviet leadership, despite U.S. opposition, forced through the adoption of the UN Security Council's cease-fire Resolution 338 of October 22, followed shortly afterwards by Resolution 339. Ignoring the UN resolutions, the Israelis continued to advance, closing in on the 3rd Army near Suez.

In this critical situation, Sadat appealed to the USSR and the U.S. to send their troops to Egypt (jointly or separately) to prevent the decimation of the 3rd Army. On October 26, the Soviet Union approached the U.S. with the suggestion that Egypt's request be met. The Soviet leadership warned that if the United States refused, the USSR would go it alone. The Soviet move proved effective. The Israeli troops stopped their offensive that same day.

Ten Centimetres East of Suez

Mahmut Gareyev: On the whole, we consider the Yom Kippur War to have been a great achievement for the Arabs. Unfortunately, the Egyptian and Syrian troops failed to consolidate and exploit their initial success. We believe the main reason for this to have been poor coordination between the two Arab states. President Sadat had failed to inform the Syrian side that Operation Badr was planned to a small depth. The October war highlighted the grievous consequences of lack of unity and coordination in the Arab ranks.

In terms of military strength, the Egyptian President's mistake was that he did not want to pursue hostilities to a greater depth. In his talks with the Soviet advisers, he repeatedly said that all he needed was to gain "ten

centimetres of land East of Suez," in order to draw the attention of the world public to the Middle East problem; whereupon, he said, "I will seek to end the war on terms acceptable to Egypt."

Under any circumstances it was his duty to inform the Syrians of his plans. As it turned out, while calling the Syrians to act to great depth, Sadat was planning his own actions in a very different way.

Vladimir Vinogradov: Even so, the Egyptian army showed that it was well trained, and that Arab troops were armed with weapons of high quality, even better than those used by the enemy. President Sadat told me so on many occasions, and asked me to convey his gratitude to the Soviet leadership. In return, I asked him to say this to the Egyptian people and soldiers. But he never did so.

In mid-October there was a strange pause in the hostilities. The Israeli troops used it to deal with Syria. Syria could not withstand the onslaught alone. The Israeli army then turned southwards, where the Egyptian troops were totally inactive. I asked Sadat why he was allowing Syria to be bled white. He replied: "Let it go on the defensive and wage guerrilla warfare. Our main goal is to knock out as many enemy forces as possible." A strange tactic, to say the least. King Hussein of Jordan later told me that he had repeatedly made Sadat offers to enter into the war. President Assad of Syria agreed, but President Sadat of Egypt refused.

Be that as it may, the Yom Kippur War created a very favorable situation for a political statement in the Middle East. First, the Arab states had proved that they could score a military victory over Israel. Second, the Israeli leadership was aware that its troops could be defeated, if not now then later, considering the vast military-political and economic potential of the Arab countries. Third, world public opinion swung in favour of the Arabs.

I recently visited Cairo, where I met President Mubarak. We had a friendly and useful talk. Much has changed in Egypt. Political dialogue is getting under way and trade, economic and cultural cooperation is developing.

Admiral Kuznetsov on Politicians' Competence in Military Decisions

18010156a Moscow *POLITICHESKOYE*
OBRZOVANIYE in Russian No 9, 1988 pp 71-73

[Interview with Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov on 15 August 1973: "From Recorded Interview With Adm N. G. Kuznetsov on 15 August 1973"; interviewer not identified; place of interview not given]

[Text] [Interviewer] What is your overall assessment of Stalin's role in the Great Patriotic War?

[Kuznetsov] You know, this is a very complicated question and is very difficult to answer. It cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. Obviously in assessing Stalin even from a military point of view, both the positive and the negative must be placed on the scales.

As for the Great Patriotic War and the victory over Germany, when speaking of Stalin, and while not forgetting that he was the Supreme Commander, we must not forget that victory was achieved by the Soviet people, under the guidance of the Communist Party.

I would like to draw your attention to the following items. Let us say that you are addressing an assessment of Stalin regarding purely military issues. You should take into consideration not only the fact that we ended the war victoriously and give Stalin due credit for this, but you should also remember that we lost 20 million lives and ask the question of whether we could have sustained fewer casualties. Obviously mistakes on Stalin's part constitute an important contributing factor here. In other words, in giving credit where credit is due we should not forget all other considerations.

[Interviewer] As a former member of Stavka [Hq SHC—Headquarters, Supreme High Command], what can you tell us in specific terms about the working atmosphere during Hq SHC meetings, and what is your assessment of Stalin's competence in naval matters in connection with this?

[Kuznetsov] I shall endeavor to state my personal opinion on this. Naturally I formed an opinion on the job done by Stavka from the very first days right up to war's end. Here is how Hq SHC operated.

...First of all, as you know, we were slow in forming Headquarters, Supreme High Command. It was not until the second day of the war, 23 June, that Red Army High Command Headquarters was formed, under the chairmanship of Marshal Timoshenko. Membership also included several members of the Politburo, including Stalin, which naturally put Timoshenko in a very difficult position. Could he serve as Supreme Commander with the presence of Stalin, for example, as a member of Stavka? We shall not be severe in our judgment, but facts are facts: organization of Hq SHC took place at a very difficult moment for us. During those first days Stalin demanded of the General staff information on the situation at the fronts, but unfortunately this information was very inaccurate and very unclear. For this reason on 29 June Stalin decided to go to the office of the People's Commissar of Defense, accompanied by several Politburo members (I know for sure that they included V. M. Molotov and A. I. Mikoyan), to take a look at their maps and demand a situation report. I know that he was unhappy with the situation in a number of areas. It was precisely at that time that the shift occurred in favor of

organization of the State Defense Committee, Headquarters, Supreme Command (predecessor of Headquarters, Supreme High Command), and organizational leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense. As we know, on 2 July Timoshenko left for the Smolensk sector, and Stalin became people's commissar of defense for all intents and purposes, although technically the change did not take place until later. And therefore we must consider the end of June and first days of July as the beginning of operations of what was initially designated Headquarters, Supreme Command and subsequently called Headquarters, Supreme High Command, and when Stalin became the de facto head of Stavka.

How did Hq SHC function? Well, I must state that the full membership of Hq SHC never met even once. In any case I never personally witnessed a meeting of the full membership.

[Interviewer] Would you say that the situation did not allow it?

[Kuznetsov] By way of explanation I shall state that it would have been outright harmful to convene together the entire membership of Hq SHC during the first period of the war and to discuss operational matters at a full meeting of the membership. Here too one must acknowledge that Stalin's authority played a positive role, and Hq SHC managed to function nevertheless, although there were those who have stated that no Hq SHC was in fact in existence. That is incorrect. But Stavka existed to the extent that there was a Supreme Commander and a chief of the General Staff (initially G. K. Zhukov and B. M. Shaposhnikov, and subsequently A. M. Vasilevskiy and A. I. Antonov). Individual members of Hq SHC would be called in on specific matters (for example, K. Ye. Voroshilov, or G. K. Zhukov, or S. K. Timoshenko). These individuals would handle specific items, while the situation did not permit Hq SHC to meet in its full membership. Later, when the situation changed, and when Hq SHC genuinely assumed command and control, although the enemy still held the initiative, Hq SHC functioned in a normal manner.

I disagree, for example, with General Shtemenko's assertion that Stavka was always in command of any given army or any given front. This of course is not quite true. In my opinion it is incorrect to apply this particularly to that first difficult autumn of 1941. I know for certain that Hq SHC was unable to command and control a number of operations at the fronts, for these operations were taking place at the enemy's initiative, and the only question at hand was how to bring the enemy to a halt and where he could best be halted. A large number of cities and towns were abandoned without the knowledge or consent of Stavka, and armies were retreating without orders or instructions from Stavka to that effect. This was the difficult period of so-called strategic defense, when our forces were hanging onto every scrap of ground for dear life and endeavoring to inflict as much damage as possible on the adversary, to wear him down, in order

subsequently to seize the initiative from the enemy. As you know, this went on through the entire fall of 1941. The events of the summer of 1942 were also different from the way Hq SHC had foreseen them. Hq SHC had not anticipated such an enemy offensive in the south. If it had anticipated and had more correctly estimated the situation and the enemy's forces, obviously it would have focused more on defensive measures, and possibly we would not have had to retreat so far. But the fact remains that following the German defeat at Moscow, they proceeded to gather their forces and decided to launch a second offensive in the south, which to a certain degree they succeeded in accomplishing. They captured Sevastopol, they seized the Kerch Peninsula, subsequently advanced into the Caucasus and, as you know, reached Stalingrad. It was here that the process took place which laid the groundwork for this decisive turning point in the war. And I remember, as the stubborn fighting for Stalingrad was in progress, at the same time Hq SHC was assembling enormous forces, which our country was now capable of accomplishing, in order to surround Paulus's army and destroy it.

I would also like to comment that at such difficult moments Stalin's amazing firmness, tenacity, and sometimes perhaps even obstinacy, played a positive role. A. M. Vasilevskiy once related to me how, during the critical days of fighting at Moscow, when elements were being formed to counterattack the enemy (and some were of the opinion that the enemy was about to enter Moscow), we (that is, General Staff personnel) turned to Stalin and requested several divisions from the reserve to fight off enemy attacks. Stalin would not release any forces and maintained this position right up to the end, until he himself made the same decision after the Red Army proceeded to launch a counteroffensive. And I recall when, at the beginning of December, P. F. Zhigarev, commanding general of the Air Forces, literally ran into my office on Skakovaya and shouted that the enemy was in flight. Something similar occurred during the fighting at Stalingrad. Stalingrad seemed to be holding by a thread. Nevertheless Hq SHC (in particular, Stalin's will was a contributing factor) was assembling enormous forces to launch an offensive. And, as you know, it was successfully launched, Paulus's army was routed, and that turning point occurred, which was culminated by the Battle of Kursk, that famed battle on the Kursk Salient.

The character of Hq Stavka activities also changed decisively after this. The initiative shifted totally into the hands of the Soviet Supreme High Command, and Stavka was now controlling operations at the fronts.

To what degree did Stalin personally direct this entire war effort? In my opinion he was knowledgeable as regards land operations, had a grasp of the salient points, conferred a great deal with the military commanders, and always dispatched such representatives as Zhukov and Vasilevskiy to coordinate operations at the fronts.... I maintain that all conceptual ideas pertaining to operations originated with and were hammered out at Hq SHC. Rokossovskiy has written about this, Zhukov acknowledges it, and I heard right from Stalin's lips on one occasion when he had to relate in detail how the conceptual ideas for a given large-scale offensive arose, that they always originated at Hq SHC, after which the commanding generals would be summoned, and such military leaders as Zhukov and Vasilevskiy would be summoned. At first this would be done in the strictest secrecy from wider circles, after which everyone would again gather at Hq SHC, Stavka would make the decision, and after this a given conceptual idea would be implemented. And as you know, toward the end of the war Stalin personally assumed direction and coordination of the fronts. This was done when Zhukov was placed in command of the First Belorussian Front, when Vasilevskiy also was placed in command of a front, and the principal offensive drives on Berlin were being coordinated out of Hq SHC and, I shall add, not only by Stavka but by Stalin personally as well. It is therefore for good reason that the memoirs of all the marshals which are now available to the reading public in this country contain statements on how they were summoned to Hq SHC, what information was required of them, how Stalin questioned them, and what assignments they were given, that is, Stavka experienced a period of development, that very difficult fall of 1941, subsequently took command and control of the fronts and armies firmly into its own hands, seized the initiative from the enemy, and carried out a large-scale offensive which reached its culmination point at Berlin....

As regards Stalin's competence in naval affairs, I must state the following. Stalin always received a thorough briefing on planning decisions and made decisions pertaining to the navy, but unfortunately he began addressing important naval matters with some delay. It was not until shortly before the war, in 1938, that the matter of building a large navy was addressed. And it was only then that Stalin began paying close attention to naval problems. But this ambitious shipbuilding program was unable to be carried out; it had to be revised, with primary attention focused on purely land-forces issues. In addition, back during the Civil War years Stalin was more involved with matters pertaining to land forces, and this was true after the Civil War as well. He did not possess very detailed knowledge of naval matters.

Examination of Western Anti-Armor Mine Warfare Systems

18010222 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Oct 88 First Edition p 3

[Article by Candidate of Military Sciences Lt Col A. Nizhalovskiy and Candidate of Military Sciences Lt Col A. Bovda under the rubric "Military Technical Survey": "Mine Warfare—A New Look at an 'Ancient' Weapon—Against Infantry, Tanks and... Aircraft—The 'Percussion Core' Principle"]

[Text] The word "mine" has long ceased to be associated with its initial sense. The contemporary arsenal of explosive mines used in the NATO armies are most diverse in design and purpose, executed using ultramodern technology for smart devices able to operate using all sorts of actuation signals: direct contact and vibration, infrared emissions and changes in electromagnetic waves...

The concept of the so-called "ground mine warfare," which envisages the mass application of mines unlimited in scope, place, time and type of combat operations, has been developed and officially consolidated in the new regulations and manuals of the armies of the United States and NATO, the foreign press notes. In the view of Pentagon experts, the realization of this concept will facilitate the achievement of the goals of air-land operations or battles via the widespread application of explosive-mine obstacles to undermine the maneuvers of enemy troops, fight against second echelons and reserves, disorganize the operations of the rear and command posts, and mine airfields, water crossings, passes, defiles and the like.

The foreign military press especially emphasizes the role that the strategists across the ocean earmark for remote mining systems (RMS). These qualitatively new armaments, foreign specialists note, make it possible to look anew at the very significance of explosive-mine obstacles. The possibility has appeared of planting mines immediately during the course of battle at considerable distances from the front line, in the rear of enemy territory.

One of the features of the journal DEFENCE says that remote mining equipment was used on a mass scale for the first time during the American aggression in Vietnam. The mines were primarily scattered from helicopters and aircraft then. These were first-generation mines: Gravel and Dragon-Tooth anti-personnel landmines and BLU-45/B antitank mines.

The armies of the NATO countries are currently equipped with airborne (aircraft and helicopter), missile-artillery and remote-mining landmine systems. What is an RMS comprised of? First and foremost, a means of delivery, which include, aside from aircraft and helicopters, salvo-fire reactive systems and 155-mm howitzers.

The second constituent element is the clusters or shells filled with antitank, anti-personnel or anti-transport mines. They are employed, as a rule, in combination to create combined fields.

The sizes of such obstacles, according to data in the foreign press, can vary depending on the aims and conditions of mining. It is possible, for example, to mine a 1,200 x 200 meters stretch of terrain using GATOR-type aircraft systems (United States), or up to 3,500 x 500 meters using the West German MW-1 Strobo system. One salvo of an MLRS launching installation can lay a minefield of 600 x 600 meters at a distance of up to 35 km [kilometers], while several salvos from a 155-mm howitzer battery can lay a 400 x 400 meter field at distances of up to 24 km.

The time has come, as the foreign press emphasizes, for second-generation mines. The shaped-charge effect—the so-called percussion-core principle—has been further developed in particular in the design of antitank mines. The percussion core itself is the projectile, formed from the lining of the shaped hollow-charge recess, made of copper or especially viscous steel, in the mine explosion. The shaped-charge recess is a cone with a large angle or segment of a large radius and small rise. The percussion core can develop high initial flight velocity (up to several thousand meters a second) and have an effective range on the order of 0.5-0.8 meters for vertical-penetration mines and up to 50 meters and more for horizontal-effect mines depending on the specific design features of the munitions, the type of explosive substance employed and the lining material.

The use of the percussion-core principle makes it possible to decrease the size and mass of mines by several times compared to traditional ones with a simultaneous increase in combat effectiveness. By way of example, nine M70 antitank mines, laid at a distance of up to 24 km, fit into one 155-mm artillery shell. The mine is equipped with a non-contact detonator with a magnetic target sensor that is activated under the hull floor of the tank or APC. The percussion core penetrates armor up to 40-50 mm thick upon explosion and knocks out the tank along with its crew.

Anti-personnel fragmentation mines, intended for emplacement in mixed minefields, have sizes and shapes similar to antitank mines. This simplifies the technology for mine production, since a whole series of assemblies and parts can be simplified and the placement of the mines in one and the same cluster installations can be ensured, while on the other hand, it makes enemy actions in finding and destroying the mines more difficult. The anti-personnel and antitank mines, however, naturally differ in design terms, both in the detonator and the projectile. Anti-personnel mines shoot out several nylon threads when falling to the ground that serve as target sensors. Upon activation of these sensors, the

mine explodes and hits personnel with fragments within a radius of 6-12 meters or more. Both anti-personnel and antitank mines are equipped with anti-lift and self-destruct elements.

The foreign press also reports the development of special remote-emplacement anti-transport mines in the FRG that are employed for mining airfields. According to the journal WEHRTECHNIK, some 500 million DM have been spent on the program.

One new direction in the development of explosive-mining equipment is the development of mines that hit low-flying airborne targets, first and foremost helicopters. Such mines, notes the journal ARMEE, are simple in design—a conventional explosive-charge substance and a detonator. All of this is lifted into the air with the aid of a balloon—a synthetic soft covering filled with helium. The sensors for triggering the mine can be of different types. The simplest of these is an anchor cable, with the aid of which the altitude of the mine installation is regulated.

The foreign press notes that the development of a new, third-generation mine is underway in recent years in the NATO countries with a regard for the achievements of microprocessor technology and robotized systems. The third-generation mines, writes the journal SOLDAT UND TECHNIK, will not just be a passive means of setting up obstacles in defense, but will also be widely employed in offensive operations as well. They will have the possibility of detecting, identifying and selectively striking armored and other targets from the side or from above. The non-contact detonators installed on the mines will be able to react to the signature of a moving object (seismic, sound waves, magnetic and thermal fields and the like) with the aid of several sensors. Mine actuation can occur therein with the identification of a target according to several traits.

And all of these ideas exist not only in drawings and computer models, they are concretely embodied "in metal." The specialists of the American firm of AVCO are developing and testing BLU-101/B "thinking" antitank mines. Upon the approach of a tank—it is recognized by the mine from among other similar objects—it launches a projectile with a self-homing infrared head inclined upwards at a distance of about 50 meters. That locks onto the target. As a result of the explosion, occurring at a height of 13-15 meters, a percussion core is formed that strikes the tank or APC from above. If the target continues to advance, the mine fires a second projectile.

The firm of RTG (West Germany) is developing the LASSO remotely emplaced self-orienting horizontal-effect mine, able to penetrate the side armor of a modern tank at distances of up to 50 meters. The possibility of creating mines that would "crawl under" the target and hit it with a shaped-charge warhead is being considered.

In order to emplace third-generation mines, the journal WEHRTECHNIK reports, the use of such delivery methods as, for example, remote-controlled airborne clusters (gliding freely or having their own engines) are being envisaged for use in the future along with traditional means of delivery. This would, in the opinion of specialists, impart a new quality to remote-mining systems, since it makes it possible to emplace obstacles from aircraft tens of kilometers deep in enemy territory without entering the antiaircraft fire zone.

There is no drawback to the ideas in general. Their realization is willingly being subsidized. The concept of "mine warfare" is already strongly enticing Western tacticians and strategists. They are doing all they can to supplement the NATO arsenal with new and even more refined and insidious means of waging combat operations.

Military-Technical Review of U.S. Air-Launched 3-Stage Missile, AAAM

*18010261a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
11 Nov 88 First Edition p 3*

[Article by V. Belyayev: "Military-Technical Review—A Launch Vehicle and an Anti-Missile Missile"]

[Text] The American companies Orbital Science and Hercules Aerospace are developing the Pegasus three-stage solid-fuel launch vehicle that is launched from a heavy aircraft, specifically the Boeing B-52 Bomber. As noted in the weekly journal FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL, research into the development of this new missile began in April 1987 and strict secrecy was maintained until just recently.

Foreign reviewers note that the Pegasus missile is considered the latest concept in many respects and is therefore attracting increased Pentagon interest. According to expert evaluations, its design was developed initially by testing models in wind tunnels and was possible only with the help of computer hydrodynamics using a Cray super-computer.

The Pegasus missile is completely manufactured from composite carbon materials, is 15 meters in length, has a launch weight of approximately 18.4 tons and has a triangular wing with a 6.7 meter span. The first stage has a solid-fuel rocket engine with 59 tons of thrust through a fixed nozzle. The other stages also have rocket engines (having 14 and four tons of thrust respectively and rotating nozzles).

The payload section is 1.8 meters long and approximately 1.2 meters wide. The missile has an inertial guidance system with 14 microprocessors and also laser gyroscopes. According to foreign press, the missile can be launched into a polar orbit with a 270-kilogram payload and into an equatorial orbit with a 410-kilogram payload.

The first Pegasus launch is planned for July-August 1989. It is hypothesized that this launch will be used to put a small Defense Department communications satellite into orbit. It is being leaked that there will not be any preliminary test launches.

The initial launches will supposedly be from a Boeing B-52 aircraft that was once used to launch the experimental X-15 supersonic airplane.

The launch sequence will be as follows. The missile will be suspended under the airplane and carried to an altitude of 12 kilometers. When the airplane reaches an airspeed of $M=0.8$ the missile will be released. The first stage separates at an altitude of 63 kilometers, approximately 81 seconds later. The second stage stops its thrust at an altitude of 170 kilometers and the ballistic leg of the flight begins. When the missile reaches an altitude of 460 kilometers and a speed of approximately five kilometers/second the third stage rocket motor ignites, allowing it to achieve orbital velocity.

FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL stresses that Pegasus is the first launch vehicle developed in the US in the last 20 years. Experts feel that its employment will allow an almost 50-percent reduction in the cost of using conventional launch vehicles to put payloads into orbit. Pegasus does not require complicated launch complexes. Launch preparations are carried out by a total of 10-12 men. It is felt that this missile will provide the impetus for the creation of a new generation of satellites and also launch aircraft.

The U.S. Department of the Navy has issued the order for preliminary research into an improved guided air-to-air missile (AAAM) that is 3.6 meters long, 0.4 meters in diameter and weighs 172 kilograms. It is designed to combat aircraft that launch cruise missiles and also cruise missiles themselves. It is hypothesized that in the late 90's these AAAM will replace the Hughes Phoenix missiles that are currently in the inventory. It is thought that the new missile will be used both on existing F-14 and F-18 carrier aircraft and on the future F-19 that is being developed in the ATA program. The possibility of using AAAM on the F-15C/D and ATF has not been ruled out.

According to the journal AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, the AAAM missile (research on which is being done by General Dynamics-Westinghouse and Hughes-Raytheon) must have supersonic speed ($M=3$) and a range of 160.

Foreign reviewers are paying attention to the fact that two different variations of the missile are being developed. General Dynamics and Westinghouse are conducting research on a two-stage missile. Its first stage is a solid-fuel launch accelerator. The second is equipped with a motor which can ignite several times on the sustainer leg. It is thought that this will provide fuel economy and increase range. It is also felt that the

missile will be equipped with a semi-active guidance system.

Hughes and Raytheon are studying an AAAM variation with a constant flow jet motor and automatic guidance system. Its flight speed will correspond to $M=3$ and it will have a range of 190 kilometers. It will be somewhat larger than the initial version.

Both ventures have received 42 million dollars each to develop AAAM missiles. This covers only the work on the initial phase covering 24-30 months. During that time both groups will determine the amount of work and conduct their project's initial research. A year after the initial phase is completed they must begin the second phase which is to last almost three years. During that time they are to build test missiles for comparative testing and the final version will be selected from their results.

Examination of British Reserve-Volunteer System
18010284 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Dec 88 First Edition p 3

[Article by S. Leonidov: "The British Army: Reserve-Volunteers"]

[Text] People have recently been talking about training reserves in NATO countries as if it were the paramount mission. They link this to one of the areas for eliminating the supposed fact that they are lagging behind Warsaw Treaty forces in mobilization capabilities. This is an area where the alliance's leadership sees a sort of counterbalance for the reduced birthrate and the corresponding heightened problem of a shortage of recruits.

The reservist problem is being resolved in a very characteristic manner in Great Britain. This country's territory is essentially a base for filling out units and rapidly deploying reinforcements. They have established a far-flung system for training their reserves which number approximately 280,000 men in the various reserve categories. And here is something that is remarkable. In addition to a significantly large contingent of reservists who have undergone active duty and are in the reserves ready to be called up in the event of mobilization (as in other NATO countries), England has a so-called corps of reserve-volunteers or voluntary reservists, a corps that is considered the most effective organization from a cost-effective point of view.

What is this corps of reservist-volunteers? The journal ARMED FORCES, the publishing agency for the country's Armed Forces, characterizes the representatives of this almost 90,000-man contingent in this way: "Reservist-volunteers are men and women from 18 to 45 years of age with practically no military experience who, as a rule, have never served in the regular forces, but for one reason or another, wanted to link their fate with the Army." One of the uniquenesses of their service is that they combine their primary work in enterprises and

offices and on farms with the systematic passage of military training.

Reservist-volunteers initially sign a contract for three years with a subsequent extension for a longer period of time. After signing a contract, a volunteer becomes involved in the military training process which is held in unit training centers on the volunteers' free days and also includes annual camp assemblies and participation in active force training. The time a volunteer spends in the training centers or in service is different for the various categories of reservists and depends on the branch of the Armed Forces and also on the level of individual training. This period may be 100 days a year and sometimes more. Reservist-volunteers receive the same monetary allowance for assemblies, duty and training as servicemen in the active force who are in similar jobs and have the same military rank. Moreover, they have the right to additional compensation depending on their training year results.

The overwhelming majority of the personnel in the voluntary reserve (approximately 80,000) are assigned to ground forces and make up the so-called British Territorial Army that includes 19 independent regiments, 40 mechanized infantry battalions and rear area support organizations. In peace-time these organizations on the average consist of 20 cadre military personnel—commissioned and warrant officers—who are responsible for training the reservists. More than 75 percent of the Territorial Army units are designated to reinforce British forces that are included in the combined NATO Armed Forces and are deployed in the FRG as part of the 1st Army Corps. The rest have the mission of "defending the British Isles against invasion by aggressor forces."

The British Air Force Voluntary Reserve has a relatively small number of people—on the order of 1500 men. It basically consists of training squadrons set up at all the major universities. Each such squadron has four or five Bulldog airplanes. In addition, Great Britain has the so-called Cadet Aviation Corps which includes 13 independent aviation training groups and 28 glider pilot schools. Royal Air Force Auxiliaries were formed recently. These are also manned to a great extent by volunteers and are primarily involved in aircraft technical support and Air Force site security.

The British Naval Voluntary Reserve consists of approximately six thousand people. Its mission is to fill out existing crews and form additional ones for mine sweepers which, in the event the situation worsens, will transfer from the reserve to the active forces. They may also serve on trawlers that have been requisitioned from the civilian fleet and rearmed. In addition, the Volunteer Navy is used for staff and administrative work in major British naval bases such as Rosite, Plymouth and Northwood.

The marines also have a volunteer reserve. It consists of 1200 men who have undergone special training in commando courses.

Finally there are female reservist-volunteers. They are primarily used as medical personnel and also to substitute for servicemen in staff and administrative positions. These female reservist-volunteers thus free personnel from the Active Armed Forces so that the latter can carry out missions requiring greater physical ability.

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